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

POLITICS IN THE KREMLIN

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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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Politics in the Kremlin

By Sidney I. Ploss

The five years that have elapsed since Khrushchev's fall from power have seen the new Soviet leadership not merely slow down Russia's movement away from Stalinist iron rule but even, in some respects, reassert the dictatorial and militaristic traditions of Stalinism. Unlike Khrushchev, the majority of the present leaders have shown themselves disposed toward orthodox policies calculated to consolidate bureaucratic authority and to enhance the state's military power. They have been far less willing than Khrushchev to encourage academic theorists in devising sweeping changes in the management of the overly centralized planned economy. And the intellectuals have been obliged to desist from exposing the Stalinist system as the historical source of the moral corruption of the nation's political life.

Yet Khrushchev's downfall did not end the post-Stalin tension between reformist and conservative elements in the Kremlin. There is considerable evidence that the issues debated in the succession struggle of 1953–1957 have reappeared in all their divisiveness. These issues apparently include choices between guns and butter in budgetary allocations and the related question of the proper Soviet posture in the costly nuclear arms race; the problem of how to gear the economic administration for greater efficiency; the historical evaluation of Stalin; and relationships between party organizers and the specialists of the state bureaucracy in the management of public affairs. In the climate of internal rivalry and intrigue in which Soviet leaders have always moved, these policy disputes have been associated with the power interests of various leadership factions.

The discussion that follows will first focus on how the present leadership under General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Aleksei Kosygin has reversed or modified Khrushchev's policies in several key areas. This will be followed by an examination of the major issues on which there has been evidence of recurrent conflict among the different power groupings within the leadership. And finally some tentative conclusions will be offered as to the possible outcome of these conflicts and the implications it might have for future political evolution in the Soviet Union and the Soviet posture in world affairs.

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Reversal of Party Reforms

Symptomatic of the return to orthodox policies and traditional roles for vested interests in the state and party bureaucracies was the prompt reversal of Khrushchev's party reforms once the First Secretary had been removed from power. This was a notable triumph for the full-time party workers who had come of age politically before World War II and did not share the widespread postwar hopes of a possible relaxation of the dictatorship. These technically unskilled stalwarts, fearing the rise of young technical and managerial cadres within the party, emphasized general supervision and thought control in party activity.

Khrushchev had hoped to revitalize the party apparatus in order to make it a fit instrument with which to smash the barriers of bureaucratic opposition to his quick panaceas for the Soviet economy. To this end, he had proposed the division of the party apparatus into industrial and agricultural components to be charged with exercising practical economic leadership, and this reform had been decreed by a plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee on November 23, 1962.[1] A direct consequence of the change was the career advancement of young, forward-looking party men. Whereas there were only two second secretaries of regional party committees in the Russian Republic under 40 years of age before the reform, soon after the reform there were no less than 14 second secretaries of industrial regional party committees and 20 second secretaries of agricultural regional party committees who were less than 40 years old.[2]

Khrushchev's action led the older political cadres to complain of the party's "depoliticization," while on the other hand state managers bemoaned the reform as a "reversal for the technocrats" which subjugated the government bureaucracy to party officials.[3] The former group drew support from party secretaries Brezhnev and Mikhail Suslov; the latter from Kosygin and other high state officials. At the June 1963 Central Committee plenum, Khrushchev and his supporters had to counter outspoken criticisms emanating from the disgruntled groups. Their criticisms were directed at mounting crime, poor labor discipline and local nationalism—all matters which were normally the responsibility of the party apparatus—and thus constituted an implicit attack on the validity of the party reform.[4]

It was these disparate elements who joined forces in October 1964 to oust Khrushchev. Drawn together by a common desire to restore the division of labor between party and state which had been an essential feature of bureaucratic life under Lenin and Stalin, they were determined to make one more stab at reconciling the ideal of total control of social processes with the pragmatic requirements of operating a modern industrial state. Khrushchev's involvement of the party in practical affairs was denounced as "commercialism" and "pure empiricism," and party spokesmen called for greater attention to party political training and indoctrination of the public.[5] In mid-November 1964, one month after Khrushchev's dismissal, his party reform was swept away by the Central Committee after hearing a secret report by Nikolai Podgorny. Khrushchev's revamping of the party apparatus was condemned in the party press on the ground that it had caused "confusion of the functions, rights and duties of party, soviet and managerial agencies" and had "pushed party committees into taking the place of the managerial agencies."[6]

Rehabilitation of Stalin

Also indicative of the new leadership's inclination toward more orthodox policies was its gradual movement away from destalinization, which had been the cornerstone of Khrushchev's domestic program. In part, the former First Secretary's moves to discredit Stalin—the symbol of mass discipline and administrative control from above—had been designed to promote a measure of self-assertiveness among the educated class and to instill a greater sense of responsibility in the half-million or so leading officials. However, the zigzag fashion in which this effort had been pursued reflected both Khrushchev's own concern lest things get out of hand and the misgivings of others in the

[1] N.S. Khrushchev, *Stroitelstvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitie selskovo khoziaistva*, Moscow, 1963, Vol. VII, pp. 163–77, and *Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1963.
[2] M. Polekhin, *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 1, 1964, p. 26.
[3] V. Stepanov, *Izvestia*, Dec. 19, 1962.
[4] *Plenum TsK KPSS, 18–21 iiunia 1963 goda, stenograficheskii otchet*, Moscow, 1964, pp. 74, 78, 86, and 139.
[5] *Pravda*, Oct. 25 and 29, Nov. 1 and 5, and Dec. 2, 1964; *Pravda Ukrainy*, Nov. 13, 1964; and *Izvestia*, Nov. 19, 1964.
[6] *Pravda*, Nov. 17 and 18, Dec. 6 and 23, 1964, and *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 24, 1964, p. 6.

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top leadership who had a stake in the Stalinist political system.

Nevertheless, by 1964, Stalin had come to be treated in Soviet media as an arch-criminal and bungler who had brought the nation to the verge of disaster.[7] The once-dreaded secret police were being held in check, and former inmates of Stalin's prison camps were encouraged to throw light on past infamies.[8] Public attacks on Stalinist habits had indeed progressed so far that party officials were beginning to complain of a tendency on the part of ordinary citizens to be "insolent and insubordinate toward their leaders." [9]

The men who wrested power from Khrushchev soon showed that they were anxious to halt the erosion of discipline resulting from his destalinization policies. The first clear indication of this was an unsigned *Pravda* article of April 29, 1965, which deplored "onesidedness" in the treatment of historical events and personalities. Although the new leaders did not go so far as to excuse Stalin's long reign of terror for fear that this would revive mass anxieties and possibly even lead to outbreaks of public disorder, they did call for a halt to emotional criticism of the late dictator.

While intensifying repressive measures against dissident writers and intellectuals, the new leadership took another step to dissociate itself from Khrushchev's destalinization policies with a *Pravda* editorial of January 30, 1966, which denounced Khrushchev's pejorative term "period of the cult of personality" on the ground that it demeaned "the heroic efforts of party and people in the struggle for socialism." Although Brezhnev himself failed to make any pronouncement on the Stalin issue at the subsequent 23rd Party Congress, which opened in March 1966, other speakers did praise the late dictator, and the Congress underlined continuity with the Stalin period by decreeing that the party Presidium should again be named the Politburo and that Stalin's title of party General Secretary should be resurrected.[10]

The regime has since shown itself to be intent upon a limited rehabilitation of Stalin while retaining for itself a clear monopoly of the right to criticize various aspects of Stalinism. Thus, the Theses for the 50th Anniversary of the 1917 Revolution repudiated Stalin's domination of the Politburo and the blood purges;[11] yet, on the other hand, Professor Aleksandr M. Nekrich was expelled from the CPSU for assailing Stalin's conduct of diplomatic and military affairs in the Second World War.[12] Again, a *Pravda* article on the occasion of Stalin's 90th birth anniversary in December 1969 called the former leader a "great theoretician"—the highest tribute a Communist can receive—but also noted "theoretical and political errors that became serious in nature during the latter period of his life." [13]

7 See, e.g., "Kult lichnosti Stalina," in A.M. Samsonov *et al.*, *Kratkaia istoriia SSSR v dvukh chastiakh*, 2nd part, Moscow-Leningrad, 1964, pp. 268-71.

8 See, *e.g.*, the book reviews in *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, Aug. 15, 1964, and *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Sept. 15, 1964.

9 A. Yepishev, in *Plenum TsK KPSS*, *op. cit.*, pp. 190–91.

10 *XXIII Sezd KPSS, 29 marta-8 aprelia 1966 goda, stenograficheskii otchet*, Moscow, 1966. Vol. I: pp. 126-28, 186, 422, 551. Vol. II: pp. 319-20.

11 *Pravda*, June 25, 1967.

12 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 8, 1967.

13 *Pravda*, Dec. 21, 1969.

HISTORY IN FLUX

Two Views of Stalin

1962

The murder of S. M. Kirov [on December 1, 1943] had a distressing impact on the life of party and state. Stalin used the murder as a pretext for organizing the punishment of all people who were inconvenient to him. A great number of arrests followed. It was the beginning of massive repressions and most flagrant violations of socialist legality.

***—Istoriia kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskovo soiuza* (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 2nd supplemented edition, Moscow, 1962 p. 486.**

1969

The murder of S. M. Kirov alarmed the party and the Soviet people. It served as another reminder of the need to enhance revolutionary vigilance. The party had to be protected from alien elements so as to forestall actions hostile to socialism and the interests of the Soviet state, no matter how they were camouflaged.

***—Istoriia kommunisticheskoe partii sovetskovo soiuza* (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), 3rd supplemented edition, Moscow, 1969, pp. 437–38.**

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The members of the Central Committee Secretariat have been in the vanguard of the movement to revive latent pro-Stalin feelings in the ranks of officialdom. Brezhnev himself has freely used such Stalinist epithets as "two-faced people" and has consistently stood for the enforcement of Stalinist-type ideological orthodoxy and discipline both at home and in intra-bloc relations.[14] Piotr E. Shelest, Ukrainian party boss and a member of the CPSU Politburo, has also backed the use of Stalinist methods with hardline speeches and dogmatic press campaigns. Army generals, visibly distressed by the spread of pacifist sentiment among younger citizens, have tended as a group to favor a revival of Stalinist discipline, and judging from promotions of former or present security operatives and the popularization of counterespionage activities, police officials have likewise been active in engineering the retreat from destalinization.

Economic Recentralization

There has also been a clear-cut reversal of policy in the realm of economic administration. Whereas Khrushchev sought to remedy declining gains in industrial and agricultural output and productivity by promoting decentralization of economic planning and management, the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership has in general brought economic reform back into a framework of bureaucratic centralism, notwithstanding some devolution of operational authority to managers of farms and industrial enterprises.

Khrushchev, it will be recalled, proposed in 1962 that the USSR State Planning Committee merely "dovetail" the economic plans of the union republics—an obvious departure from the traditional dictation of such plans from the center.[15] Similarly, he gave his blessing to industrial reform at the July 1964 Supreme Soviet meeting and subsequently put forward concrete proposals for granting wide decision-making powers to factory directors.[16] In agriculture, just prior to his ouster, he was contemplating a scheme for the assignment of kolkhoz land and machinery for long periods of time to small teams or "links" instead of the existing system of managing production through the larger field brigades. The goal was to inspire the collective farmers to identify more closely with the land and to develop a greater interest in its productivity, on which their income would be based.[17] He also inspired a proposal that centralized procurement of certain foodstuffs be reduced in order to permit farms to market part of their crop commercially in the towns.[18]

In contrast to Khrushchev's decentralization moves, his successors lost little time in moving to restrengthen central direction of the economy. The rebuilding of the state control hierarchy began with a party-state decree of March 1, 1965, restoring to the USSR Ministry of Agriculture its time-honored function of planning the production and sale of farm products. A decree of March 2 transformed into ministries several state committees concerned with defense technology and production. Moreover, the restored central bureaucracy continued to draw power away from republic agencies. By 1967, there were 25 all-union and 27 union-republic ministries in Moscow, with only 8 republic ministries in the Russian Republic which answered to no central body.[19] (At the moment of Stalin's death there had been 30 all-union and 22 union-republic ministries.)

Premier Kosygin spoke like a judicious centralist when he told the USSR State Planning Committee on March 19, 1965, that while republic-level planning under the Khrushchev scheme had accomplished a great deal, "this work was not always in harmony with general state interest, especially when localist tendencies were strongly shown in the plans." This localism was explicitly blamed on Khrushchev's idea of merely "dovetailing" the republic plans at the center.[20]

The reform in economic management announced by Kosygin in the autumn of 1965 did, it is true, promise enterprise managers fewer plan-

[14] On Brezhnev's hardline attitude towards the Czechoslovak reform Communists in 1968, see the interview of V. Bilak in *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 19, 1969, pp. 66–72, and G. Husak's report to the CPCS-CC, as published in *Pravda*, Sept. 30, 1969.

[15] *Pravda*, Nov. 20, 1962. This view, foreshadowed in the 1961 Party Program, was the basis of a party-state decree of January 11, 1963.

[16] See articles by V. Trapeznikov and Ye. Liberman in *Pravda*, August 17, and Sept. 20, 1964, respectively.

[17] *Pravda*, Aug. 5, 1964.

[18] *Ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1964; M. Lemeshev, *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, Sept. 26, 1964; and A Goltsev, *Kommunist*, No. 14, *1964, pp. 56 ff.*

[19] P.T. Vasilenkov, *Organy sovetskovo gosudarstva i ikh sistema na sovremennom etape*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 228–29. The all-union type of ministry operates enterprises from a single agency in Moscow. The union-republic type has a USSR-level ministry in Moscow and like-named subordinate ministries in several or all of the 15 union republics.

[20] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, April 21, 1965.

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ning orders from Moscow and the opportunity to dispose of increased sums of working capital, while plan fulfillment would be based on sales and profits rather than on physical volume of output. However, the ability of enterprises to make effective use of these new rights was hindered by the center's retention of control over investment and price policy, as well as over the physical distribution of 886 categories of producer goods. Kosygin also rejected a proposal that enterprises be permitted to fix their own wage funds because this would impair the state's authority to regulate purchasing power and the output of consumer goods.[21] Moreover, the 1967 reform of wholesale prices gave little incentive to increase quality or improve production technology, still leaving managers without a reliable guide for production and investment decisions.

Khrushchev's recommendations for a basic reorganization of collective farm labor and greater flexibility in product marketing were still in the discussion stage when the change in leadership occurred, and they were left in abeyance for the time being. The new leadership confined itself to a series of stop-gap measures to halt deterioration of the national diet, including the easing of restrictions on private plots, the abolition of taxes on privately-owned livestock, the release of reserve fodder to feed such livestock, and increased purchase prices for milk (without raising retail prices).[22] At the March 1965 Central Committee meeting, Brezhnev further announced a doubling of state investments in agriculture during 1966–70 as compared with the total for the preceding five years, increases in crop delivery prices, and stable delivery quotas for several years.[23] (As will be seen, the investment program ran into serious difficulties not long after its adoption.) Collective farmers were also offered a guaranteed monthly wage based on state-farm rates to replace the old system of deferring payment until crop deliveries were made to the state.[24]

In any event, it is clear that Khrushchev's successors preferred to preserve the mechanism of central control rather than let economic development depend upon the responses of farm and enterprise managers to the desires of society at large. The economic cost of this reliance on power politics instead of on considerations of economic efficiency has been seen in gross waste, declining returns on capital investment, and a slowing annual growth rate—a modest 5.5 percent for 1966–69.

Shift in Priorities

Still another sphere in which the present Soviet leadership has veered sharply away from Khrushchev's policy intentions has been that of relative priorities in resource allocation as between defense and defense-related industry on the one hand, and the development of the light-industrial, consumer-goods sector of the economy on the other. Khrushchev's boast in *Izvestia* of September 20, 1964, that the Soviet Union possessed new and formidable weaponry was the last of many such avowals and carried the clear implication that Soviet military superiority made it possible to release investment funds from military projects to light-industrial development. Shortly thereafter, Khrushchev was reported (in *Pravda*, October 2) to have told a joint meeting of the CPSU Presidium and the Council of Ministers that, in drafting the 1966–70 economic plan, "it is essential to be guided by the fact that the main task . . . is the further improvement of the living standard of the people."

Speaking in Red Square only a few days after Khrushchev's dismissal, Brezhnev significantly modified the deposed leader's definition of the "main task":

> **The party considers that its main task in the area of internal policy is the *development of the productive forces* of our society and unswerving improvement *on this basis* of the prosperity of the Soviet people.[25] (Italics added)**

In other words, there would be no shift of priorities in favor of consumer industry.

Although the 1965 state budget, already prepared under Khrushchev, reduced declared defense outlays by 500 million rubles,[26] the new leadership's intention to reverse this trend in favor of a determined effort to overtake the United States in the arms race was signaled at the end of 1965 when the 1966 budget programmed a 600-million ruble increase in declared defense spending.[27] Ad-

21 *Pravda*, Sept. 28. 1965.
22 *Ibid.*, Nov. 6 and 7, 1964; and *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, Nov. 14, 1964.
23 *Plenum TsK KPSS, 24–26 marta 1965 goda, stenograficheskii otchet*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 9–12 and 21.
24 See party-state decree of May 16, 1966, in *Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika* (7th ed.), Moscow, 1967, pp. 124–26.
25 *Pravda*, Oct. 20, 1964.
26 *Ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1964.
27 *Ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1965.

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ditional increases followed: 1.1 billion rubles for 1967; 2.2 billion rubles for 1968; 1 billion rubles for 1969; and 200 million rubles for 1970.[28] Declared defense expenditures, however, are but a part of overall investments in defense. Total Soviet investments in defense, space and nuclear energy programs in 1969 have been estimated at around $60 billion, or more than 13 percent of gross national product, representing a larger proportion of GNP than was spent on defense and defense-related programs by the United States last year. Western experts have reckoned that the Soviet stockpile of intercontinental missiles jumped from around 224 in 1965 to over 1,000 by 1969, while heavy expenditures are also believed to have been incurred in hardening Soviet missile-launching sites.

The increase in defense spending under the present Soviet leadership is thought to have entailed an appreciable slowdown of investment in the civilian sector of the economy. Total industrial investments, in constant prices of 1955, grew by 27.4 percent in the period 1961–64, as compared with only a 19.2-percent increase in the period 1965–68. While it is not possible to separate out consumer-industry investments, the continued underfulfillment of housing construction plans provides one indication that investments in the consumer sector have lagged behind. It is also surmised that at least $8 billion earmarked for farming in 1966–70 was redirected into defense-related projects. This was undoubtedly a factor in the decline of the agricultural sector after a brief period of improvement, and even though the situation did not deteriorate to the point of creating a grave economic emergency, it appears to have caused a number of the top Soviet leaders to develop second thoughts about sacrificing domestic programs, particularly those affecting agriculture, for the sake of accelerated military development.

The concern of the leadership over the deterioration in agriculture was reflected in a party-state decree of May 23, 1968, which ordered a doubling of the construction rate of new chemical fertilizer plants in 1969 and 1970.[29] This move, in effect, revived Khrushchev's 1963 goal for fertilizer production and meant an annual increase of at least $1 billion in investment in the chemical industry. At a Central Committee meeting on October 30, 1968, Brezhnev himself took the lead in proposing even more ambitious plans for expanding the production of agricultural chemicals, and at the November 1969 All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers, he expressed himself in favor of increased government spending on agricultural irrigation and facilities for the production of farm machinery.[30]

Although Brezhnev would thus appear to have been among those who had second thoughts in 1968 about channeling an excessive share of national resources into defense at the expense of vital domestic programs, there is little doubt that at first he, along with his Politburo and Secretariat colleagues, Mikhail Suslov and Andrei Kirilenko, had led the political forces championing first priority for the buildup of Soviet military might. After the change in leadership, Khrushchev's idea that the Soviet Union was already strong enough to permit economies in defense investments was quickly repudiated in organs mirroring the views of the Secretariat,[31] and at the time the leap forward in nuclear armament began in 1965, Brezhnev, Suslov and Kirilenko were all speaking like devotees of military industrialization.[32] (Brezhnev, it may be noted, has personal ties with army leaders dating back to World War II, as attested to in some military memoirs.[33]) Kirilenko and Suslov continue to be staunch advocates of military claims on national resources, with the latter in particular frequently conjuring up the specter of global war.[34]

Collective Leadership Restored

Finally, there has been a clear-cut return on the part of the present leaders to the principle of collective leadership. While the extent and nature of Khrushchev's power will long be debated by Sovietologists, there is little question that an erosion of the collective principle occurred during the latter part of his tenure—that is, after 1958, when he combined in himself the posts of Premier and party First Secretary. With Khrushchev's overthrow, there was an immediate and deliberate re-

[28] *Ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1966, Oct. 11, 1967, Dec. 11, 1968, and Dec. 17, 1969.

[29] This decree is in *Resheniia partii i pravitelstva po khoziaistvennym voprosam*, Moscow, 1968, Vol 6, pp. 720–24.

[30] *Pravda*, Nov. 26, 1969.

[31] *E.g.*, *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 2, 1965, pp. 9–10.

[32] See *Pravda*, June 5, July 4 and 11, and Oct. 24, 1965; and *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 25, 1965.

[33] See, *e.g.*, S. M. Shtemenko, *Generalnyi shtab v gody voiny*, Moscow, 1968, p. 86.

[34] *Kommunist*, No. 15, 1969, p. 35.

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vival of the separation of these two offices so as to ensure a more balanced representation of the complex of interest groups in the party and state bureaucracies. Most observers agree that today no single person controls the decision-making machinery in the Kremlin.

The party professionals, concerned with political power, and the state administrators, concerned with technology, are about equally represented in the 11-man Politburo formed at the 23rd Party Congress. If the Politburo itself functions according to the directives handed down to guide lower party bodies, its decisions are based on the view of the majority after conflicting opinions have been expressed, or decisions are deferred when irreconcilable arguments arise. Careful analysis of many facts is supposed to replace Khrushchev's alleged habit of impulsively generalizing from random examples in the formulation of policy. These arrangements, in combination with the personal qualities of Khrushchev's successors, have often resulted in delay and fumbling on the part of the present leadership.

On the level of personal influence, the greatest political weight within the leadership appears to rest with Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Suslov and Kirilenko. The administration of party affairs and the monitoring of policy execution are the prime responsibility of party secretaries Brezhnev, Suslov and Kirilenko. Kosygin is the specialist in economic planning and management. Podgorny was dropped from the Secretariat in late 1965 and named to the Soviet presidency, where he soon began claiming a role for himself in the supervision of state economic agencies. These five men, all in their early or middle sixties, constitute the inner circle of the Politburo, and they enhanced their standing in 1967 by engineering the transfer of the dynamic and relatively youthful Aleksandr N. Shelepin (51) from the party Secretariat to the Trade Union Council. They and their elderly constituents in the power structure may be presumed to share a dread of any real change in the present hierarchical pattern of social organization.

Thus far, we have examined the major areas in which the acts, decisions, or pronouncements of the present Soviet leadership spelled a sharp deviation from the basically innovative policy initiatives of the Khrushchev regime. There is, however, abundant evidence to indicate that some of these as well as other persistently recurring policy issues have been the subject of renewed conflict between contending power and interest groups represented within the top leadership. Let us therefore look at the major issues which appear to have given rise to leadership dissension.

Investment Conflicts

First of all, questions involving priorities in the allocation of resources have apparently been the subject of high-level controversy on a number of occasions. One such dispute that came into the open in 1967 centered on the leadership's decision to cut back state investments in agriculture by 13 percent below the level targeted in the directives for the 1966–70 Five-Year Plan. Dmitri S. Polianski, the Politburo's agricultural specialist, had already warned publicly against such a cutback in a March 1967 statement in *Pravda* assailing "some people" who were "beginning to argue that collective and state farms can now develop even with less material aid," and that land reclamation work and deliveries of equipment and fertilizers to agriculture could be reduced.[35] The 13-percent cut was nevertheless decided upon, and Polianski promptly voiced his opposition in an extraordinary article in *Kommunist* arguing for an "uninterrupted increase" in state investments in agriculture.[36] Party and state leaders countered with a "letter" in *Pravda* (November 5, 1967) redefining the "main economic task" in terms that called for "unswerving growth of industry and agriculture" in place of the 1966 Five-Year Plan directives' primary emphasis on "high and stable rates of agricultural development."

The controversy over investment priorities intensified following a decision in late 1967 to commence work on the directives for the 1971–75 Five-Year Plan. Premier Kosygin and General Secretary Brezhnev took conflicting positions reminiscent of those taken, respectively, by Malenkov and Khrushchev in the immediate post-Stalin period. In a Kremlin address in December, Kosygin stressed the development of light and food industries and "satisfaction of the population's demand for a varied assortment of goods."[37] Again, at a Minsk party rally the following February, he called for closing the gap between the slow growth rate of light industry and the rapid expansion of heavy industry, in order to solve the problem of provid-

[35] *Pravda*, March 3, 1967.
[36] *Kommunist*, No. 15, 1967, p. 23.
[37] *Pravda*, Dec. 26, 1967.

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ing the population with an "uninterrupted and varied supply of foodstuffs, clothing and other consumer goods." [38] On the other hand, Brezhnev in the same month publicly urged "preserving the accelerated development of heavy industry as the basis of our industrial might" and called for a 22-million-ton increase in steel production over the next three years.[39] In another statement in March, he seemed to take aim at Kosygin's emphasis on increasing the supply of consumer goods as a stimulant to labor productivity when he declared that "it would be wrong to reduce everything to material incentives; this would impoverish the inner world of Soviet man." [40]

As a result of a combination of factors, including the need to ease inflationary pressures, the debate resulted in a compromise which leaned in favor of the advocates of consumer interests, as evidenced by the setting of slightly higher targeted growth rates for consumer goods output than for heavy industrial production in the 1968 and 1969 annual economic plans. The press, however, mirrored continuing behind-the-scenes conflict. The Defense Ministry organ *Krasnaia zvezda*, on December 31, 1968, pointedly extolled heavy industry as "the bedrock" (*osnovy osnov*) of socialist might. On the other hand, the government daily *Izvestia* (February 28, 1969) referred to the traditional emphasis on capital goods production as merely "one of the foundations of our economic policy" and denied that a speedup of light industrial growth would undermine future development. This view was promptly seconded in an article published in *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, the official organ of the State Planning Committee, which went so far as to suggest that it might be expedient to continue the higher development rates for light industry and food production in the 1971–75 Five-Year Plan.[41]

The place of defense industry proper in the Soviet scheme of priorities became the focal issue of controversy later in 1969, on the eve of the Kremlin's decision to enter preliminary strategic arms limitation talks with the United States. On August 30, *Sovetskaia Rossiia* published an article by Marshal Nikolai I. Krylov, commander of Soviet missile forces, warning against attempts by "imperialist ideologists" "to lull the vigilance of the world's peoples by resorting to propaganda tricks and saying that there will be no victors in a future nuclear war." Krylov's remarks strongly implied that an "imperialist" (*i.e.*, US) attack on the USSR could not be ruled out, and that, instead of being complacent about the supposed balance of armaments, the Soviet Union should proceed with an even greater strategic buildup. The Soviet missile chief's call was echoed soon afterward by Major General A. Lagovsky, a retired professor of military science, writing in *Krasnaia zvezda* (September 25). Attributing "the greatest importance" to the "struggle for military-technical superiority," the author recalled Lenin's statement that an army is "unwise or even criminal" if it "does not train itself to master all arms, all means and methods of warfare that the enemy possesses, or may possess. . . ." He went on to draw special attention to the words "may possess"—seemingly a reference to US development of multiple warhead missiles and new ABM defense systems.

But the tide seemed to be moving decisively against the army leaders' claims for a larger share of national resources. One indication that economic considerations played an important part in the Politburo's decision, announced in late October, to begin the preliminary SALT talks at Helsinki in November was provided in an internal propaganda booklet circulated about this time. Holding up the earlier nuclear test-ban treaty and the agreement to halt the spread of nuclear weapons as examples of fruitful cooperation between the superpowers, the booklet stressed the "importance of partial agreements and compromises" in solving the problem of disarmament and went on to state:

> **Experience has shown that only under conditions of a relaxation of tension is it possible to *concentrate a maximum of resources* on accomplishing the plans for the building of communism.[42] (Italics added)**

When the 1970 state budget was officially presented to the Supreme Soviet on December 16, following approval by the Central Committee, its contents did indeed suggest that the military lobby had failed to win majority support in the Politburo. Budgeted defense outlays were to increase by only 1.1 percent (200 million rubles) over 1969, as compared with a 6-percent increase in 1969, and a 15-percent increase in 1968. The targeted growth

[38] *Sovetskaia Belorussiia*, Feb. 15, 1968.
[39] Speech delivered in Leningrad, February 16, 1968, and broadcast over Soviet radio.
[40] *Pravda*, March 30, 1968.
[41] No. 3, 1969, p. 66.
[42] K. P. Ivanov, *Leninskie osnovy vneshnei politiki SSR*, Moscow, 1969, p. 50.

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rate for steel production was also set lower than in the preceding two years, while that for consumer goods output continued to slightly exceed that for heavy industrial production. Significantly enough, *Pravda's* lead article on the budget, published on December 21, failed for the first time since 1964 to stress the importance of strengthening Soviet military power.[43]

Economic Reforms

There have also been indications of recurring differences within the present leadership over the broad issue of reforms in economic management, both in agriculture and in industry. Generally speaking, the manner in which these differences were resolved suggests that the advocates of a conservative, centralist viewpoint prevailed.

The whole question of a restructuring of collective farm management was reopened in April 1969 with the publication of the proposed draft of a new Model Kolkhoz Charter, scheduled for submission to the Third All-Union Kolkhoz Congress the following November. For present purposes, it will suffice here to point to two specific issues on which there were strong evidences of leadership disagreement, with victory eventually going to the conservatives. Both issues involved proposals which had been put forward during Khrushchev's tenure but had not been promoted by his successors.

One was Khrushchev's idea of assigning land and machinery on the collective farms to small teams, or "links," for long periods of time, with remuneration to be based on unit productivity. The system was already being practiced on an experimental basis in parts of the USSR with good results, and the draft Charter posed the question of extending and formalizing it. In the course of the public debate, the proposal received strong support from Gennadi I. Voronov, Premier of the RSFSR and a member of the Politburo, in *Komsomolskaia pravda* (May 11, 1969), as well as from specialists writing in *Pravda* (August 26) and in letters published in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* (November 15–16). On the other hand, a *Pravda* discussion of agricultural issues on September 24 strongly suggested that conservative elements in the leadership opposed the "link" system on the ground that it would lead to the transformation of the kolkhozes into family-type farms. The upshot was that Brezhnev and Polianski avoided the issue at the Kolkhoz Congress in November, and the Model Charter as approved by the Congress provided for the allotment of land to "productive sub-units of the kolkhoz" without adding the phrase "for several years," which had been included in the draft.[44]

Another controversial issue raised in the debate was the idea of establishing a nationwide kolkhoz union with a measure of decision-making authority —a proposal which had been advanced under Khrushchev but had been shelved by the Central Committee in December 1959. The inclusion in the draft Kolkhoz Charter of a provision confirming the right of kolkhozes to form "associations and unions" revived the issue and called forth sharply divergent views. A letter published in *Pravda* (October 9, 1969) told of an association formed by nine kolkhozes in the Leningrad region to coordinate their activities and bargain with the state authorities over crop delivery quotas, and the letter went on to advocate that the association be allowed to function entirely free of Ministry of Agriculture control. The same paper (October 15) also publicized the view of a senior Central Asian party official who proposed that operational control of farm activities be transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to a kolkhoz union.

In November, however, these reformist views drew firm opposition from conservative spokesmen. Speaking at the Ukrainian Kolkhoz Congress, First Deputy Premier of the Ukraine Nikifor T. Kalchenko regretted the "absence of supervision" by the Ministry of Agriculture over self-help associations of collective farms and did not even mention the idea of a national kolkhoz union.[45] Similarly, in a statement published in *Pravda* (November 21), Estonian party chief Ivan G. Kebin argued against a national kolkhoz union on the ground that it would only swell the bureaucracy, and called for closer Ministry of Agriculture regulation of farm organizations.

Brezhnev eventually sided with the conservatives, presenting to the All-Union Kolkhoz Congress in late November a watered-down proposal for a network of collective-farm "councils" which would be staffed by kolkhoz chairmen and other agricultural specialists and would only be empow-

[43] *Cf. Pravda,* Dec. 11, 1965, Dec. 21, 1966, Oct. 14, 1967, and Dec. 15, 1968.

[44] For text of the Chapter, see *Pravda,* Nov. 30, 1969.

[45] *Pravda Ukrainy,* Nov. 13, 1969.

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ered to make recommendations to the government. The conservative victory was further underlined by the appointment of the incumbent USSR Minister of Agriculture, V. V. Matskevich, to the chairmanship of the newly-established All-Union Collective Farm Council.[46]

A recurrence of top-level disagreement likewise became apparent last year with respect to the future direction of industrial reforms. One clue was the highly unusual failure of the press, on two separate occasions in April and June, to publicize speeches delivered by Premier Kosygin at conferences of industrial workers.[47] These incidents—suggestive of a deliberate press embargo—took on added significance when they were followed by a spate of attacks in the press directed at economic theorists who favored breaking fresh ground in planning reforms. These conservative arguments appeared mainly in organs of the party Secretariat and State Planning Committee.

Writing in *Pravda* (September 26), the deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Economics, D. Allakhverdian, rebuked economists who urged greater stress on profit as the key indicator of enterprise performance, as well as those who would switch to the free sale of almost all types of producer goods, or who favored Yugoslav-type regulation by the center through monetary methods rather than by fixing physical output parameters. He saw in all this a particular threat to the "observance of assigned ratios"—*i.e.*, to continued preferential treatment of defense-related output. Behind Allakhverdian's criticism seemed to be the fear that increased professionalism in planning would tend to deprive the party apparatus of its role in implementing economic decisions.

In a similar vein, an article published in the November issue of the Gosplan organ *Planovoe khoziaistvo* censured Academician N. P. Fedorenko for espousing the formulation of plans in terms of prices calculated mathematically on the basis of relative scarcities—a proposal which, the author claimed, undermined state authority and introduced "drift" into plan fulfillment. Interestingly enough, the Soviet leaders only four and a half years before had honored four mathematical economists by awarding them Lenin Prizes.

A division of opinion over economic policy appears to have emerged anew at the December 1969 plenum of the Central Committee. Not only was General Secretary Brezhnev's speech at the December 15 session not made public (nor has it been since), but the communique issued at the close of the plenum conspicuously omitted the

[46] *Pravda*, Nov. 29, 1969.

[47] See the terse reports on the All-Union Conference of Workers of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy and the All-Union Conference of Workers of Light Industry, in *Pravda*, April 3 and June 25, 1969, respectively.

ON LEARNING FROM THE WEST

A. N. Kosygin

We cannot tolerate the fact that in our country many years pass from the start of scientific technical works until their usage in production . . . . In the capitalist countries, the monopolies are compelled to wage an acute struggle for profit, to respond quickly to the demands of the consumer, to manufacture modern types of products, and to find more sensible forms of organizing output and of management . . . . it would be nearsighted of us not to make use of the latest achievements of foreign science and technology . . . . We must use . . . every opportunity to purchase [foreign] licenses and improve our use of such licenses to speed up technical progress in our economy.

—*Sovetskaia Belorussiia* (Minsk), Feb. 15, 1968.

L. I. Brezhnev

In our country, too, of course, there are shortcomings in the development of some branches of science and in the work of a number of scientific research establishments. But the main thing is that many discoveries of scientists and new ideas in technology are slowly introduced into production. This really occurs. But, comrades, things among us sometimes stand as follows. Speaking of scientific-technical progress, certain officials clearly underrate the achievements of scientific-technical thought in our country and in the other lands of socialism. At the very same time these people overrate the achievements of science and technology in the capitalist world.

—*Pravda*, (Moscow), March 30, 1968.

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usual claim of unanimity in announcing the plenum's approval of Politburo policies.[48] It would indeed have been a novel phenomenon in Soviet history if the decline in Soviet industrial growth in recent years had not become a bone of contention in the Central Committee. The presumption that the contrary was in fact the case gained further substantiation when *Pravda* warned editorially (February 13, 1970) that criticism of economic deficiencies ought not to take the form of "demagogic fault-finding, squabbling, and squaring of private accounts."

Some fresh light was thrown on the proceedings of the December plenum in an article by G. Popov, Chief of the Control Problems Laboratory of Moscow State University, which appeared in *Pravda* on February 28, 1970. According to Popov, the plenum "emphasized that the party regards improvement of control primarily as a political problem" but noted at the same time "that attention must also be paid to both the technical and organizational aspects of control." Although a continued commitment to intensive economic development seems to be firmly embedded in official party policy, there was considerable emphasis on increasing work discipline and on trimming the bureaucracy through improved organization and automated controls.

The Stalin Issue

As pointed out in the first part of this article, the present Soviet leadership began soon after assuming power to move gradually but decisively away from Khrushchev's destalinization policies. Yet the Stalin issue is still far from settled. Indeed, just as this issue produced much strife in the 1953–57 period of collective leadership, with the forces of Khrushchev and Mikoyan pressing for an assault on the Stalin myth and those of Molotov and Kaganovich seeking to keep criticism of Stalin within narrow bounds, so today the question of refurbishing Stalin's image is a fundamental point of division between the more conservative and the more forward-looking elements in the leadership.

Brezhnev's failure to make any pronouncement on Stalin at the 23rd Party Congress was itself suggestive of the inability of the leadership group to reach a clear-cut agreement on this issue. Moreover, while some speakers at the Congress stressed the need to combat "negativism" toward Stalinist methods, Politburo member and chief of state Nikolai Podgorny instead stressed only the harmfulness of those methods [49]—a clear sign that he was among those opposed to a Stalin renaissance.

After the April 1968 Central Committee plenum, expressions of anti-Stalinism in the party became increasingly muffled, suggesting a further shift in the balance of forces within the leadership in favor of the conservatives. Nevertheless, the continued presence of strong anti-Stalinist elements was demonstrated by the appearance in early 1969 of a pamphlet written by Vladimir Bazovsky, party first secretary of the Novgorod region since 1961.[50] In criticizing "the excessive centralization that took root in the period of the cult of personality," Bazovski defied the party's ban on Khrushchev's favorite term of abuse for the era of extreme Stalinist dictatorship, and he also strongly upheld the principle of collective leadership.

The tug-of-war within the leadership over the Stalin issue has also been reflected in doctrinaire disputes among party historians. One such dispute began in August 1969 with the publication in the party's historical journal of an article dividing the postwar history of the CPSU into two basic periods: the period 1946–58, in which the party concentrated on the rehabilitation and development of the national economy and completion of the building of socialism; and the period since 1959, which has seen the "beginning of the transition from socialism to communism," with the party setting as its goal "the full-scale building of communism." [51] This periodization implied two things: first, that it was only under Khrushchev, and not Stalin, that the Soviet Union entered the all-important period of transition from socialism to full communism; and second, that there was, therefore, a clear discontinuity between Khrushchev's policies and those of the Stalinist period. Indeed, the author underlined this discontinuity by noting that the party congresses of the Khrushchev era had "decisively exposed the cult of personality of Stalin." This view, however, was directly challenged by another historian writing in the same journal a few months later. The author fixed 1939 rather than 1959 as the pivotal year in which the Soviet Union

[48] *Pravda*, Dec. 16, 1969.

[49] *XXIII Sezd KPSS*, Vol. I, 242.

[50] V. N. Bazovski, *Leninskie printsipy vnutripartiinoi demokratii v deistvii*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 9, 21–22 and 43.

[51] A. F. Kostin, *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 9, 1969, p. 66.

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had entered the stage of "completing the building of a socialist society" and beginning the "gradual transition from socialism to communism," and he depicted the resolutions of the Stalinist party congresses of 1939 and 1952 as beacons illuminating the road to full communism.[52] It is noteworthy that the first of these articles quoted only Kosygin among the members of the present leadership, while the second quoted only Brezhnev.

The intra-party struggle over Stalinism has likewise had reverberations in the literary world. Last summer dogmatic party officials and writers mounted a concerted onslaught against the liberal-minded chief editor of the literary journal *Novyi mir*, Aleksandr Tvardovsky. One of the complaints was that *Novyi mir* had published a contribution depicting the old Bolshevik N. N. Krestinsky, a victim of Stalin's 1937 Great Purge, as a close friend of Lenin.[53] Shortly thereafter, eleven diehard writers in the literary-political weekly *Ogoniok* (July 26, 1969) leveled the familiar Stalinist charge of "cosmopolitanism" against one of *Novyi mir*'s best-known critics. Tvardovsky and his associates struck back at these attacks as the "crude demagogy" of "one narrow group."[54]

On September 12, an unsigned article in *Pravda* called for a truce on the literary front, but this failed to hold the neo-Stalinists in check. On November 10, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, world-renowned author of several anti-Stalinist works, was expelled from the RSFSR Writers' Union. A few months later, Tvardovsky was pressured into writing a letter condemning the unauthorized publication in the West of one of his poems entitled "Over Stalin's Remains." His letter appeared in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, organ of the USSR Writers' Union, on February 11, 1970, along with an announcement of the replacement of four members of *Novyi mir*'s editorial staff. Tvardovsky himself resigned as chief editor two days later and was replaced by Vasili A. Kosolapov, a hack administrator of literary periodicals.

Party vs. State

Conflicts between party and state bureaucrats are endemic to the Soviet system of rule, and such conflicts are no less apparent under the present leadership than in the past. Broadly speaking, the interest of the party organizers lies in preserving their control of economic decision-making and bureaucratic appointments regardless of considerations of efficiency, while on the other hand the state technical experts seek the right to run the economy with minimal interference by party functionaries and to select personnel without regard to dogmatic political criteria. The strains between the two groups grow more acute when there is no single holder of the supreme party and government offices. In this situation, authority to decide policy and personnel questions is vested in the bureaus of the party committees at all levels, and since power in these bureaus is shared by party and state representatives, the line officers of the party machine find it more difficult to impose their will on the state managers. They consequently try to shift the locus of power from the party bureaus to the party secretariats, which are the exclusive domain of the party. These constant struggles for power have a significant bearing on policy in that the state officials' immersion in practical affairs disposes them toward a less doctrinaire approach to problems than that of the party apparatchiks.

The delicate balance of party and state leaders restored at the top level upon Khrushchev's removal seems likely to have increased frictions in party-government relationships at all levels. An oblique intimation of this was the fact that *Pravda* (July 20, 1966) saw fit to publish an article by F. Petrenko, an organizational specialist, underlining the need to observe equality of status in party legislative bodies and particularly in the relations between the members of a party committee or bureau and the first secretary. The author wrote:

> **The secretary of a party committee is not a commander *(nachalnik)*, and he is not endowed with the right to command *(kommandovat)*. He is only the senior person *(starshii)* in the organ of collective leadership elected by the Communists. He has greater responsibility, but in solving problems he has only as many rights as other members of the committee.**

Despite this early emphasis on balance and equality, evidences of friction between party and state representatives have reappeared on numerous occasions. In early 1968, for example, there were reports of complaints by party officials against over-assertive state managers. According to *Pravda* (February 26, 1968), a Tiumen region party boss claimed that state officials "do not consult with us about the recruiting and placement of cadres and are consequently making gross mistakes," and a conference of the Moscow party organization a

52 A. I. Sekerin, ibid., No. 12, 1969, pp. 77–80.
53 *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, July 13, 1969.
54 See *The New York Times*, Aug. 30, 1969.

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month later was told that top officials of the USSR Ministry of Radio Industry did not always heed the opinions of party executive bodies.[55]

At the highest level, the party-state rivalry for power has manifested itself in an apparent attempt by Brezhnev and his supporters to increase the relative weight of the party secretariat in the central decision-making hierarchy. A hint of this was the appearance in 1968 of a book on the history of the CPSU which referred to the "CPSU Central Committee headed by the Politburo *and Secretariat*" [56] (italics added). Especially significant was the fact that its author, D. Yu. Bakhshiev, had used the same phrase in 1954 at a time when Khrushchev was striving to assert the primacy of the party against the pro-state faction led by Premier Malenkov.[57]

However, the pro-state forces in the present leadership, headed by Kosygin and Podgorny, continue to have influential backing from certain factions within the party apparatus itself. Thus, in a political booklet published in 1969, Piotr M. Yelistratov, a former colleague of Podgorny in the Ukraine and currently first secretary of the Mordva region party committee, came out strongly against would-be party autocrats, and particularly against "immoderate worship" of the authority of party first secretaries. "One cannot regard as normal," he wrote, "a situation where an attempt to dispute the opinion of the first secretary is looked upon in some quarters as an attempt on his primogeniture." [58] Similarly, writing in *Pravda* (August 2, 1969), P. Rodionov, a Georgian party leader, warned against singlehanded decisions by party first secretaries and the issuance by them of directives to state agencies; and Fikriat A. Tabeev, party first secretary for the Tatar ASSR, reprimanded party organizers, again in *Pravda* (August 10), for usurping the decision-making rights of state administrators, suggesting that they work instead through the party bureaus.

With his secret speech to the Central Committee plenum last December, Brezhnev appears to have launched a new drive for rigorous control of the economy by party functionaries. This was evidenced by a key change in the Theses for the Lenin Centenary, published on December 23, 1969.[59] The Theses affirmed that the party "accomplishes its tasks *both directly* and through the soviets, state bodies and public organizations" (italics added), thus nullifying the tactful formula of the 1967 Theses for the 50th anniversary of the 1917 Revolution, which had stated that the party fulfills its leading role in society "through the system of state and public organizations." [60] In line with this change, a decree issued by the party center in January 1970 required party committees of the government's economic ministries to keep party headquarters informed of shortcomings in the work of the ministries.[61] This, in effect, made the top state bureaucracy directly responsible to Brezhnev as well as to Kosygin and tended to violate the spirit of the collective leadership understanding reached upon the overthrow of Khrushchev. The General Secretary's fight for mastery over the state bureaucracy was further reflected in an announcement on April 11, 1970, that two veteran regional party officials had been named to key posts in Gosplan and the State Committee for Science and Technology.[62]

Brezhnev himself virtually monopolized the center of the stage both on the eve of and during the Lenin Centenary festivities. He presented "proposals" to the ministers of agriculture of the union republics at a meeting on March 4, 1970.[63] He was the only Politburo member to attend the critique and military review held in Minsk (March 14–15) following the largest army maneuvers ever held in the Soviet Union. His speeches in connection with Lenin's 100th birth anniversary were far more numerous and more widely publicized than those of any other leader.[64] A two-volume edition of his speeches and articles covering the period 1964–70 was released on May Day, conferring upon the party chief a distinction enjoyed by no Soviet leader since Khrushchev.

There were also some hints of an attempt to diminish the prestige of the head of government. *Pravda*'s report of April 30 on the nomination of candidates for election to the USSR Supreme Soviet relegated Premier Kosygin to the role of a mere "organizer," while rating Brezhnev's personal contribution to Soviet achievements on a par

55 *Pravda*, March 30, 1968.
56 D. Yu. Bakhshiev, *Marksistko-leninskie osnovy stroitelstva i deiatelnosti KPSS*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 227–28.
57 See Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR*, London, 1961, p. 234.
58 P. M. Yelistratov, *O leninskom stile v partiinoi rabote*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 32–33.
59 *Pravda*, Dec. 23, 1969.
60 *Ibid.*, June 25, 1967.
61 *Partinaia zhizn*, No. 4, 1970, pp. 3–6.
62 *Pravda*, April 11, 1970.
63 *Ibid.*, March 5, 1970.
64 *Ibid.*, April 14, 15, 17, and 22, 1970.

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with that of the Politburo as a whole. Kosygin was further slighted by receiving fewer nominations to the Supreme Soviet than Podgorny, whom he had surpassed in this regard in 1966.

Nevertheless, there appears to be a continuing struggle by Brezhnev's rivals to curb his assumption of greater authority and to preserve a balance of power between party and state. *Izvestia,* for example, advised on March 19 that party organs should refrain from "direct interference" in managerial work and echoed Kosygin's preference for relying to a greater extent on material incentives as stimulants to economic productivity. The government organ, on April 25, also bestowed on Kosygin the accolade of "true Leninist," thus giving him the same degree of homage that the party newspaper *Pravda* reserves for Brezhnev.

Future Prospects

The Soviet rulers will soon have to reach some basic decisions in connection with the upcoming 24th Party Congress and the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971–1975). (According to party statutes, a congress should be held in 1970.) They may, of course, postpone action until the results of the current border talks with China and the SALT talks with the United States are known. But sooner or later the ever-recurring issues of how to allocate economic resources and redistribute political power in the USSR will again come to a head.

The solutions will depend upon which of the following configurations the Politburo will take in the immediate future: (1) maintenance of the present delicate balance, with an uneasy compromise between middle-of-the-roaders, hardliners, and moderate reformers; (2) a new alignment of forces favoring the moderate reformers; or (3) the advent to power of civilian hardliners and/or military leaders. Only the last eventuality is likely to produce a total departure from the principle of collective leadership and the emergence of a Stalin-type personal ruler.

Any attempt to foretell what power group will prevail is extremely hazardous because of what Daniel Bell has called "the variabilities of accident, folly, and simple human cantankerousness." [65]

However, some guarded optimism about probable Kremlin behavior in areas that have a bearing on US-Soviet relations may be justified. There would appear to be a growing feeling at the top of the Soviet hierarchy that military spending should be reduced and greater outlays made for ailing branches of the civilian sector of the economy. This makes it almost certain that the Soviet Union will continue to show a serious interest in ways to avoid a major intensification of arms rivalry with the United States. Indeed, the force of the economic impulse driving the Soviet leaders to settle for virtual nuclear equality with the United States seems so powerful that only a political takeover by civilian and army militarists in Moscow would be likely to decisively diminish its impact on policy-making. Of course, even if progress is made toward leveling off the nuclear arms race, the Kremlin may still be expected to retain large armed forces for possible deployment against Communist China or against rebellious peoples in the Soviet security zone of East-Central Europe.

Much less promising is the short-run outlook for a diffusion of basic decision-making power from the Politburo and central executive organs to local bodies more responsive to the peaceful needs and desires of the nation. The information now at hand suggests that the central *apparat* will also be able to bridle for some time to come the restless intellectual, student, and national minority groups that wish to see the present authoritarian system put on a more democratic footing. The methods used to combat democratic ideas will probably continue to include selective arrests by the secret police, occasional trials of dissenters, and propaganda tirades against "the American way of life."

The continued domination of affairs by a handful of powerholders will also mean that the Soviet Union will retain a freedom of maneuver in the international arena which, while not unlimited, is certainly broader than that of Western governments. Any profound change in the Soviet internal structure that would permit the development of positive relations of friendship between the United States and the USSR would seem to be conditional upon two developments in the higher and lower reaches of Soviet society—the departure from public life of the present leaders, who were trained in the Stalinist school of absolutism; and the emergence of a more self-confident population. Until these developments occur, only piecemeal adjustments of socio-economic forms and intermittent relapses into Stalinist oppression may be anticipated on the Soviet domestic scene.

[65] "Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior," in Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology. On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties,* New York, 1962, pp. 315–53.

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East Germany Today

EDITORS' NOTE: The Communist Party leaders of East Germany, like those of most East European countries, are currently caught up in the dilemma of trying to modernize some parts of their system, such as the economy and the organization of scientific research, while attempting to freeze the political status quo. In the following articles, their predicament is examined from two complementary vantage points: Mr. Lippmann investigates the broad social forces making for reform, as well as the restraints placed on them, while Mr. Ludz scrutinizes the choices between modernization and stability as they present themselves in the form of policy options to competing groups within East Germany's ruling elite.

The Limits of Reform Communism

By Heinz Lippmann

Notwithstanding the liberalizing currents which have made themselves felt in many parts of the Communist world since the death of Stalin, the East German regime of Socialist Unity Party (SED) chief Walter Ulbricht remains more resolutely Stalinist in its ideological posture and policies, and more impervious to pressures for reform, than almost any other East European Communist leadership. Indeed, while reformist tendencies emerged briefly into the open in 1956–57 and are still present beneath the surface, they have unquestionably been more muted and ineffective than elsewhere. It is the purpose of this article to describe the nature and scope of such reformist currents as have developed in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) since the mid-1950's and to offer an assessment of their present limitations and future prospects.

In the discussion that follows, the term "reform communism" will be used in preference to "revisionism," which in recent years has commonly

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been applied to all movements seeking to liberalize the Stalinist model of Communist rule and interparty relations. The reason for this is that, historically, the term "revisionism" properly applies to the earlier thinking of Eduard Bernstein, Otto Bauer, Rudolf Hilferding and others, who sought to revise the substance of Marx's and Engels' theories of revolution. By contrast, the postwar movements to reform the Communist system, starting with the Yugoslav deviation after 1948, have aimed not so much at revising Marxism itself as at freeing it from its Stalinist deformations by reviving its "humanistic" aspects, and at replacing the rigid Stalinist model by one leaving greater room for adaptation to differing national conditions and the complex requirements of modern industrial society.

The Emergence of Reformism

The first visible signs of intraparty opposition to Ulbricht's autocratic leadership emerged at the time of the short-lived workers' uprising of June 16–17, 1953. The uprising, however, was sparked by economic grievances rather than by demands for political liberalization, and the stand taken by the opposition to Ulbricht in the Politburo and Central Committee of the SED fell far short of embodying what could be called reform-communist positions. Although the opposition group, led by Wilhelm Zaisser, State Security Service head, and Rudolf Herrnstadt, chief editor of the party daily *Neues Deutschland*, with the support of Ernst Wollweber and Karl Schirdewan, demanded a sweeping debureaucratization and reorganization of the party,[1] the changes it proposed were dictated in the main by the limited objective of curbing Ulbricht's personal domination of the leadership and bolstering its own position in the party apparatus. This is why the opposition leaders not only held back from placing themselves at the head of the uprising but capitulated when the spread of the upheaval throughout the GDR seemed to threaten the regime's survival. With the uprising crushed, thanks to the intervention of Soviet garrison forces, the oppositionists were swiftly purged by the Ulbricht leadership.

Reform communism in the true sense made its first appearance in the GDR in 1956 under the impact of the similar but more explosive developments in Poland and Hungary. When the slogan of a humane socialism was proclaimed by Polish intellectuals in the summer of 1956, reformist ideas soon spread to intellectual circles in East Germany, finding expression in a variety of forms ranging from revisionistic concepts put foward by Marxist theoreticians, demands articulated by writers and artists, scientists and philosophers, jurists and educators, for greater freedom of expression, inquiry and debate, to appeals for the introduction of workers' councils in industry. To cite only a few examples, the Marxist theoretician Ernst Bloch formulated a blueprint for a humanistic socialism;[2] natural scientist Robert Havemann pleaded for the exclusion of party dogma from all fields of science; economists like Professors Fritz Behrens and Arne Benary argued for replacement of the party-state economic bureaucracy by an "autonomous administration of workers";[3] and educators such as Dr. Werner Dorst, head of the National Institute for Education, urged elimination of the political selection of cadres in favor of a system that would reward gifted students. The Institute of Sociology in East Berlin and—ironically enough—the Walter Ulbricht Academy of Political and Legal Science in Babelsberg became hotbeds of reform-communist thought.

This development culminated in the formulation of a far-reaching program of reform, the principal author of which was Dr. Wolfgang Harich, chief editor of the East Berlin magazine *Zeitschrift für Philosophie* and a lecturer at Humboldt University. The so-called Harich program, which is the only consistent formulation of East German reform communism that has come to be known outside the GDR, was put forward as a statement of the views of "a group of SED functionaries" who "intended no break with Marxism-Leninism but . . . wanted to free it from Stalinism and dogmatism and to lead it back to its humanistic and undogmatic intellectual basis." The program further stated that its advocates had sought to have their proposals for a "specific German road to socialism" discussed within the party, but that the party leadership had re-

[1] Hermann Weber, "Der 17. Juni im Zentralkomitee der SED" (The 17th of June in the Central Committee of the SED), *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, supplement of the weekly *Das Parlament* (Bonn), June 13, 1956.

[2] Article by Günther Zehm, in Horst Krüger, *Das Ende einer Utopie* (The End of Utopia), Verlag Olten und Freiburg, 1963, pp. 29-48.

[3] Martin Jänicke, *Der dritte Weg* (The Third Way), Köln, Neuer Deutscher Verlag, 1964, pp. 104 ff.

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jected all discussion. "In such a situation," it declared, "party discipline must not become an end in itself. Our model is Karl Liebknecht, who broke party discipline in 1914 and 1918 in order to save the party."[4] The program then went on to set forth its substantive proposals, which may be summarized as follows:

- Reorganization of the SED along more democratic lines; expulsion of Stalinists from the party organs; and an end to absolute control by the party apparatus over members.
- Establishment of a form of government based on a broader concept of coalition than the present "national bloc" (consisting of the SED and four minor captive parties) and under the leadership of a reformed SED; drastic debureaucratization of the government apparatus; restoration of the complete sovereignty of parliament; and revision of the parliamentary electoral system so as to offer voters a multiple choice of candidates from the unified list of the national bloc.
- Development of a foreign policy based on alliance with the socialist camp but preserving complete independence and equality and providing for free and independent consultation with other people's democracies on necessary joint measures and common policy.
- Restoration of complete freedom of conscience and termination of the anti-Church struggle; restoration of university autonomy; full restoration of due process of law and abolition of the State Security Service and secret trials.
- Introduction of workers' councils on the Yugoslav pattern; encouragement of small private industry and its placement on an equal footing with socialized industry; orientation of production toward raising living standards; abolition of the excesses of production quotas; introduction of profit-sharing in all socialist industries and trade enterprises; enactment of old-age pensions for workers on the same basis as for intellectuals; and abolition of bonuses for top functionaries.
- Termination of forced collectivization; dismantling of the LPGs (collective farms); and development of a healthy system of small and medium-sized farm holdings.

Many of the demands set forth in the Harich program were to find an echo more than ten years later in the January 1968 Action Program of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. And the Ulbricht leadership's reaction to the Harich reform blueprint was no less extreme than its later reaction to the developments of the "Czechoslovak Spring" of 1968. Professor Harich was arrested at the end of 1956 and sentenced the following March to ten years' imprisonment at hard labor.[5] Two other co-defendants received lesser sentences in the same trial, and four more members of the Harich group were tried separately in July 1957 and sentenced to long prison terms.

Party Dogma under Attack

These harsh reprisals heralded a sharp intensification of the regime's efforts to suppress political dissent—a policy which the Ulbricht leadership has consistently pursued ever since. But while this policy has unquestionably muted the expression of reform-communist ideas in the GDR, it has not succeeded in silencing their proponents altogether. A notable example is Professor Robert Havemann, who, as already mentioned, played an active part in the intellectual ferment of 1956. In a series of lectures delivered at Humboldt University in East Berlin in 1963–64, Havemann reiterated his earlier demand for a clear dividing line between science and party dogma and implicitly challenged the SED on a number of key ideological issues.[6]

Referring, for instance, to Engels' definition of freedom as "the recognition of necessity," Havemann implied that this dictum had been perverted by the party leadership to justify the arbitrary imposition of its will:

Patronizingly we are told: If you cannot grasp what is necessary—and what is necessary has usually been determined by those doing the talking—then you can't have freedom either, and jail is your proper reward.

The idea that "freedom can be bought for the price of doing voluntarily what must be done although it goes against one's inclinations," he added, "is the product of a mentality according to which the fate of mankind can be determined by fiat and worked out accordingly."

[4] Quotes and following summary of Harich program based on Günther Hoffmann *Selbstkritik des Kommunismus* (Self-criticism of Communism), Rowolt, Reinbeck bei Hamburg, 1967, pp. 186 ff.

[5] After serving seven years, Harich was released from imprisonment in the fall of 1964 and has since been employed as a reader for an East Berlin publishing house.

[6] For Havemann's lectures, see "Diskussionsforum für modernen Sozialismus," in Jänicke, *op. cit.*

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Havemann again struck out at the SED's arrogation of absolutist power under cover of a discussion of the need for mass spontaneity as opposed to the Leninist idea that the working class lacks political awareness and must be commanded by an elite revolutionary party:

The idea of spontaneity is sometimes downgraded in dogmatic fashion, as if spontaneity meant aimless, selfish, chaotic action. Spontaneity, however, really means the courage to go forward despite incomplete awareness. Without spontaneity we would not advance a step.

In still another oblique attack on the dictatorial mentality of the party functionaries, he declared:

I believe that self-assertion in society emerges only in response to the development of a hierarchical structure of society. To the degree that this hierarchical structure becomes established and proliferates, self-assertion even becomes a necessity for individuals. . . . attempting to climb the ladder of society. Naturally, this intimate connection between hierarchical structure and self-assertion also manifests itself in periods of Bonapartism and Stalinism.

Shortly after these lectures, Havemann not only was dismissed from his chair in physical chemistry at Humboldt University and expelled from the GDR Academy of Sciences, but was also stripped of his party membership. Nevertheless, in an interview published in the West German newspaper *Echo am Abend* (Hamburg, March 11, 1964), he declared:

Not as one disappointed in the socialist idea but as its confirmed partisan, I demand the total eradication of Stalinism and dogmatism in all their manifestations. Our goal must be a social order in which libertarian socialism has been given reality.

Havemann was heard from still again in 1968 when, in flat opposition to the policy of the Ulbricht regime, he hailed the reform program of the Dubcek leadership in Czechoslovakia and later condemned the occupation of that country by the five Warsaw Pact powers (including the GDR) as a "grave political blunder."[7] Interviewed in October 1968 by an Italian newspaper correspondent, he stated:

The Soviets will sooner or later find themselves compelled to admit this blunder. . . . Someday they will have to analyze their own history, and not just the history of others, in terms of Marxist principles.

Referring to the Soviet claim that the five-power intervention had crushed a budding counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia, Havemann remarked, "But that is impossible. You cannot crush what does not exist."[8] (Havemann's sons were arrested for organizing demonstrations of sympathy for the Czechoslovak reformists following the occupation.)

The New Forces for Reform

Although proponents of the type of reform communism current in 1956–57, as represented by such intellectuals as Professors Harich and Havemann, are still present in the GDR and occasionally make their voices heard, such groups are now severely isolated. At the same time, the manifold changes that have taken place in East German society since the early 1960's—in particular, the introduction and growth of the "new economic system"—have resulted in a significant shift in the focal center of forces making for potential reform. More specifically, the gradual reorientation of the economy to conditions of modern electronic technology and data processing, the increased use of cost accounting and the introduction of cybernetic methods, the systematic upgrading of the qualifications of cadres and the rejuvenation of the party apparatus, the partial decentralization of economic and administrative activities with a somewhat increased degree of autonomy for such bodies, university reform, and the grant of greater independence to the LPGs—all these developments have tended not only to bring about a more professionalized and businesslike political climate, but also to prepare the groundwork for a shift in the locus of decision-making away from the party hierarchy.

One facet of this development is illustrated by the emergence of a new generation of scientifically and technologically oriented party cadres constituting what C. P. Ludz has termed the "institutionalized counterelite."[9] Unlike the reform communists of 1956–57, they work within the system and do not challenge its validity as such, but by systematically applying scientific principles to problems of social organization, they seek to bring about a gradual liberation from party dogma. The

[7] Reported in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt-am-Main), Oct. 14, 1968.

[8] Interview published in *Il Giorno* (Milan), Oct. 21, 1968. Havemann is currently living as a pensioner in East Berlin and continues to write occasional articles for European journals.

[9] Peter Christian Ludz, *Parteielite im Wandel* (Party Elite in Transition), Köln-Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968, p. 32 and *passim.*

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viewpoint of these new forces is represented, in the academic community, by such scholars as Professors Wolfgang Heise and Georg Klaus, and in the party leadership by Dr. Günter Mittag. Mittag speaks in the SED Politburo for the new type of party professionals who, though still in a minority in that body, have already gained a much stronger foothold in the lower echelons of the SED.

On the abstract level, the ideas of Professor Heise, a philosopher of history, constitute a reasoned argument for moderating the rigid centralization characteristic of the SED along with the development of a level of "conscious mass activity" that would free the concept of "democratic centralism" from its present elitist connotations.[10] Meanwhile, Professor Klaus and several younger scientists who take an even more aggressive tack have been developing new concepts of state, society and economy based on cybernetic reasoning. Although they approach their analysis from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and consciously try to avoid any head-on confrontation with the regime, they perforce arrive at conclusions that are irreconcilable with the dogmas of the old-line party leadership.

On a more practical level, such proponents of technocracy tend to feel that the specialization of functions intrinsic to modern industrial society and the perspectives which cybernetics, automation and electronic computer technology have opened up for the governance of society cannot be reconciled with the existing power structure of the SED regime. What is more, the scientific-technological revolution and the changes in the social structure resulting from it are creating conditions conducive to the disintegration of the very fabric of Marxist-Leninist assumptions concerning the shape of society. Numerical relationships between the various classes are undergoing a continuous process of change which the party, despite its primacy, is incapable of modifying in any way. What used to be called the worker's aristocracy—a small minority of the working class—is now becoming the majority. Scientific-technical personnel, clerical and business employees, and those engaged in service and governmental activities are constantly increasing and beginning to outstrip the working class numerically and hence in importance. These rising social strata inevitably seek to expand their political influence.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 281 ff.

The Modernizing Process

The Ulbricht regime thus finds itself confronted by a new, more subtle form of "opposition" which the leadership finds it difficult to combat without compromising some of its major objectives. On this point, a guest from the GDR who attended a colloquium in Frankfurt-am-Main in September 1967, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the publication of Marx's *Das Kapital*, frankly remarked to this author:

The SED is faced with a dilemma. In order to give credibility to its slogan of achieving international standards, it must make maximum use of modern science. But in so doing, it must free the analysis of important social processes from the bonds of its direct influence. For if data biased by the party perspective are fed into the computer, the results obtained are ultimately worthless and do not accomplish their purpose.[11]

It seems clear that this very process of modernization, although it does not aim at a fundamental revision of the present social and political structure, is bound in the long run to bring about substantive changes in the system itself. As an East German economist—a supporter in 1956–57 of the reform concepts of Behrends, Benary and Harich—put it not long ago in a conversation with the author, "What we have here is essentially a continuously operating political and economic dynamic which is leading inevitably—if slowly and imperceptibly—to shifts in power and reformist tendencies."[12]

Indeed, at least the beginnings of such a shift are already becoming apparent. For example, the functional committees of leading party bodies such as the SED Central Committee, district party headquarters, etc., sometimes set up *ad hoc* subcommittees or so-called "strategic groups" to study specific problems, and scientists or technical experts are brought into these groups in order to evaluate the appropriateness of contemplated projects. This by itself does not signify any change in the decision-making process since such groups have only an investigative function and are not empowered to issue directives or make staffing decisions. However, when a group, through its investigation, arrives at conclusions that are contrary to the plans of the party leadership, these plans are sometimes modified—as, for example, has happened in the specific areas of economic coopera-

[11] From author's notes.
[12] From author's notes.

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tion and university planning. In this way, these bodies exert an indirect influence on the party summit, without however affecting the strategic conceptions of the leadership in any substantial measure.

Some of the limited reforms instituted "from above" by the regime itself seem likely to produce somewhat similar long-term effects. In the state administration, for instance, district and municipal councils have been granted increased autonomy in deciding how to spend the funds at their disposal. Their decisions must of course conform to centrally-assigned objectives, but these objectives are sufficiently broad to leave some room for local initiative. In the economic sphere, the so-called "Kast movement" to increase enterprise profitability (named after Gerhard Kast, an industrial foreman[13]) was initiated by the SED primarily to further the achievement of the leadership's economic targets, but at the same time it affords skilled workers in industry the opportunity to voice criticism and share responsibility. Similarly, the university reform instituted by the party leadership with a view to making higher education more effective and university administration more efficient has brought about a significant shift of responsibilities, with professors losing much of their former untouchability and student criticism of the faculty becoming an institutionalized practice. Such developments are taking place in many sectors of East German society today and, though relatively minor in themselves, are generating potentialities for further change.

Rigidity in Cultural Policy

One sphere in which there has been no visible change, however, is that of information and culture. In contrast to the scientific and technological intelligentsia and the new "counterelite" in the party and state apparatus, writers and artists in the GDR still find themselves subject to rigid regime controls. Here, the party's watchdogs keep a vigilant eye out for every deviant view or departure from the rules of socialist realism. Under the slogan of "ideological clarification," the regime seeks to stifle every conflict at its inception so as to give an outward impression of harmony with the creative groups that really does not exist. Yet it has not succeeded in sweeping all conflicts under the rug.

One fairly recent case that came into the open involved Hermann Kant, deputy chairman of the GDR Writers' Association. In an interview given to the West German Socialist Party organ *Vorwärts* last November, Kant welcomed the change of government in Bonn and came out in favor of negotiations between East and West Germany without any preconditions.[14] Three days later, the SED organ *Neues Deutschland* published an official policy statement reiterating the GDR's demand for full legal recognition as a precondition for negotiations with Bonn.[15] This put Kant in direct conflict with the official line, and he was shortly forced to publish a self-critical "explanation" in which he affirmed his allegiance to the GDR and restated his position on the German question in more innocuous terms.[16]

On the subject of literary freedom of expression, however, Kant has shown himself less willing to compromise. In his *Vorwärts* interview mentioned above, he noted that the East German literary review *Forum* had suspended the serialization of his latest novel, *Das Impressum* (The Colophon), because of differences between the publisher and himself "over its contents." He dared to add, however, that "our discussions continue" and "my novel will appear as I want it to appear." In another interview—also published, significantly enough, outside the GDR—Kant defended the writer's right to criticize in these terms:

I think that an actively participating Socialist must always be a critical participant. . . . It goes without saying that this applies to literature. While I don't consider criticism the only tune for literature to play, it is for me an essential note without which there would be something lacking in the music.

And on the subject of socialist realism:

Many times in the past we have had curious theories—for example, that certain styles, certain forms of expression, were incompatible with the socialist consciousness of an author. [But] practice has since demonstrated that there is no such thing as a monopoly, or exclusive possession, of a stylistic form for any class literature.[17]

[13] Hermann Weber, *Von SBZ zur DDR, 1945-1968* (From Soviet Zone to GDR, 1945-1968), Hannover, Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1968, pp. 197 f. (citing *Neues Deutschland* [East Berlin], Feb. 8, 1967).

[14] *Vorwärts* (Bad Godesberg), Nov. 6, 1969.
[15] *Neues Deutschland*, Nov. 9, 1969.
[16] *Ibid.*, Nov. 30, 1969.
[17] *Budapester Rundschau* (Budapest), Nov. 14, 1969. This newspaper is published for the German-speaking minority in Hungary.

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Kant is not alone. He exemplifies a new, critical generation of writers in the GDR who, unlike Anna Seghers or Stephan Hermlin, have not resigned themselves to being conformists, and who are pursuing in the cultural field goals quite similar to those being pursued by the new "counterelite" in other spheres of activity.

Brief mention should also be made here of a subtle new method of criticizing party dogma that has come to be employed particularly by young scholars in the field of social research. Under the guise of an objective analysis supporting the party's position regarding a given problem, these scholars sometimes include in their dissertations a detailed exposition of opposing social theories documented with lengthy quotations from Western sources generally proscribed in the GDR, to which they are given special access for research purposes.[18] In this way, while protecting themselves *vis-à-vis* the party, they manage to circumvent the regime's stringent censorship controls and to disseminate among a limited yet important segment of East German society—mostly students and members of the intelligentsia—knowledge of Western social thought that would otherwise be barred to them.

The Limits of Reformism

Such, then, are the different forms in which reformist concepts and tendencies have manifested themselves in the GDR. Let us now turn to a consideration of the major reasons why these tendencies have remained relatively weak and ineffectual by comparison with similar movements in some of the other East European Communist countries, and to an evaluation of their present status and future prospects.

To begin with, the weakness of reformist tendencies is explainable, at least in part, by the absence of any democratic tradition in the SED. Historically, the stalinization of the prewar German Communist Party began as early as the mid-1920's, with the result that the period of relative party democracy was much shorter than in other European Communist parties. After the advent of Nazi rule, the party organization inside Germany was virtually wiped out, and during the war a new generation of leadership cadres was trained in the Soviet Union under the direction of Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, becoming thoroughly imbued with Stalinist principles and methods of extreme party centralism. When the party was reconstituted after the war in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany (later to become the GDR), these cadres assumed the leadership, and the hundreds of thousands of new members recruited into the party ranks were largely men and women whose formative years had been spent under Nazi rule and who experienced little difficulty in adjusting to the autocratic, centralized rule of the Ulbricht regime. All in all, the SED has provided a poor soil for the kind of intellectual independence and moral autonomy that would lend popular support to demands for reform.

Aided by this underlying factor, the Ulbricht regime has been highly successful in preventing the formation of any organized political opposition based on reform-communist ideas. As noted earlier, these ideas have remained alive in a small group of intellectuals, but the latter have found themselves effectively isolated and incapable, owing to the regime's stringent controls, of disseminating their views. They have consequently been unable to develop any significant support within the party and government apparatus, much less among the workers and general public, to whom the concepts of the reformists remain virtually unknown. It should also be noted that the regime not only has muzzled reformers at home but has barred the influx of reformist ideas from other East-bloc countries: for example, the views of the Czech economic reformer Ota Sik, or of the Hungarian philosopher Georg Lukacs, and even the January 1968 Action Program of the Czechoslovak Communist Party were never fully publicized in the GDR.

At the same time, the potential appeal of reformist ideas has been somewhat diminished in recent years by reason of the fact that the SED leadership has managed to win a substantial measure of popular support through its success in raising the domestic standard of living, which is now reported to be twice as high as that of the Soviet Union.[19] As a result of this economic improvement,

[18] A good example is a monograph by Günther Rose, *Zur Genesis und Funktion der Theorie der "Industriegesellschaft"* (Genesis and Function of the Theory of "Industrial Society"), East Berlin, VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1961. In it, Rose deals mainly with the "convergence" theory seen from the SED viewpoint, but quotes copiously from Western authors, *e.g.*, Arnold Gehlen, Rolf Dahrendorf, Ferdinand Tönnies, Karl Jaspers, etc.

[19] *Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger* (Köln), Jan. 8, 1970.

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the bulk of the population has become reconciled to the system to the point where shortcomings are no longer blamed on the system itself, or on the central leadership, but are attributed rather to local conditions or individual deficiencies at the lower levels of the official hierarchy.

This is not to say, however, that dissatisfactions have ceased to exist. On the contrary, despite the higher standard of living and the fact that the economy is essentially moving forward, many shortcomings conducive to economic discontent still remain. As Politburo member Dr. Günter Mittag pointed out just last December in addressing the SED Central Committee on the subject of the economic plan for 1970, the country continued to experience shortages of various consumer items, including children's clothing, certain textile products, housing supplies such as bathtubs and hot-water heaters, and even briquets for home-heating.[20] More basically, despite the partial reforms instituted under the "new economic system," many of the congenital weaknesses of a centrally-planned, command-type economy continue to be present—*e.g.*, recurrent planning changes and resorts to sporadic "brush-fire" actions which preclude continuity of development and organic growth, inefficient use and coordination of already short supplies of materials and manpower with an enormous amount of resultant waste.

These continuing deficiencies place a particularly heavy burden on lower and middle-level party and government functionaries—especially those concerned with the day-to-day running of the economy—who must cope with difficult problems of production and distribution and find themselves caught between dissatisfaction and criticism from below and constant pressures from above.[21] But, ironically enough, while the chronic troubles of this group might be expected to foster in them a general receptiveness to reformist ideas, the very nature of the problems they face leads them to look for practical options and solutions, and they consequently have little or no inclination to listen to or support the reform communists, whose blueprints for the future must strike them as unduly ideological and utopian.

Something must also be said about the vital role which the division of Germany has played in inhibiting the rise of a strong and vocal reformist movement in the GDR. As long as the existence of the East German state is challenged by the West German Federal Republic (FRG) on an international level, those who seek a liberalization of the SED regime but nevertheless give it their basic allegiance are deterred from mounting an opposition movement out of a feeling that to do so would be treasonable. Whereas the reform movements in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were restrained by no such inhibition in combatting the Stalinist forces in their own countries (and, indirectly, in Moscow), reform-communist circles in the GDR have felt compelled, albeit reluctantly, to declare their solidarity with the party leadership on this crucial issue of sovereign statehood.[22] Conversely, the Ulbricht regime has not hesitated to exploit the alleged menace from the FRG as a means of silencing internal opposition. As the only Communist regime in Europe that is fighting to achieve recognition in international law as a sovereign state, it constantly invokes the special situation of the divided country in order to smother all reformist tendencies at home that appear to threaten its power.

The regime has also endeavored to stem the forces making for reform by resorting to piecemeal corrective measures calculated to adapt the system to the conditions of modern industrial society without compromising the leading role of the party. The SED leadership has, for example, tried to raise the qualifications level of present party functionaries considered reliable and at the same time to develop a new body of cadres with scientific-technological training but also imbued with party loyalty. (It is doubtful, however, that the complex structure of a modern industrial society can be permanently manipulated by more highly-qualified or specialized party personnel whose functions are ultimately political.) The leadership has also confined its carefully-measured reforms almost exclusively to the economic sector and steered clear of making the corresponding changes called for in the sociopolitical sphere. Thus far, at least, it has been largely successful in manipulating and containing, through the use of conventional administrative methods, the pressures generated by the basic changes taking place in the social structure and by the growing strength and importance of the new "counterelite." In this, it has been aided by the fact that the scientific-technocratic upper stratum

[20] *Neues Deutschland*, Dec. 15, 1969.

[21] Based on accounts given by recent refugees from the GDR, including Dr. Werner Barm, who was chairman of the district council of Ostburg, near Magdeburg, until last fall.

[22] Jänicke, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-25.

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has to some extent been corrupted by financial rewards and special provileges, and its interest in reform reduced by the constant expansion of its range of responsibilities and its participation in important research projects.

Outlook for the Future

In sum, the SED leadership appears to have the reformist elements and tendencies in the GDR well under control. Obviously, nothing on the order of the workers' uprising of 1953 in East Germany or the "Polish October" and Hungarian revolt of 1956, or even of the reform-communist mass movement of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, is even conceivable in the GDR today. For one thing, the possibility that an anti-regime revolt might be touched off through the offering of concessions to the East German population by the FRG was definitely lost with the erection of the Berlin Wall. For another, the links between workers and students—who in Czechoslovakia joined together to give the liberalization movement much of its driving force—are tenuous in the GDR and very much under the watchful eye of the regime's security apparatus.

In the final analysis, therefore, the hopes for eventual reform of the system reside largely in the gradual changes taking place in the fabric of East German society under the impact of modernization. Though noticeable on all levels of the social structure, this development is not yet a self-sustaining process, nor has it generated any organizational forms or any theoretical-ideological platform. Whether the process will remain confined, as it has until now, to the industrial, technological and scientific sectors, or whether it will eventually spill over into the sociopolitical and cultural spheres, cannot yet be foreseen today. One thing, however, is certain: it is a process which in the long run is bound to make it more and more difficult for the SED to maintain its present monolithic power.

The SED Leadership in Transition

By Peter C. Ludz

This article proposes to analyze the top leadership of East Germany's ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) in terms of the rival political groups it encompasses, the career patterns of the spokesmen of these groups, and their contending views on the domestic and foreign policy options open to East Germany. Focusing on the personal characteristics of the men who will one day succeed the 77-year-old Walter Ulbricht and who already participate extensively in shaping East Germany's course seems justified because, as we shall try to show, the personalia of the individuals composing the major elite groupings reflect, in a very direct fashion, the major social processes at work in the GDR. The careers, convictions and life styles of different groups of party and state functionaries are intimately tied to specific ongoing social developments; hence their biographic data—the rise

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and decline of specific types of *apparatchiki* and experts—can also be read as indicators for East Germany's political and economic development and, above all, for the resolution of East Germany's basic problem, to which all others are subsumed: the dilemma of how to combine modernization with stability. Before turning to the discussion of the East German leadership, it might therefore be useful to sketch here the nature of this problem and its special application to East Germany.

At bottom, the problem—one that exists in all polities—is to find the proper balance between the frequently contradictory requirements of modernizing a political and social system while keeping intact the character and identity of its core institutions and its essential leadership group—what is known in political science terminology as system modernization and system maintenance. These two processes, far from being mutually exclusive, are complementary; no political entity of any complexity could perpetuate itself for long without making at least a minimum provision for both. But, in any given case, there is bound to be tension between the requirements of modernization and those of stability; and, almost inevitably, there are bound to be differences within the leadership group (and in the society at large) concerning the correct mix of the two elements. Those who identify with the status quo will tend, out of conviction as well as from a well-defined sense of their own interests, to accentuate the need for system maintenance and downplay the need for modernization; modernizers can be expected to take the converse approach.

Though the processes of system modernization and system maintenance (or system preservation, as it has sometimes been called) constitute what in Hegelian terminology might be called a "dialectic unity", they obviously are never in perfect equipoise in any system at any specific time. One tendency may predominate for long periods of time, or there may be considerable fluctuations from one tendency to the other. In the specific case of East Germany, these forces did not really come into full play for the first fifteen years of SED rule because the GDR had not attained a sufficiently high level of industrialization to qualify as a fully articulated modern system, being instead a "system-in-construction" whose social processes were not advanced enough to conform to the patterns of system maintenance and modernization. However, when these patterns finally did emerge during the early 1960's, it became clear in retrospect that they had been decisively conditioned by the political and economic developments of the 1950's.

In this earlier period the political structure installed in East Germany by the Soviets after World War II was securely based on the *de facto* monopoly of the SED over the political life of the state, while the economic organization—copied from the Stalinist model of Soviet development—operated, like its prototype, on the principles of complete centralization of the economy and tight party control. Both sub-systems served their purpose: the political structure ensured popular compliance, while the economy showed consistently high growth rates. And while there was some opposition among both theoreticians and managerial types to economic overcentralization on account of hidden inefficiencies, demands for change were overridden and did not become major political issues.

The situation changed radically in the early 1960's. The dislocation caused in agriculture by a new program of forced collectivization in 1960 and, more importantly, the traumatic impact of an abrupt drop in industrial growth rates in 1961–62 generated doubts as to the continued stability of the existing economic model. Moreover, the Liberman debates which took place in the Soviet Union in 1962, providing open recognition that some of the main features of the Stalinist system were no longer appropriate to an industrialized economy, strengthened the hand of those in the East German leadership who, in the past, had unsuccessfully advocated changes in the economic system. In 1963, Ulbricht made the decision to update at least the economic sector of East Germany, while attempting to preserve the old order in the political sector.

Change vs. Stability

It was at this point in time, when the SED leadership (and some perceptive Western observers) recognized that East Germany had attained the status of an advanced industrial society, that the cycle of system modernization and system maintenance was initiated. In this case, circumstances clearly called for modernization; it was implemented in the economic reform of 1963 and took three approaches: the diffusion of decision-making authority from the central economic agencies to associations of nationalized enterprises (the VVBs or *Vereinigungen Volkseigener Betriebe*) and the enterprises proper; the rationalization of work processes in the central and regional economic bureaucracies; and the improvement of training methods geared toward fostering initiative and independence in managerial personnel. In short, the

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kind of process was undertaken which political scientists have called the extension of sub-system autonomy. While the reform was not entirely restricted to the economy (indeed, as implied above, it was vigorously applied to the organization of research and training), the major implementing agencies were in the field of economics: the State Planning Commission and the associations of nationalized enterprises, as well as various central and regional agencies of the party and government —all of which were thoroughly reorganized in the spring of 1963. The result was nothing short of astounding: administrative and industrial executives at all levels acquired, within a very short time, a managerial sophistication which led to an economic dynamism unparalled in Eastern Europe.

However, by 1965 the process of modernization gave way temporarily to a counterbalancing trend emphasizing system maintenance at the expense of system modernization. Whether this reaction was in response to pressure from the post-Khrushchevian Soviet leaders, who were embarking on a similar policy in the USSR, or whether the conservatives in the East German leadership felt threatened by the sweep and rapidity of economic modernization, the years 1965–67 saw a return to the predominance of system-maintenance processes designed to safeguard the power and authority of the ruling group. A development in 1964 both antedated and presaged this trend—the transformation of the so-called "production committees" in enterprise plants. Initially established in a few enterprises in 1963 for the purpose of providing a convenient administrative roof for various party and mass organizations in the enterprises, the production committees were converted in 1964 into instruments whose primary function was supervising the enterprise managers.[1] Starting in early 1965, control over all segments of party, government, economy and society was noticeably reinforced. An important example was the creation, in December 1966, of so-called Social Councils (*Gesellschaftliche Räte*) attached to the VVBs, whose task it was to advise and supervise the VVB management boards, which previously had been given a rather free hand in running the associations.[2]

Since 1968, the trend in East Germany has been back toward modernization, for somewhat paradoxical reasons. Partly because of the collapse of the Czech economy in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion, and also because of the increasing difficulties experienced by the Soviets in their own economy, East Germany has been called upon to respond to expanded East European and Soviet demands for commodities and technical know-how. Fulfilling this task has required an expansion of East German economic capabilities, which in turn has given new impetus to the demand for modernization.

This trend may not go unchecked. The unexpectedly cordial reception accorded by the population of the East German city of Erfurt to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt during his visit there is just one event demonstrating that the state's political situation has not yet been stabilized. Therefore, despite East Germany's economic progress, its relatively high standard of living and a growing sense of social cohesion, the current leadership may decide at some time that the problems of system maintenance must take precedence over the problems of system modernization, and may revert to stabilizing measures.

The Experts

In turning to analyze the effect of these broad social tendencies on the SED leadership, it must be kept in mind that the identification of specific leadership groups with definite trends must be qualified. On the one hand, certain groups and individuals have a definite stake in either modernization or preservation by dint of their past history, their philosophy, their organizational association, and their career patterns and interests. On the other hand, the identification cannot be pushed to the point where an individual or a group is totally identified with modernization at the expense of stability, or *vice versa*. At least, this is not the case in East Germany where the modernizers are thoroughly integrated into the political system and where the stabilizers do want to see an extension of East German capabilities and are willing to accept a certain amount of modernization. All groups in the East German leadership advocate a mix of stability *cum* modernization. However, the mixes are sufficiently varied to permit categorization of the Politburo of the SED into clearly different wings.

At one end of the spectrum is the group of

[1] See, for example, Peter C. Ludz, *Parteielite im Wandel*, Köln und Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1698, p. 136 ff. It should be noted that the Soviet Union had pioneered this type of organization by establishing production committees in several Leningrad enterprises early in 1963.

[2] *Cf.* Paul Liehmann *et al.*, *Leiter und Kollektiv in der sozialistischen Wirtschaft*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1967, p. 101 ff.

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leaders who promote modernization and change, consisting of the younger and professionally educated members of the Politburo. If one takes the age of 45 and the possession of an advanced education as the minimum criteria for inclusion in this group, one of the fifteen full members and five of the six candidate members of the Politburo qualify on both counts. All members of this group were recruited into top positions in the party because of their contributions to East Germany's economic, technical and scientific performance; and their future success in the party depends clearly on the continued dynamism of the economic system. Hence their commitment to modernization is both intellectual in nature and prompted by self-interest.

At present, the single most important individual in this group is Günter Mittag, a full member of the Politburo and Central Committee Secretary for the Economy (born 1927). Five others hold candidate membership in the Politburo. They are Werner Jarowinsky, Central Committee Secretary for Trade and Procurement (born 1927); Georg Ewald, an agricultural expert, who also sits on the Presidium of the Council of Ministers (born 1926); Walter Halbritter, Director of the Office of Prices attached to the Council of Ministers (born 1927); Günther Kleiber, State Secretary for Data Processing on the Council of Ministers (born 1931); and Margarete Müller, a member of the Presidium and Secretariat of the Free German Trade Union Federation (born 1931). Mittag, Jarowinsky, Ewald, and Margarete Müller have belonged to the Politburo since 1963; Halbritter and Kleiber were elected to candidate membership in the spring of 1967. All of these people are experts in their specialized fields. All but Ewald hold either Ph.D. degrees from major universities or diplomas for advanced study at higher technical institutes. Thus their careers demonstrate that economic or technological competence has now become a means to achieve political power in the Communist system.

In an earlier work, the writer has described this group as the core of an "institutionalized counterelite."[3] The term "counterelite" is useful in two senses: it identifies the new breed of party cadres whose education, expertise, and career experience clearly differentiate them from the functionaries of the "Old Guard"; and it also reflects the fact that these younger experts and "technocrats" are regarded with a certain amount of suspicion by the *apparatchiki*. At the same time, this counterelite is "institutionalized" in that it has taken firm root in the apparatuses of the party, the state, and the economy. The members of the counterelite consider themselves convinced Marxists functioning within the political framework of the GDR. But their views on Marxism are quite different from the ideological concepts entertained by many older functionaries. They can best be characterized as pragmatically-oriented neo-conservatives, to differentiate them from the dogmatically oriented old-style conservatives in the leadership.

All of the above-named spokesmen of this group advocate a continuing process of economic and technological modernization in East Germany. They support economic reforms not as a matter of principle but as a matter of practicality—so long as the reforms are aimed at strengthening the industrial and agricultural infrastructure of the GDR and thereby increasing its political leverage *vis-à-vis* other countries. By the same token, when they criticize Politburo decisions, they are not criticizing the basic system or its ideological underpinnings but are rather opposing the imposition of economically inefficient measures by political decision-makers. It may be assumed that they favor improved relations between East and West Germany—again, mainly for economic reasons; they are less interested in the ideological subversion of West Germany or in ideological questions in general.

Within the group, Mittag unquestionably enjoys the most power and prestige, though lately Jarowinsky's star has also been on the rise. In December 1969, Jarowinsky was chosen to present the report of the Politburo to the 12th Plenum of the Central Committee (a key assignment since the report included a comprehensive review of recent economic and scientific progress, covering such subjects as automation and rationalization of industry, developments in the construction and transportation fields, the state of agriculture, foreign trade, etc.).[4] To all outward appearances, however, there have never been any serious rivalries within the group—probably because their special areas of concentration have led to a natural division of

[3] Peter C. Ludz, *op. cit.*, p. 43 ff.

[4] Werner Jarowinsky, *Bericht des Politbüro an die 12. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, 12/13 December 1969* (Report of the Politburo to the 12th session of the Central Committee on the Socialist Unity Party, Germany, December 12–13, 1969), Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1969.

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labor. Thus Mittag has focused on special efforts to rationalize industry and transportation; Jarowinski has concentrated on measures to raise the standard of living; while Ewald has been responsible since 1955–56 for improvements in agriculture.

Some Western observers believe that the Soviets maintain a guarded and even mistrustful attitude toward the younger reformers in the SED Politburo. Such opinions are difficult to prove or disprove. Mittag has visited the Soviet Union a great many times, together with Ulbricht and party stalwarts Erich Honecker and Willi Stoph. In the writer's view, there is nothing—at least on the surface—to indicate that Mittag does not enjoy good relations with the Soviet leaders.

The Dogmatists

Opposed to the group of modernizers is that wing of the Politburo which places the need for stability above the requirements of modernization. Generally older and less well educated than those belonging to the first group, functionaries by experience and true believers by conviction, members of this group tend to stress the supremacy of politics and ideology at the expense of economics and technology (which, in any event, they do not fully understand). They cannot, of course, express opposition to the modernization of East German society—in fact, they probably approve of certain political effects of the GDR's present rapid development, above all its growing influence with the USSR. But they clearly fear that an overly rapid pace of liberalization in the economy might spread to the political structure of East Germany and thereby constitute a very real threat to the power of the party and the preservation of the current system. Hence, they tend to be cautious about modernization even when the situation is well in hand, and to press for a reversal of the trend in times of crisis.

The views, affiliations, interests and policy objectives of this group are epitomized by the case of Ernst Honecker, its leading spokesman. In contrast to Mittag, Jarowinsky, *et al.*, who achieved high rank in the party because of their economic and technological expertise, Honecker reached his top-drawer position thanks to his political know-how. The son of a veteran Communist, Honecker —who was born in 1912 and has been a party member since 1929—is considered by many to be Ulbricht's most likely successor. In recent years he has frequently been deputized by Ulbricht to act as the official representative of the East German party and state. More important, he holds key positions in the party and has managed over the years to build up a personal power base. Since 1958, he has been both a member of the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretary for military affairs and internal security, exercising crucial authority over the People's Army and other security organs of the GDR. As an old-style politician who has spent 40 years in the Communist Party, he has enjoyed the confidence of the older party *apparatchiki.* He has also maintained good relations with the leadership of the East German Communist youth movement (FDJ), which he himself founded and headed up in the first postwar decade (1946–55). In the traditional pattern of the professional party functionary, he has also put in two years of political training in the Soviet Union (1955–56). In general, Honecker fits the stereotype of the colorless, disciplined and cautious party bureaucrat who has little understanding of the "new economics" and who has never displayed much initiative in the area of policy-making. Ironically, it is in part these qualities—in combination with an unswerving devotion to Ulbricht—that have enabled Honecker to become number-two man in the party apparatus.

One possible indication of a recent weakening in Honecker's position perhaps ought to be mentioned. It is clear from his public statements that he has been strongly opposed to the idea of a rapprochement between East Germany and West Germany. For instance, in a speech delivered February 16, 1970, to the students of the SED Higher School "Karl Marx," he declared:

There is no indication that the objectives of West German imperialism—which has at its disposal a strong and aggressive force that must not be underestimated . . . the army—have been changed under the regime of the Social Democrats. . . . What distinguishes the Social Democratic variant [of West German imperialism] is simply that it employs more flexible methods than those used by certain CDU/CSU politians.[5]

While there is no way to verify the report, it has been rumored that Honecker raised strong objections to the initiation of discussions between West German Premier Willy Brandt and SED leader Willi Stoph (more on whom shortly). If this is true, Honecker's view certainly did not prevail—and his defeat on so crucial an issue may well be a significant political omen.

[5] *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Feb. 22, 1970, p. 4.

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Some of the other "hard-line" conservatives in the party's top council ought to be mentioned. One is Paul Fröhlich, a member of the Politburo since 1958, and First Secretary of the SED Bezirk (regional) Party Committee in Leipzig since 1952 (born 1913). Another is Paul Verner, a Politburo member since 1963 and First Secretary of the immensely important SED Bezirk Party Committee in Berlin since 1959 (born 1911). Verner, who fought in the Spanish Civil War and later emigrated to the West during World War II, has become known primarily as an expert on Western affairs; he was also a cofounder with Honecker of the Communist youth movement. Still another member of the group is Alfred Neumann, who has been on the Politburo since 1958 and is now serving concurrently as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (born 1909). Neumann's performance as an administrator has been unimpressive. He served as chairman of the short-lived People's Economic Council from its founding in 1961 until its dissolution in 1965. He then spent three years as a rather ineffectual Minister for Material Economy. In both roles he displayed a lack of understanding of the complexities of modern economics and little more talent for administrative organization.

The professional ideologues in this group of hardliners are Albert Norden (born 1904) and Herman Axen (born 1916). Norden has been a member of the Politburo since 1958 and has served as the Central Committee Secretary in charge of propaganda *vis-à-vis* West Germany and West Berlin since 1955. While he is a highly intelligent man, his intense dogmatism has always impelled him toward a strident and primitive approach in agitprop activities (one of his frequent themes is that the West German government represents little more than the old Nazi system in a new guise[6]). Norden has an obvious rival in Herman Axen, even though both belong to the conservative wing and though Axen is only a candidate member of the Politburo. Axen, who was editor-in-chief of the party organ *Neues Deutschland* for the decade 1956–66, has served more recently as the Central Committee Secretary in charge of foreign propaganda. (A third up-and-coming rival to both of these men is Werner Lamberz, who is not on the Politburo but who has served since 1967 as the Central Committee Secretary in charge of domestic propaganda.)

Considered as a group, the old conservatives obviously do not enjoy as much political power as they did in the 1950's and early 1960's. Since they have relatively little knowledge or understanding of scientific, technological, and economic problems, their influence in a whole range of vital activity has been small. To all appearances, their most important external objective is to weaken the political and ideological fabric of the West German Federal Republic, and it is possible in many instances to show how members of this group have promoted contacts with and extended support to Communists, anarchists, and fellow travelers in West Germany; by the same token, the group takes a negative attitude toward any kind of dialogue with the democratic parties in the Federal Republic. Insofar as relations with Moscow are concerned, most members of the group seem to be limited to contacts with their Soviet counterparts—for example, personnel in the Soviet agitprop apparat. (Honecker is an exception, since he is a frequent visitor to the USSR and has many political contacts there.) Finally, on the domestic front, the group rejects any and every concept or measure that might promote modernization of the party apparatus, presumably because they fear that changes might alter power relations within the party to their further disadvantage.

The "Middlemen"

The remainder of the Politburo is comprised largely of advocates of a middle course between the two wings described above. This mediating posture seems to be dictated less by the search for an optimal balance between the requirements of modernization and stabilization than by the pragmatic recognition that maximum political leverage can be obtained from a flexible "centrist" position catering to—and drawing support from—the other two contending groups. The star proponent of this approach is party chief Walter Ulbricht, whose image as an ideological hardliner is often overdrawn in the Western press; Willi Stoph is in the chief supporting role, with Horst Sindermann and Kurt Hager as other important members of the "Center."

The group's characteristic approach to politics is exemplified by Walter Ulbricht's conduct in the leadership of the SED: on the one hand, he has

[6] *Cf.* Norden's speech, *ibid.*, March 8, 1970, p. 3.

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been tough and unyielding with respect to the pursuit and protection of his personal political power; on the other hand, he has been flexible, adaptive, and open to compromise in policy determinations, generally seeking to achieve a balance or "integration" of various opposing forces in the party leadership. The first of these postures was most evident in the decade between 1950 and 1960, when Ulbricht was involved in the deadly game of eliminating his rivals for power (notably, Zaisser, Herrnstadt, Schirdewan and Wollweber).[7] The second of Ulbricht's postures was epitomized by his quick reaction to Khrushchev's announcement in November 1962 of a major reform in the party, state apparatus, and economic structure of the Soviet Union. Before any of the other bloc regimes acted, Ulbricht managed to formulate and announce a program of economic reform for the GDR, and implementation was already under way by the summer of 1963. Meantime, having recognized that a successful economic policy required new blood—or new brains—in the party leadership, he threw his support behind the aforementioned experts (Mittag, Jarowinsky, *et al.*), who were pressing for more authority, ensuring their election to the Politburo at the Sixth Party Congress of the SED in January 1963.

Just as Mittag and Jarowinsky represent the younger generation, Willi Stoph (born 1914) is the most important spokesman of the middle generation of pragmatic, flexible and organizationally gifted functionaries who have moved to the fore since 1963. In any speculation about the future leadership of the SED, Stoph must loom large; for while Honecker occupies the number-two spot in the party apparatus, Stoph has built up a comparable power base in the state apparatus.

To understand Stoph's current standing in the East German hierarchy, it may be useful to review the highlights of his long and varied career experience. Going back to the early postwar era, in 1945, Stoph—who had spent part of the war years undergoing intensive training in the Soviet Union—was assigned at the age of 31 to the newly-created central economic administration in the then Soviet zone of occupation in Germany, where his most notable achievement was the organization of the construction-materials industry. In 1948, he moved on to the Central Committee apparatus as head of its influential department for economic affairs. In 1951, he transferred into the new state administration of the GDR, devoting himself for the next four years to a series of high-level assignments directed toward the reconstruction of the East German economy. Meantime, in 1953, he was elected to the party Politburo. From 1955 to 1969, Stoph turned to quite different fields of endeavor, organizing first the People's Police and later the National People's Army. During this period, he served as Minister of Defense of the GDR and also as *ex officio* deputy to the Commanding General of the Warsaw Pact forces.

Stoph's combination of economic expertise and extraordinary organizational ability was, of course, precisely what was needed in the "new economic era" of the 1960's; so it is hardly surprising that he quickly came to occupy key positions of power in the regime. Since 1963, he has served as First Deputy Chairman (under Ulbricht) of the Council of State, the supreme policy-making organ or "inner cabinet" of the governmental apparatus; in addition, he has served since 1964 as Chairman of the Council of Ministers—that is, as chief coordinator of all the organs in the state administration. Under his leadership, the Council of Ministers has come to assume an ever larger role in the direction of economic affairs, further enhancing Stoph's area of political leverage and influence.

While Stoph's fabled talents have been basically responsible for his ascent to power, his success must be explained in a larger context. In the first place, his pragmatic approach to problems represents a new style of leadership that has been essential as the SED moved away from its past dictatorial control over society to its present more flexible and more authoritative (as opposed to authoritarian) method of rule. In the second place, Stoph's rise is directly related to the evolution of East Germany from a semi-state demolished by war to the second strongest industrial power in the Sovet bloc; in consequence, the GDR has become indispensable to the Soviet Union for economic reasons as well as for political reasons. Stoph's role in East Germany's recovery and subsequent economic development has without question won him friends and supporters in his contacts with the Soviet elite, including party and government leaders, economic and technological experts, and military men.

Stoph's public posture shows that he is disinclined to engage in ideological rhetoric and suggests that he is disinterested in political intrigues and power rivalries within the Politburo. His political statements differ clearly from those made by

[7] *Cf.* Carola Stern, *Ulbricht: A Political Biography*, Praeger, New York, 1966.

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dogmatists like Honecker and Norden, and insofar as style and manner of delivery are concerned, he is often more conciliatory than Ulbricht. This was quite apparent, for example, in his speech to the People's Chamber in March 1970,[8] reporting on the discussions held in Erfurt with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. The tone of the report was measured and nonpolemical, although in substance it presented the collective view of the Politburo, which is firm in its stance on the conditions that must precede a genuine reconciliation with West Germany (these demands include West German support for international recognition of the GDR; agreement to a policy of non-interference in foreign policy; conclusion of a treaty renouncing the use of force; agreement to the application of the GDR for membership in the UN; renunciation of atomic weapons; and settlement of claimed West German debts to the GDR).

While it is rumored that Stoph has built up loyal and well-integrated staffs wherever he has been in charge, he is not the spokesman for an entire group of functionaries in the sense that Honecker is. The very flexibility that has made the centrist line successful is a clue to the loosely-knit character of the coalition that supports it. Thus it would be misleading to single out Stoph as the one and only representative (next to Ulbricht) of the middle position between the two wings of the Politburo. Certainly another party leader who ought to be mentioned here is Horst Sindermann (born 1915). Before 1963, Sindermann had made something of a name for himself as an agitprop specialist—specifically, as chief of the department of press and radio at the national level of the party apparatus. Like many other party leaders who are currently counted as influential, Sindermann got his real boost at the Sixth Party Conference of the SED in 1963. At the same time that he was elected to candidate membership in the Politburo, he was also appointed to the position of First Secretary of the regional party organization for Halle. This region has reportedly posed particular problems of administration, since it has a mixed economy embracing both large industry and agriculture. To all appearances, Sindermann has performed well in the job. In addition, his knowledge of the central party apparatus, his organizational talent and his exerience in propaganda activities mark him as one of the most promising of all the 15 regional party first secretaries in terms of political potential. In sharp contrast to most of this group, Sindermann's political statements place him unambiguously and squarely among the flexible "centrists" in the party leadership. The three other regional secretaries who belong to the Politburo—Paul Verner (for East Berlin), Erich Mückenberger (for Frankfurt an der Oder) and Paul Fröhlich (for Leipzig)—must be counted as belonging to the wing led by Honecker. Most of the 11 remaining Bezirk secretaries, who sit on the Central Committee but not the Politburo, have also given evidence of being oriented toward the dogmatic wing of the party.

A final figure who ought to be mentioned among the important political functionaries of the "center" is Kurt Hager (born 1912). Since 1954 Hager has served without interruption as the Central Committee Secretary in charge of ideological matters. Since 1963, he has also been chairman of the ideological commission of the Politburo (and a full member of that body). While Hager is an ideologue by nature and by profession, the support he has given to various reform policies places him in the middle group of party leaders around Ulbricht. In particular, he has been open to the modernization of education—and, in fact, has proven very adept at tying the political need for a continued level of ideological indoctrination to the practical need for a better and more efficient educational system in the GDR. According to informed sources, he is personally responsible for the reform of the Higher Party School "Karl Marx" and the Institute for Social Science attached to the SED Central Committee[9]—institutions that have gained greatly in stature during the past few years and can no longer be viewed as mere educational factories turning out propagandists versed in Marxism-Leninism. Thus, whatever the polemical overtones of Hager's public statements, he must be recognized as a modernizer in the field of ideology and, as such, an influential member of the Ulbricht team.

In concluding the discussion of this group, certain similarities should be noted between its approach and objectives and those of the group around Mittag. A rationalistic, pragmatic style of problem-solving is a common characteristic of both

[8] *Neues Deutschland*, March 22, 1970, p. 3.

[9] See, for example, Ernst Richert, *Die DDR Elite*, Rowohlt Verlag, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1968, p. 71.

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Stoph and Mittag. Efficiency in operating the economy is a major goal of Stoph, as it is of the young pragmatists in the Politburo. And, it seems safe to say, the expansion of East Germany's economic and trade relations with the West, and with West Germany in particular, seems desirable to leaders of both groups. Such trade, by making available to East Germany sophisticated machinery and advanced know-how, will quicken the speed of her modernization, expand her economic capabilities, and thus give her more political leverage in Eastern Europe.

The Balance of Power

Like all political systems, that of Communist East Germany has developed a mechanism to adjust the conflicting requirements generated by the processes of system maintenance and system modernization. The key role in achieving the necessary balance is played by the system's political leadership, which serves as a steering mechanism equilibrating the system in response to various pressures from within and without.

In the case of East Germany, that role has been fulfilled by the Politburo of the SED with some adroitness, but with less than complete success. Shifting several times from a policy accentuating system maintenance to one emphasizing system modernization and then back again in response to various contradictory pressures such as the internal need for greater economic productivity and administrative decentralization (1961–62), the Soviet example of recentralization (1965) and Soviet and East European requirements for greater output and efficiency (1968), the East German leadership has managed to generate dynamic growth in a liberalized economy, while maintaining a somewhat precarious stability in the political system.

Perhaps the most important clue to understanding the leadership's performance is to be found in the composition of the group. All members of the ruling elite are thoroughly committed Communists; hence they possess considerable coherence and unity. At the same time, the leadership is sufficiently differentiated so that various groupings (they do not really qualify as full-fledged factions) can be discerned; and this difference is based precisely on the priority which they variously accord to the need for modernization and stabilization. The younger group of technological experts put the main emphasis on innovation and change, particularly in the field of economics, while the dogmatists care most about safeguarding the dominant position of the SED. In between stands the pivotal group of pragmatists whose continuous aim it is to establish a middle position that is acceptable to the entire SED Politburo, both on domestic issues and on the question of relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.

If this balance-of-power arrangement at the top has determined East German policy in the past and does so in the present, can it be expected to survive the eventual demise of its single strongest figure, Walter Ulbricht, who is 77 years of age? Clearly, no one leader in the Politburo combines in his person Ulbricht's power, his prestige at home and abroad, and his long experience. Nor is any one group sufficiently strong enough to assume total power. It seems most likely that representatives of all three groups will share the succession, at least initially. Probably they will be Honecker for the dogmatic wing, Stoph as the advocate of the middle, and Mittag as the representative of the pragmatists. Alternatively, various two-man teams can be projected; the most plausible is the combination of Stoph and Honecker.

While the exact composition of the leadership must remain a matter of speculation, one thing seems quite certain: on balance, both external and internal pressures presently favor the forward march of the East German economy; in this situation, the experts and the pragmatists tend to have the upper hand, and their influence is bound to remain strong for the foreseeable future.

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Security Priorities in Eastern Europe

By Wolfgang Klaiber

Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the Soviet Union and its East European allies have been engaged in an unprecedented diplomatic offensive to mobilize West European governments and political groups in support of an all-European security conference. The idea itself is by no means new. In its present form, it was first proposed by Poland's former Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, before the United Nations General Assembly in December 1964, and since then it has been renewed with increasing vigor and frequency in joint Warsaw Pact appeals to European governments.

Interpretations of Moscow's motives in pressing the proposal have varied greatly. It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that the Soviet Union aimed at disrupting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, at getting United States forces out of Europe, and at forcing the West Germans to recognize the postwar status quo (including the permanent division of Germany, the Oder-Neisse line, the nullity of the 1939 Munich Agreement, and the independent political status of West Berlin on East German territory). A parallel interpretation has been that the Soviet Union sought to preserve the present political status quo in Europe and, in particular, its deteriorating hegemony over the countries of the Soviet East European bloc. Since 1968, some analysts have seen an added reason for Moscow's intensified drive to bring about an all-European security conference in a desire to divert attention from the Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia.

Meanwhile, little attention has been given to the interests of the East European countries, whose diplomacy has also become increasingly active in the quest for an all-European security conference. Implicit in this lack of attention seems to be a prevalent assumption that these countries, especially since the Czechoslovak crisis, have had no choice but to support Moscow's foreign policy initiatives, that they cannot advance any aims of their own, and that therefore their interests and desires in the matter of European security are of

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little importance. This assumption has, however, been rendered problematical by the visible difficulties the Soviet Union has encountered—after the Czechoslovak affair as much as before—in imposing its will on its Comecon and Warsaw Pact partners in regard to other issues. This leads one to hypothesize that the East European regimes tend to view Soviet policy designs generally in the context of their own interests. They may, therefore, see Warsaw Pact policy on the question of all-European security as a vehicle which, in the long run, can promote their own goals—goals that may in some respects diverge considerably from those of the Soviet Union.

One gain for the East European countries is already apparent, even if it derives only indirectly from the Warsaw Pact's all-European security politics. This is the fact that although the policy and diplomacy of these countries regarding European security are more or less closely coordinated with Moscow's, their entry into bilateral political relations and interactions with the West European countries has been legitimized. To this extent, the East European regimes have gained greater freedom of action in the international arena. Furthermore, to the extent that individual East European leaderships are actively interested in transforming the presently bipolar European security system, they may be presumed—within the present framework of intra-bloc politics—to have had a voice in the formulation of the Warsaw Pact proposals.

Security is a state of mind dependent upon a number of elements to which different orders of priority are assigned in the several countries of the Soviet bloc. Safety from military attack is only one such element, and it concerns East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (and the Soviet Union) much more immediately than it does those countries which made no territorial gains as a result of World War II. Related to this consideration is the element of confidence that the nation can pursue its goals in the international arena with some degree of freedom from the fear of war, meaning that the interests of the nation need not be unduly compromised in the face of threats of military sanctions.

While the above considerations variously influence the East European nations' perception of their security needs vis-à-vis the West, their desire for protection against foreign domination—a very important security desideratum indeed—is shaped in significantly different ways by their reactions to the hegemonistic tendencies of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania openly oppose the Soviets in this area, while Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia have considered it the better part of wisdom to subordinate their interest in independence to the imperative of political and physical survival.

Another vital element in the security considerations of Soviet-bloc leaderships is the integrity of the Communist political systems they rule. Lacking legitimacy not only among the people at large but sometimes also within their own party (as the Czechoslovak crisis recently underlined), some of these leaderships could not long perpetuate their dictatorial rule without the support of Soviet military power. Their contention that they require protection against the threat of "reactionary influences" from the West is, therefore, no mere propaganda.

Elements such as these are vital to an understanding of the security priorities of individual East European regimes. For although the Soviet Union dominates the overall approach of the Warsaw Pact powers to the issue of European security and sets the pace in accordance with its own security interests, the various proposals that have been issued so far encompass the different priorities of the several bloc countries. And while the diplomatic initiatives of the individual bloc countries are undoubtedly coordinated with those of Moscow, there also appears to be a definite division of labor that correlates with the discernible security priorities of the different countries of the bloc.

What the present article attempts to do is to illustrate this thesis through a broad-stroke, comparative analysis of the interests that are apparent in the security policies of Romania, Hungary, Poland, and East Germany. The policies of other East European countries would further support this thesis and are equally worthy of study; however, space limitations make it necessary to restrict discussion to the four countries selected, which provide a representative sample of the contrasting security priorities apparent within the Soviet bloc. A brief analysis of the Warsaw Pact's recurrent European security proposals will provide the background against which the interests of the four countries will be examined.

Warsaw Pact Initiatives

The most comprehensive and far-reaching Soviet-bloc proposal on all-European security came out of the July 1966 meeting of the Warsaw Pact Polit-

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ical Consultative Committee in Bucharest.[1] Although undoubtedly initiated by Moscow, the proposal as finally agreed upon was the result of arduous preliminary negotiations among the Pact's member governments in which, as will be shown later, acrimonious exchanges took place between Romania and East Germany.

The Bucharest Declaration was ostensibly addressed to the governments of Europe. Throughout, however, it appealed to "all social forces that are for peace, regardless of their ideological views and religious and other persuasions" to join together in an effort to paralyze "the influence of the forces that would like to continue kindling tension in relations between European states. . . ." Characteristically, it singled out as the bugbear of Europe

> **the militarist and revanchist forces of West Germany [who] refuse to consider the vital interests of the German people themselves and are pursuing aggressive goals that manifest themselves . . . in the shifting of the country's economic potential into military channels, in the creation of a 500,000-strong Bundeswehr, in the glorification of the history of German conquests, and in the nurturing of hatred against other peoples whose lands are again coveted by the above-mentioned circles of the Federal Republic of Germany.**

The FRG, the Declaration charged, was seeking access to nuclear weapons and pushing for "the creation of a scientific-technological and industrial base which could at some time serve for the production of its own atomic and hydrogen bombs," at the same time that it continued to make territorial demands on other nations. Moreover, the United States was accused of "collusion with the militarist and revanchist forces of West Germany . . . [who] . . . are directly prodding the US onto a still more dangerous course in Europe." Pointing, however, to the growing strength of countervailing forces, the Declaration proceeded to call for the convening of an all-European conference and suggested the following measures to insure peace and security for the continent:

1) Development of "good-neighbor relations" based on the principles of "independence and national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage" and of "peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems"; development of economic relations and "cooperation in the fields of science, technology, culture, and art" to provide the material base for European security; and renunciation of all discrimination and pressure in relations among the states of Europe.

2) The complete abolition of military blocs (the Declaration affirmed the readiness of the Warsaw Pact states to join in "the simultaneous liquidation" of the Warsaw Pact and NATO alliances, but warned that as long as NATO continued to function, the Warsaw Pact states were "fully resolved to strengthen their might and defense capability").

3) The undertaking of partial steps to ease tensions, such as "the withdrawal of all foreign troops from other countries' territories to within their national frontiers," mutual reductions of military forces in the two German states, creation of nuclear-free zones, and prohibition of the stationing or transit of aircraft or ships carrying nuclear weapons.

4) The prohibition of West Germany from gaining access to or control over nuclear weapons in any form.

5) Recognition of all existing borders, including the Oder-Neisse line and the frontier between the two German states, as final and inviolable.

6) Agreement that a German peace settlement should be reached on the basis of the above-stated principles.

The Bucharest proposal urged that an all-European security conference produce a declaration "on cooperation for the maintenance and strengthening of European security" along these lines, but indicated that the conference agenda would be open to proposals by any other state. While the Declaration did not specifically exclude any state from participation in the proposed conference, it maintained that "the European states are capable of solving questions of the relations among them without outside interference," and it also asserted that "the peoples . . . are not indifferent to the political course this or that state may choose—one corresponding to the interests of peace and security, or one running counter to these interests." These statements made it plain that the United States would at best be an unwelcome partner in the conference, and that West Germany could expect to be put in the role of an accused. From the standpoint of Moscow's aims, the Bucharest Declaration was quite clearly a prescription for eliminating the US presence from Europe and opening the way for eventual Soviet domination of the continent from the Urals to the Atlantic.

[1] "Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe," *Pravda* (Moscow), July 9, 1966.

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The importance attached by the Kremlin to the growth of "peace-loving forces" in the West European countries in furtherance of these aims was highlighted by Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev in his speech to the conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in April 1967. Referring to "the opportunities" opening up in Europe in connection with the approach of the time for a decision by the NATO powers on whether to extend the Western alliance, Brezhnev declared:

In our opinion it is very right that Communists and all progressive forces are endeavoring to make use of this circumstance in order to develop on an ever wider scale the struggle against preserving this aggressive bloc. . . . Recent years have shown especially clearly that in conditions of relaxed international tension the needle of the political barometer moves to the left. Certain shifts in the relationships of Communists and Social Democrats in some countries, a noticeable decline in anti-Communist hysteria, and an increase in the influence of West European Communist Parties are connected in the most direct way with a marked easing of tension on the European continent.[2]

Between the Karlovy Vary meeting and the Budapest conference of Warsaw Pact powers two years later, some bilateral consultations between individual Pact members and governments outside the bloc on the question of European security took place,[3] but no more joint bloc appeals were issued. The long delay of any new joint initiative may be explained in part by the fact that the developing Czechoslovak crisis preoccupied the bloc leaderships from January to August of 1968, and also by the fact that the ensuing occupation of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces called into question some of the more important proposals contained in the 1966 Bucharest Declaration. In March 1969, however, the Budapest meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders renewed the Bucharest appeal in a slightly more conciliatory and persuasive tone that attracted more than usual interest in the West.

Although the new appeal, issued just before the celebration of the 20th anniversary of NATO in Washington, contained the familiar anti-Western allegation of "forces striving to maintain the division of our continent by pursuing a policy of intensifying tension,"[4] for once no villains were mentioned by name. Even more interesting, in the light of the occupation of Czechoslovakia, was the Budapest appeal's reaffirmation of the validity of the Bucharest Declaration, which had called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from European countries. This gave rise to speculation that the Soviet Union might be weighing the feasibility of securing its hegemony over Czechoslovakia and the other East European Communist countries by means other than the stationing of Soviet forces on their soil.

Still another Warsaw Pact appeal, issued from Prague on October 31, 1969,[5] held out hope that an all-European security conference might be convened in Helsinki in the first half of 1970. (The Finnish government had been persuaded in the meantime to offer its capital as the meeting place for such a conference.) However, the Prague appeal, which was much shorter than the preceding ones, confined itself largely to proposing steps designed to lay the groundwork for a security conference, such as the negotiation of agreements on renunciation of force and "widening commercial, economic, technical, and scientific relations between European states." It suggested bilateral and multilateral meetings among European states in preparation for an all-European conference on security.

As of this writing (May), the date projected in the Prague appeal for such a conference is obviously unrealizable. But the quest continues. It therefore seems appropriate to examine more closely the long-term interests of some of the East European Communist leaderships in the European security debate.

Romania

Since 1962, when its leadership came into open conflict with Moscow over the issue of Comecon integration, Romania's primary security criteria have visibly centered on safeguarding or increasing its autonomy from the Soviet Union. This quest has caused the country—which has been free of Soviet troops since 1958, but which borders geo-

[2] *Pravda,* April 25, 1967.

[3] For instance, the European security problem was reportedly among the topics discussed during French President De Gaulle's visit to Romania in May 1968 (see *East Europe* [New York], June 1968, p. 54), Norwegian Foreign Minister John Daniel Lyng's visit to Poland in November 1967 (*ibid.,* January 1968, p. 49), and Hungarian Premier Jenö Fock's visit to Paris in March 1968 (*ibid.,* May 1968, p. 50).

[4] MTI (Budapest), March 17, 1969. MTI (Magyar-Tavirati Iroda) is the official Hungarian news agency.

[5] MTI, Oct. 31, 1969.

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graphically on Soviet territory—to pursue a delicate and highly risky foreign policy in the uncertain grey zone of Soviet tolerance. Bucharest's stubborn assertion of its independence from Soviet domination reflects the regime's awareness of Moscow's difficulties in moving militarily against a leadership that maintains orthodox Communist political patterns internally at the same time that it insists on pursuing its own national interests—a leadership that enjoys widespread popular support at home precisely because of its resistance to Soviet dominance.

In line with this security interest, Romania's policymakers have moved in two directions. On the one hand, they have endeavored to legitimize and institutionalize the principles of national sovereignty, independence, and mutual non-interference in internal affairs (broadly defined) within the Communist bloc, so as to make it more difficult for the Soviet Union to intervene in Romania's domestic affairs. On the other, they have sought to expand and improve relations with non-bloc countries, particularly those of the West, so as to diminish Romania's economic dependence on the Soviet Union and the rest of the bloc and make it more difficult for the latter to exert political pressure on Bucharest.

In the context of these two major objectives, it is understandable that Romania has shown a predilection to mediate the Sino-Soviet dispute in an effort to prevent the expulsion of China from the world Communist movement. In Romania's estimation, the retention of China in the Soviet camp and the continuation of the Sino-Soviet conflict, albeit in moderated form, would serve to legitimize conflicts of view and national interest among ruling Communist parties everywhere, and in the long run might make the Soviet Union more tolerant of foreign policy divergencies within the bloc. That Romania in 1967 became the first bloc country (after the Soviet Union) to establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany—much to the chagrin of the Ulbricht regime in East Germany—made sense not only as an independent course calculated to further Romanian national interests, but also as a demonstration that Bucharest did not regard West Germany, the proverbial bugbear of European security in Communist eyes, as a threat so great as to preclude peaceful coexistence.

In other words, Romania's foreign policy reflects the calculation that in the long run its security from foreign domination hinges upon its success in bridging the gulf between East and West in Europe, and in obtaining guarantees that the Soviet Union will conform to the standard norms of international comity in dealing with all European nations, including its own Communist protégés, and that policy differences among Communist states will be ironed out only by negotiation and compromise and not by resort to force. This, of course, is a prescription against Soviet domination, and whether Romania will be able to implement it successfully over the long term is open to some doubt. Its success thus far, however, has been noteworthy and inspires hope for the future.

Specifically in the realm of European security, Romania has for some time been trying to forestall Soviet efforts initiated in 1965 to "strengthen" the Warsaw Pact through a greater centralization of its decision-making structure which would facilitate Soviet domination over the other Pact members.[6] To counter the Soviet move, Romania was reported in 1966 to have circulated a position paper among its Warsaw Pact allies demanding an enhancement of the East European members' role in Pact decision-making and rotation of the office of commander-in-chief of Pact forces among the member countries. According to the report, the position paper also held that the maintenance of Soviet garrison forces on the territory of other Pact members was no longer justifiable, that Romania would henceforth refuse to contribute funds for this purpose, and that in case a Pact member should require the stationing of Soviet forces on its territory, it should negotiate the matter bilaterally with the Soviet Union.[7] The unmistakable implication was that Romania no longer regarded the Warsaw Pact as a legitimate basis for the entry or stationing of Soviet troops on the soil of other members of the Pact.

A short while later, Romania again displayed its independence at a conference of Warsaw Pact

[6] The Soviet desire to strengthen the central organization of the Pact was expressed by Brezhnev in a 1965 statement in which he said: "Judging the problem of improving the activity of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, it is necessary to establish, within the framework of this Pact, a permanent and operational mechanism for evaluating current problems" (*Krasnaia zvezda*, Sept. 30, 1965).

[7] United Press International dispatch, May 9, 1966. The latter part of this report was very much in line with the position stated publicly the same day by Romania's party chief and President, Nicolae Ceausescu. Speaking on the occasion of the Romanian Communist Party's 50th anniversary, Ceausescu said: The military blocs and the existence of military bases and of troops on the territory of other states are . . . . an anachronism incompatible with the independence and national sovereignty of peoples and normal relations among states. See *The New York Times*, May 10, 1966, p. 4.

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foreign ministers in Moscow preparatory to the Bucharest summit meeting of July 1966. In the course of the conference, an acrimonious dispute reportedly developed between the Romanian and East German representatives over the question of how strong a denunciation of West Germany should be included in the Bucharest Declaration. Romanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu sought a relatively mild condemnation of the FRG that would leave the door open for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn, whereas East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer insisted on an uncompromising denunciation. At one point Winzer reportedly accused Romania of treason to the socialist cause, causing Manescu to threaten to walk out of the meeting. Brezhnev himself was said to have averted the walkout by conceding that any future disagreements between Romania and other bloc countries (including the Soviet Union) should be discussed bilaterally—in other words, Romania would henceforth not be subjected to collective pressure by a united front of the other Warsaw Pact members.[8]

It has also been suggested that the statement of the principles of independence, non-interference in internal affairs, and disavowal of political or economic pressures contained in the Bucharest Declaration as finally issued was included "clearly at Romanian insistence."[9] Besides this, however, other proposals put forward in the Declaration bear an even more distinctively Romanian trademark. Specifically, the proposals for the simultaneous liquidation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the countries of Europe were among the issues widely reported to have been in dispute between Moscow and Bucharest at the time.[10] Furthermore, the Declaration's criticism of West German "revanchism" supported and exploited by US "imperialism" would certainly have been far stronger had it fully conformed to the standard propaganda materials disseminated by the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Poland on this subject. In acknowledging the importance of strengthening "political relations between states regardless of their social system," the Declaration also recognized a point which Romania had been stressing as a goal of its foreign policy, and in effect helped pave the way for Bucharest's establishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn six months later.

Whether or not, and to what extent, all or any of these points represented victories for the Romanians in the hard-fought negotiations leading up to the issuance of the Bucharest Declaration must, of course, remain a matter of speculation. To determine this, one would have to know specifically what points came into dispute in the preparatory meetings and what positions were taken on them by all the participants. It is nevertheless a fact that the points mentioned above have remained part and parcel of Romania's foreign policy even though the Czechoslovak crisis appeared to give the Soviet Union second thoughts about some of the Bucharest proposals.

Since the Bucharest conference, Romania has been a frequent absentee from Warsaw Pact political meetings, particularly when it seemed probable that Bucharest's independent course would come under attack, or when the agenda concerned matters that Romania holds to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the individual national leaderships. Romania, for instance, was conspicuously absent from all the Pact meetings that dealt with the Czechoslovak crisis, and some reports have it that the Bucharest regime was not even invited to participate. The Romanian government condemned the five-power armed intervention in Czechoslovakia in the strongest terms and has since gone out of its way to denounce the "Brezhnev Doctrine" on numerous occasions. In the context of the intervention and Romania's well-known fear of becoming the next victim, Ceausescu's repeated declarations that Romania's forces would cooperate with those of all other socialist countries against imperialism or foreign aggression sound as if they were directed more against the Soviet Union than against West Germany or the United States. At the same time, the Romanian leadership has continued to maintain that "the road to peace, security, and détente is not the road of the consolidation of military blocs, but of their abolition and of placing relations among states on healthy foundations of collaboration and mutual confidence."[11]

[8] See *The New York Times*, June 16, 1966.

[9] Marshall D. Shulman, "A European Security Conference," *Survival* (London), December 1969, p. 375.

[10] Romania's insistence upon these provisos was clearly implied by Ceausescu in his speech of May 9, 1966 (see footnote 7 above). For other reports alluding to Soviet-Romanian differences on these points, see *The New York Times, May 22*, Section IV, p. 3; May 28, p. 2; June 1, p. 1; and June 12, p. 1.

[11] Speech by Ceausescu before the Romanian National Assembly on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the union of Transylvania with Romania, *Scinteia* (Bucharest), Nov. 30, 1968.

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Unlike some of the other Warsaw Pact members, Romania does not appear to be in any great hurry to convene an all-European security conference. It holds that such a conference "would need the most careful preparation,[12] and that under any circumstances European security depends on the institutionalization of adequate guarantees safeguarding each country against foreign interference in its internal affairs[13]—meaning, in effect, freedom from Soviet domination.

Hungary

Hungary is governed by a regime that has paradoxically managed to combine loyalty to the Soviet Union with strikingly distinctive approaches in both internal and foreign policy. In the domestic field, Hungary is now implementing what is without question the most progressive economic model in the Soviet bloc, yet one that gained apparent acceptance in Moscow at a time, in the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis, when East German and Polish media were vigorously denouncing some of the very reforms which Hungary proposed to put into effect. In the sphere of foreign policy, Hungary has opted for "peaceful coexistence" with a pronounced emphasis on reconciliation across the boundaries of conflicting social systems and ideologies that is quite distinctive among the countries of Communist East Europe. Hence it was probably no mere accident that Budapest was chosen to play host to the numerous preparatory meetings leading up to the June 1969 conference of the world's Communist parties in Moscow, and the fact that so many parties attended the conference no doubt reflected in part the adroit mediation and conciliatory efforts of the Hungarian leadership, apparently winning for it a good deal of respect in the Kremlin.

In the renewed Soviet-bloc drive for a European security conference since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Hungary again appears to be playing the role of prime mover. However, there is some reason to doubt that Budapest's objectives are wholly identical with those of Moscow. Admittedly, the contrast between the Hungarian and Soviet viewpoints on security is less striking than that between the positions of Moscow and Bucharest, but this may be explained in part by the fact that Hungary is much more dependent on the Soviet Union economically than Romania, and in part by the Kadar regime's apprehension—left over from the 1956 revolution—lest any display of anti-Sovietism be interpreted by the Hungarian population as anti-communism.[14]

Hungary's official pronouncements on European security reflect a peculiar mix of "Europeanism" and solidarity with the Soviet-bloc position. Geographically removed from West Germany and free of all claims on its territory, Hungary has for the past several years voiced, in its propaganda, only the minimum criticism of West German "militarism and revanchism" consistent with bloc solidarity. Indeed, Hungary was actively interested in establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany in 1966 but was preceded in this move by Romania, and thereafter, under diplomatic pressure from East Germany (supported by the Soviet Union), the Budapest leadership was persuaded to desist from such initiatives until the Bonn government acceded to the minimum demands of the Ulbricht regime. The underlying premise of Hungary's position vis-à-vis the FRG appears to have been quite different from that which shaped the policies of the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Poland at that time. In the Hungarian view, the key to European security is a long-term process of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among nations with differing social systems and often with conflicting aims—a process that generates its own impetus and hopefully will lead to the institutionalization of peaceful methods of conflict resolution. As Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter explained to the Ninth Party Congress in Budapest on December 1, 1966,

> **The all-European security system will involve increased cooperation among neighboring countries and the examination, step by step, of complex questions causing tensions. Gradually, cooperation between groups might evolve, and from this could follow the organic development of a whole security system of European countries with different regimes. In the Balkans, there could be cooperation by Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania,**

[12] Charles Andras, "European Security and the Security of Europe," *Radio Free Europe Research Report,* East-West Relations 1, March 1970, p. 40.

[13] Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, summarized this position very succinctly in a press conference in London. See transcript reported by *Agerpress* (Bucharest), Nov. 29, 1969, also cited in Andras, *loc. cit. supra,* p. 49.

[14] The latter thesis is supported by the fact that the Kadar regime has made numerous concessions to Hungarian nationalism while emphasizing that there is no contradiction between this and socialist internationalism.

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Greece, and Turkey in the solution of their immediate problems; in central Europe, there are particular possibilities for cooperation among Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria; and [the political division of] the Danube valley may make possible various new forms of cooperation among countries with different systems, ranging from the German Federal Republic to the USSR.[15]

Thus, Hungary's long-term concept of European security is based on regional foundations involving a radical departure from the two-bloc or bipolar reality of the present day. Since the mid-1960's, Hungary has been assiduously cultivating political, economic and cultural relations with Austria and Yugoslavia, as well as with Czechoslovakia. According to Hungarian official statements, these three countries, along with Hungary, constitute the primary Danubian states; Romania and Bulgaria are considered "secondary" Danubian states because of their integral position in the Balkan cooperation scheme which Hungary has sought to encourage as a counterpart to its own concept of Danubian cooperation; and the Soviet Union and West Germany are relegated to a tertiary position because they are "not truly Danubian countries."[16]

The Hungarian leadership, then, sees the solution of the European security problem in a transformation of the present bipolar arrangement into regional security systems cutting across bloc dividing lines. The hope appears to be that the Danubian basin and the Balkans may eventually evolve into regional security communities through the institutionalization of cooperation among the several countries in each region. Hungary therefore attaches special importance to developing cooperative relations with Austria, whose geographic position, "capitalist" social system, and non-alignment with either bloc make it a particularly propitious potential partner in Budapest's scheme of all-European security. Yugoslavia, whose political system, though socialist, is quite distinct from the general pattern of the Soviet bloc, and which enjoys real independence from Soviet control, is also looked upon by Budapest as a key cog in a security system along regional rather than bloc lines.

Such a blueprint for European security is difficult to reconcile with Hungary's posture of absolute loyalty to Moscow, since it implies the replacement of Soviet domination by regional cooperation. The conflicting pulls on Hungarian policy which it reflects were, indeed, strikingly illustrated during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. Throughout the first half of the year, until about a month before the five-power intervention, the Hungarian leadership displayed a markedly positive attitude toward the Dubcek regime and the reforms that it was contemplating. The intellectual ferment impelling Czechoslovak communism toward "humanization" at times received even enthusiastic praise in the Hungarian media. Basically opposed to any military intervention in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs, Hungarian party chief Janos Kadar sought to mediate the steadily intensifying dispute between the Dubcek regime and the majority of the Warsaw Pact leaderships (with Romania the only other significant exception besides Hungary) in the months leading up to the occupation. On the one hand, he tried to induce Dubcek to meet the minimal demands of his Warsaw Pact allies, while on the other he sought to dissuade the latter from resorting to military action against Czechoslovakia. His attempt failed, however, because the Czechoslovak reform movement had developed a momentum that even Dubcek, had he wanted to, could not stop or reverse, creating a situation in which the Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland insisted upon intervention as necessary to protect their own security. Although Hungary finally participated in the five-power occupation of Czechoslovakia, it did so with obvious reluctance. Totally dependent on the Soviet bloc for its economic needs and with Soviet garrison troops stationed on its soil, Hungary found itself in a position where it had no alternative but to yield to the pressure of its Warsaw Pact allies.

Since the Czechoslovak crisis, the Budapest regime—with Soviet approval—has renewed its efforts on behalf of an all-European security conference, which it sees as a matter of the utmost urgency. However, in keeping with its view that the security problem can only be resolved by a long-term process of developing a new framework of European interdependence and cooperation in place of the existing rival blocs, it believes that the proposed conference represents "not a final aim, but only a way station."[17] Like Romania, and per-

[15] MTI (Budapest), Dec. 1, 1966.

[16] See the well-documented analysis by Charles Andras, "Neighbors on the Danube," *Radio Free Europe Research Report*, December 1967, especially pp. 62–83.

[17] *Nepszava* (Budapest), Nov. 2, 1969.

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haps from a viewpoint somewhat at variance with that of Moscow, Hungary regards peaceful coexistence as a struggle

> **. . . waged to enable every people in the world to live, completely and without exception, in national independence, to control their destiny without outside interference, and to choose their social system freely, thus insuring that normal relations can develop among states and that the settlement of disputed international questions by negotiations becomes universal practice.[18]**

Poland and East Germany

For the purpose of this paper, it seems best to discuss Poland and East Germany in tandem, since they have shared common security problems in the postwar era and until very recently have adopted common approaches to these problems. In particular, both countries have been guided by their perception (or misperception) of the potential threat to their territorial security posed by West Germany. Through all the years from the founding of the West German state until the recent victory of the Social Democratic Party (October 1969), Bonn has been adamant in its claim to represent all the German people and in its aim of reunification; in deference to Bonn's stance, most non-Communist governments have refused to extend diplomatic recognition to the GDR. From the viewpoint of the East German leadership, this situation has represented a triple threat—to its own legitimacy, to the future of communism in East Germany, and to the survival of the GDR as a separate state. The regime in Poland has faced a similar if somewhat less complex problem in that Bonn has refused in the past to recognize the finality of the Oder-Neisse line, thus perpetuating Polish fears that West Germany might some day seek to recoup the territories it lost to Poland at the end of World War II.

Until about a year ago, the East German and Polish regimes showed staunch solidarity in their response to these issues. In essence, they maintained the position that any significant improvement in their relations with West Germany would require Bonn's irrevocable acceptance of the postwar status quo—expressed through its diplomatic recognition of East Germany as a sovereign state (within whose territory West Berlin would exist as an independent political entity rather than as part of West Germany, as at present) and its affirmation of the Oder-Neisse line as the inviolable western frontier of Poland. Both regimes were absolutely firm in their adherence to this position, although they differed in the vigor and tenor of their demands. Both in policy statements and in propaganda, Warsaw tended to strike a milder tone than Pankow with its harsh emphasis on irreconcilable conflict. Nonetheless the message was the same.

In their propaganda, the two regimes ceaselessly plied the theme that West German "revanchism" combined with US "imperialism" constituted the foremost threat to the security of all European countries. The latter emphasis served two distinct political purposes: it was intended both to influence popular attitudes in the West against the German "menace" (and thereby weaken NATO) and also to sustain a sufficiently high anxiety level at home to ensure compliance with regime dictates.

While these political aims were obvious, it was also clear that the East German and Polish regimes felt genuine fear with respect to the possibility of military aggression on the part of West Germany. Their mounting concern over the gradual rearmament of West Germany was compounded by the apprehension that Bonn might eventually get access to nuclear arms. It is understandable, then, that after the introduction of US nuclear weapons on the European continent (mostly on West German territory), Poland became one of the leading proponents of European security and arms control agreements. The efforts undertaken by Poland's former Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki to achieve disarmament and nuclear-free zones in Central Europe are well known and need no discussion here. East Germany's overtures in this regard were probably just as numerous as those of Poland, but because the GDR lacked international recognition, its activities did not gain nearly as much attention as Warsaw's. As already mentioned, Poland is credited with having opened the new cycle of Warsaw Pact initiatives for an all-European security conference—specifically when Rapacki, in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1964, denounced the idea of creating a multilateral nuclear force in NATO and urged the convening of a conference of all European states "to examine the problem of European security in its entirety." (Incidentally, Rapacki called for the participation of the United States along with the Soviet Union—which is interesting in view of the ambiguity of the Bucharest proposal on this subject and the frequently negative attitude of Moscow on

[18] Istvan Darvasi, "Struggle and Tactics," *Magyar Hirlap* (Budapest), Sept. 28, 1969.

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the inclusion of the United States in an all-European security conference.)

Interestingly, Rapacki's proposal for a security conference came at a time when East Germany was hinting that if bilateral talks could be held with Bonn leading to West Germany's withdrawal from any multilateral nuclear force arrangement, reunification and other benefits might follow—a somewhat paradoxical approach in view of East Germany's long quest for international recognition as an independent state. It seems fair to conclude that if East and West Germany had gotten to the negotiation stage, complications would have ensued—a notion amply confirmed by East Germany's later escalation of demands whenever the possibility of negotiations between the two sides appeared realistic.

When Romania and West Germany established diplomatic relations in January 1967, East Germany and Poland showed great consternation—much more visibly, in fact, than did the Soviet Union. From their point of view, West Germany was being granted recognition by a Soviet-bloc country without consideration of their vital interests. Worse still, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria were also showing signs of interest in establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany; thus, there was a real danger that Bonn could gain influence in the Soviet bloc without conceding on any of the issues considered crucial to the security of Poland and East Germany. Only frantic diplomacy on the part of Pankow, with Polish and (belatedly) Soviet support, averted this danger. Bilateral agreements on mutual friendship and assistance between East Germany on the one hand, and Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, on the other, forestalled the establishment of West German diplomatic relations with the bloc countries until Bonn had met the postulated prerequisites.[19]

In general, the positions taken by Poland and East Germany on specific European security problems have been in close accord with those of the USSR—mainly because their national interests have coincided with the broader power-oriented interests of the Soviet Union. By the same token, the East German and Polish regimes have always put much greater stress on the Warsaw Pact and the might of the Soviet Union as the guarantors of their security than have the other East European countries—a fact that is once again explained by their vulnerable geographic position, their concept of the threat from West Germany, and their rather obvious unease about the susceptibility of their political systems to popular unrest. During the crisis of Czechoslovakia, East Germany was the most insistent of the Soviet Union's East European allies in urging military intervention, and Poland was close behind. Both regimes appeared to fear the effect of Czechoslovak ferment on their internal security and the threat of a corridor opening from West Germany to the heart of the Warsaw Pact bloc. Both assessed the Czechoslovak crisis as a lesson underscoring the danger of imperialist subversion and the need for unity among the Soviet bloc countries. In the wake of the intervention, they launched an intensive propaganda offensive against liberal reforms—aimed directly at Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia but equally applicable to Hungary—contending that such measures inevitably opened a Communist country to capitalist influences. East Germany's party chief, Walter Ulbricht, went so far as to declare "deadly hostility" (*Todfeindschaft*) to capitalism (with inevitable stress on the West German variant); he also advocated a drastic curtailment of bloc contacts and connections with the West on the ground that they tended to make Communist countries dependent on and vulnerable to Western influences.[20] Although Polish party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka did not go quite so far, a speech he delivered to the Fifth Congress of the PZPR (or CP) did deemphasize Poland's relations with the West.[21]

The solidarity of the East German and Polish views on security lasted until the spring of 1969. The fact that the two regimes had for so long

[19] The dates of these agreements are March 15, March 17, May 18, and September 7, 1967, respectively. The parties acknowledged the existence of two German states, emphasized the inviolability of present frontiers, and promised to defend one another in the event of aggression. West Berlin was said to be a separate political unit on East German territory. The parties agreed to consult with each other on all important international questions (meaning in this context primarily the question of relations with West Germany). Implicitly, West Germany's recognition of the status quo just described was deemed necessary for the normalization of relations between parties to the treaties and Bonn. See ADN, the official East German news agency (East Berlin), March 16 and 17, 1967; MTI (Budapest), May 18, 1967; and *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Sept. 8, 1967.

[20] Speech to the Ninth SED Central Committee Plenum, in *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Oct. 25, 1968.

[21] For text, see *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), December 1968.

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spoken in unison made the impact of Poland's change of course all the more striking when it came. It did so in the form of a sudden offer from Gomulka in May 1969 for bilateral negotiations with West Germany aimed at a formal recognition of the Oder-Neisse line.[22] As the basis for his hope that bilateral talks might lead to a definitive agreement on this issue, Gomulka cited several statements made by Willy Brandt (already on the campaign trail for leadership of the FRG) referring to the "necessity of recognizing or respecting the Oder-Neisse line until a settlement in a peace treaty." Ostensibly in response, Gomulka adopted a notably softer tone with respect to the "German problem," implying that Warsaw no longer considered West German recognition of the GDR and of the special status of West Berlin a prerequisite to a bilateral Polish-West German search for normalization of relations.

Beneath the formal rhetoric, it was quite obvious that Warsaw's new course was strongly motivated by economic factors. Gomulka's bid for talks came amid signs of increasing economic difficulties in Poland, particularly in the investment field, and amid reports that East Germany had refused to grant a Polish request for a large loan. Soon after Gomulka's bid for talks, there were reports that the West German government was considering a large-scale program of economic aid to Poland.[23]

Brandt's accession to the Federal Chancellery in October was greeted as a positive development throughout the Soviet bloc (though only reluctantly in the ruling circles of the GDR). It also made bilateral talks between Poland and West Germany almost a foregone conclusion—particularly since the Soviet Union now made it clear that it also wanted to negotiate with Bonn with respect to an agreement on the renunciation of force.

Needless to say, the East German leaders viewed the growing prospect of Polish-West German bilateralism with grave misgivings. They had to face up to the fact not only that Poland was separating its own primary security problem (recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line) from the issues of concern to the GDR, but also that by seeking a direct solution with West Germany, Poland was very seriously impairing Pankow's leverage with Bonn. More broadly, the East Germans feared that bilateral negotiations between bloc countries and the FRG might lead to the recognition of that country by Pankow's allies without exacting Bonn's *de jure* recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state. (Brandt had made it clear that he recognized the *de facto* existence of two German states but emphatically rejected the notion that these two states, which—to use a formula coined by him—represented one nation, should regard each other as foreign countries; hence, diplomatic recognition of East Germany was precluded in his *Ostpolitik*.) Pankow also feared that bilateral negotiations might diminish or obviate the need for an all-European security conference. The latter was East Germany's key to recognition in Europe—for at such a conference both German states would be represented as sovereign entities on an equal footing with the other European states.

Early in December 1969, the Warsaw Pact leaders assembled in Moscow to assess the change in the government of West Germany and to decide jointly on the most promising approach to that country to promote their several interests. It seems clear that the East Germans defended the stance just outlined, opposing bilateral talks with Bonn and urging patience on their allies until an all-European security conference should materialize.[24] Obviously, however, the East German delegation was overruled, and the conference gave the green light for bilateral negotiations with Bonn. While the communique issued at the close of the conference was characteristically vague about its disputes, both the Soviet Union and Poland made direct overtures to Bonn shortly thereafter, and the ensuing bilateral talks are still in progress at the time of writing.

This turnabout in tactics left East Germany as the "odd man out" in the Soviet bloc—a position it could not maintain for long, at least not on a matter so vital to its own security. In January 1970, it was Ulbricht's turn to make overtures for a meeting between East and West Germany at the highest governmental level, and on March 19 the heads of government from both sides met at Erfurt for the first time in the 20-year-long existence of the two German states.

Thus, the tactics of Poland and East Germany

[22] Electoral speech by Wladyslaw Gomulka in Warsaw, May 17, 1969, *Trybuna Ludu*, May 18, 1969.

[23] See, e.g., "Bonn Weighs Aid Program for Poland," *The Washington Post*, June 26, 1969.

[24] This position was clearly and forcefully outlined in an article by East Germany's Foreign Minister Otto Winzer, "Für Sicherheit and Zusammenarbeit der Völker Europas," in *Neues Deutschland*, Nov. 4, 1969.

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(not to mention those of the Soviet Union) toward the solution of their primary security problem have changed. But their objectives have not. In the Polish case, Warsaw—propelled by impatient domestic political forces and economic necessity—appears to have acted on its own volition, with an approving nod from Moscow. East Germany was compelled to fall into line with the changing tactics of its closest allies—first, because it could not carry on the confrontation alone, and more important, because there was a real possibility that negotiation might bring results where confrontation had failed, leaving East Germany far behind if she refused to adopt a similar course.

What is known of the Erfurt talks and Stoph's behavior during the recent Kassel discussions with Brandt suggest that all three Warsaw Pact powers which have met for talks with Bonn are making the stiffest demands possible. The immediate objective of the three countries appears to be to soften up the FRG, the core of Europe's security problem (as they perceive it), so as to facilitate the convening of, and later negotiations in, an all-European security conference. Whether or not they will succeed remains an open question. For the present, the most that can be said is that the process of détente in Europe has entered a new phase and gained a new dimension.

It might also be added that this shift in tactics has brought the Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany closer to the ideas propagated by Romania and Hungary, regarding an all-European security system as an objective to be achieved through an ongoing process of consultation, cooperation and confidence-building. This process is dynamic, promising change and compromise on both sides, whereas the confrontation of the past has been static, yielding only an uneasy status quo (one that has been more uneasy in the Soviet bloc than in the West). In the negotiations between West Germany and the Warsaw Pact powers, the conflicting issues are being laid on the table; if they cannot be reconciled, then at least they can be better understood.

Conclusions

Our examination of the policy lines followed by Romania, Hungary, Poland and East Germany in promoting the joint Warsaw Pact effort to organize an all-European security conference has revealed telling differences in their respective approaches to the problem of security; and it has pointed up as well the gap between their several positions and that of the Soviet Union. At bottom, these differences stem from the nations' various perceptions of the nature of the threat to their security, which in turn are determined by their evaluation of three fundamental factors in their political environment: first, each country's perceived vulnerability to Bonn's outstanding claims upon its territory arising from the settlement of World War II; second, the degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the regime, or conversely, the degree of attraction exerted over its population by Western political freedom and standards of living—what their propaganda media label as "reactionary influences of Western imperialism"; and third, the degree of their economic and political dependence on the Soviet Union.

Together, these perceptions, which for obvious historical and geopolitical reasons vary from country to country, shape variously the order of priorities assigned by each country to different security objectives, the complexion of the diplomatic line taken to accomplish these objectives and the vision of the international security system most likely to allow for their fulfillment.

Of the four countries discussed here, Romania is the most favorably situated in regard to all three security factors: she has little to fear from West Germany, her regime enjoys firm popular support, and she seems least dependent upon Soviet support. It is no surprise, then, that Romania has used the diplomatic maneuvers for an all-European security conference to articulate ambitious national security objectives, to move boldly to achieve them, and to work vigorously for the establishment of a loose European security system which would minimize outside pressure on her. In fact, the Romanian blueprint for a European security system is designed to forestall not Western but Russian intervention and military aggression—clearly considered by Romania's leaders to be their foremost security problem—via the foreclosure of all outside interference in the affairs of sovereign nations.

The Hungarian regime, as its diplomatic demarches on behalf of the all-European security conferences have shown, is also moving toward greater autonomy in the international field. But, since its domestic following is relatively insecure and its need for Soviet support large, its security objectives are more limited than those of Romania, its modus operandi is unobtrusive (consisting of "small steps" toward autonomy taken to the accompaniment of loud protestations of solidarity with the Warsaw Pact), and its vision of the most favorable European security environment is ori-

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ented toward the establishment of a regional cooperation scheme in which the influence of the Soviet Union would progressively diminish. In the end, both Hungary and Romania appear to have placed their bets on the proposition that the creation of such larger security systems is bound, in the long run, to create a situation in which the actions of the Soviet Union will be governed by the common rules of international comity and intercourse, much as those of Western nations are today.

So far, Poland and East Germany have been rather unfavorably situated with respect to their ability to cultivate independent approaches to their security problems. During most of the postwar period, their leaderships have been preoccupied with what they considered to be the continuing threat of Western aggression. For East Germany, this problem has been compounded by the question of its survival as a separate state. Both regimes are rather insecure in their domestic backing, and both rely heavily on Soviet protection; hence, their immediate goals continue to be rather closely related to the security objectives of the Soviet Union.

However, if the recent bilateral negotiations between these two countries and West Germany continue, and if they lead to even a partial resolution of the issues at conflict, they may raise a number of questions affecting these countries' evaluation of the security problem in Europe. Thus, if and when Poland and the GDR start to view the West German threat as more remote, will their priorities with respect to security change accordingly? Will the changing political environment in Europe prompt these governments to follow the lead of Romania and Hungary in attempting to expand their freedom of action in pursuit of their national goals? Will they, in the end, come to regard Soviet domination as the primary threat to their security?

The answers to these questions about future East German and Polish attitudes to security, in conjunction with projections of current Romanian and Hungarian policies in this field, may well add up to the prognosis that one day the present bipolar European security system will be transformed —particularly, since interest in all-European security arrangements is increasing among Western and neutral nations as well. The complexion of the new system will be determined largely by the length of time allowed for the transition and by the manner in which the Europeans use that time. And not the Europeans alone—much will also depend on the behavior of the Americans and the Soviets. On the American side, the critical factor will be the degree to which the US upholds the credibility of its guarantee to protect the security of Western Europe, thus giving West European countries, and above all West Germany, both the time to engage in protracted negotiations with the East and the self-assurance to refrain from making unnecessary concessions. On the Russian side, future developments will be crucially affected by Moscow's decisions and attitudes on the continued stationing of Soviet occupation troops in Eastern Europe, on the application of the Brezhnev doctrine justifying Soviet military intervention in "socialist" countries, and on the use of military force in countries outside the bloc.

Clearly, the transformation of the present bipolar security system into a looser system will be a process of great complexity and long duration. One of the positive aspects of the current negotiations is that they have brought this point home to the Warsaw Pact nations. Implicit in the Warsaw Pact's original Bucharest Declaration and the subsequent proposals up to 1969 was the assumption that an all-European security conference could speedily settle all outstanding security problems in Europe; it was part of that unrealistic expectation that no significant European role was assigned to the United States and that a largely disarmed West Germany was expected to accept the postwar political and territorial status quo in a security environment molded by the dominant "European power," the Soviet Union. By contrast, the Prague proposals of October 1969 conveyed the recognition on the part of the Warsaw Pact powers that the settlement of Europe's security problems required the initiation of a protracted process of negotiations, entailing the convening of numerous conferences. Thus the stage has been set for a long debate ahead.

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The Other Germany

ARTHUR M. HARNHARDT, JR.: *The German Democratic Republic.*
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.
JOHN DORNBERG: *The Other Germany.*
Garden City, Doubleday and Company, 1968.
JEAN EDWARD SMITH: *Germany Beyond the Wall.*
Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1969.

Reviewed by Melvin Croan

EAST GERMANY HAS ELUDED serious public attention for far too long. The appearance of these three books suggests that this state of affairs may now be changing, which is certainly all to the good. All three volumes offer a *tour d'horizon*, each from a markedly different vantage point, and it seems only appropriate to ask how well each equips the non-specialist to come to terms with the much-neglected "other Germany." As will be pointed out, none is fully satisfactory.

Professor Harnhardt's monograph, originally commissioned as part of a larger study of "integration and community building in the Communist Party states," is severely restricted by its framework. Adhering to a simplistic scheme of historical periodization (pre-entry into the Communist system, entry, post-entry in two consecutive stages), it examines such attributes as "belief system," "goal fulfillment," and "compatibility of goals relevant to integration" in each of the prepackaged periods. The results are entirely predictable, stylistically and analytically. The reader discovers, for example, that East Germany's "entry [into the Communist system] was achieved between the Third Party Congress in July 1950 and the Second Party Conference in July 1952." But what of the complex and controversial international diplomacy surrounding the German question during the entire crucial decade 1945–1955? One also learns that insofar as the "correlation matrix" between the GDR and the other Communist states is concerned, the highest correlation to be found in the system is between the diad GDR-Soviet Union and GDR-Czechoslovakia at .706." How very sad that when the units of East Germany's National People's Army marched into Czechoslovakia in August 1968, they were so oblivious to statistical inference. Or perhaps they were only acquainted with the "raw data" score of the "diad" GDR-USSR.

To cite other examples of misleading generalization or misplaced precision would serve no useful purpose. At the same time, however, it would not be entirely appropriate to invoke Alfred Cobban's well-known dictum castigating behavioralism as a "device for avoiding politics without achieving science." Suffice it rather to say that systematic comparative study of the Communist states (and their relationships to one another) can be a challenging enterprise, and it is most assuredly a timely one. But for such study to be productive, both flexibility in approach and breadth of perspective are essential.

IF PROFESSOR HARNHARDT'S exercise in political science is narrow in focus and stilted in presentation, Mr. Dornberg's journalistic account must be faulted on exactly opposite grounds. As *News-*

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week's "man in Bonn," Dornberg covered East German developments at close range during most of the 1960's. In the course of his German assignment he was afforded many opportunities to travel throughout the GDR, and his visits included a stay in Erfurt, where he was born. An extremely well-informed observer, Dornberg has a great deal of real interest to report—a pity, therefore, that his book should be so shapeless and repetitive. That occasional minor errors crept into such a wealth of factual detail, political gossip, and lengthy excerpts from official pronouncements and personal conversations can be readily forgiven. But that little attempt was made to digest this mass of material for the benefit of the uninitiated reader is a more serious failing. Dornberg's recurrent use of the purplest of journalistic prose doesn't help matters in the slightest. His major point appears to be that a separate nation is developing (or has already emerged) in East Germany—a tantalizing thought that is merely asserted rather than examined or argued. Much of the same applies to the author's thought-provoking, if no longer very novel, idea that unification of the two halves of Europe is the only means by which the partition of Germany can eventually be overcome.

OF THE THREE BOOKS under review, however, Jean Edward Smith's is far and away the most puzzling. An American political scientist now teaching in Canada, Mr. Smith visited East Germany with his family for three months during the spring and summer of 1967 and returned there for a shorter visit in the spring of 1968. He relies heavily on his own experiences and impressions and those of his family, recounting numerous dialogues with East Germans from all walks of life. According to Smith, he was entirely free to come and go as he pleased; yet the reader is confused at the outset by being told that although he planned to call upon Professor Robert Havemann and Wolf Biermann, the most outspoken domestic critics of the regime, he did not press his request when confronted with official disapproval because, he writes, "if the government wished me not to see Havemann, that was within their prerogative." (As a matter of fact, the "government's prerogative" notwithstanding, both men have seen Western visitors repeatedly. Indeed, there are good grounds for believing that Havemann, for one, regards such visits as the best possible guarantee against his being brought to political trial.)

In general, Smith's highly personal account is lively, engaging, and quite well written. It would be a pleasure to be able to add that it is also analytically sound and politically sophisticated. Alas, it is neither. Smith seems so eager to prove that the GDR "actually exists," and that it has made substantial economic progress (both of which are undeniably true), that he either neglects or distorts essential features of the East German polit-

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ical system. As a political scientist, he might have been expected to give us some idea of the extent to which the SED's ideological and political controls have been affected by the more pragmatic imperatives of East Germany's New Economic System. Yet he skirts that crucial issue in favor of a textbook-like sketch of the SED's formal organizational structure.

The GDR's unenviable political history gets remarkably short shrift. To be sure, Smith does provide a chapter dealing with what he calls the "years of doubt: 1945–1949," which relies on conventional secondary sources. But he has little to say about the 1950's, when there were many false starts in domestic policy and outbreaks of infighting inside the SED hierarchy. His discussion of the Ulbricht regime's *Kulturpolitik*, inserted at the end of a chapter on education, exhibits almost total insensitivity to the deeper political ramifications of cultural affairs under communism. As Smith sees it, the artists and writers are well paid by the state and should be expected to toe their employer's line; the state, moreover, deserves high praise for spreading culture among the masses. Concerning East German agriculture, Smith stresses the good performance of recent years and ignores the dismal record of earlier years. But except for a passing allusion or two to the "dislocation" of the early 1960's, there is no serious discussion of the massive collectivization of agriculture which, according to Dornberg and most other reporters, was accompanied by brutal terror.

And what is one to make of Smith's assessment of Ulbricht as a talented civil servant, animated by "ideals" that "flow from the ethical humanism of Marxist thought"? (Tell *that* to the hapless protagonists of humanistic socialism in Prague!) Or take Smith's interpretation of the June 1953 uprising. While granting the existence of "widespread dissatisfaction at that time," he deems it necessary to add that "nevertheless, it is unlikely that Western intelligence agencies—given the open border in Berlin—remained completely aloof from the proceedings in the Eastern sector." This sort of innuendo may be modish New Left stuff, but just what is it meant to prove? Or does Smith actually know something about the June 1953 "proceedings" that the rest of us do not? As for East Germany's construction of the Berlin Wall, the reader's attention is directed to the preceding intensification of Western, especially West German, "pressure." Again, however, his evidence—in the form of Cold War rhetoric on the part of second-rank officials in Bonn—is scarcely conclusive. If one attached the same significance to the Cold War rhetoric of Ulbricht and his henchmen, East German "pressure" would long since have toppled the Federal Republic. Finally, isn't it presuming too much to imply, as Smith does, that it lay essentially within the West's own power "voluntarily to stabilize the GDR?" Can it really be that the domestic policies pursued by the SED regime had no bearing on East Germany's internal stability?

The reviewer fully shares Smith's expressed desire to get away from Cold War cliches and propaganda. But to substitute for West German propaganda an equal measure of East German misrepresentation hardly seems the right way to go about things. After all, as Dornberg suggests, East Berlin has now become much more of a Cold War capital than Bonn. This was true when Professor Smith first ventured into the GDR, and it seems destined to remain true for some time to come. Unless the situation is fully explored and its implications dispassionately analyzed, no amount of rigorous behavioralism, on-the-spot journalism, or occasional tourism will provide us with an adequate picture of "the other Germany."

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Soviet Views on Education

HENRY CHAUNCEY, Ed.: *Soviet Preschool Education, Vol. I: Program of Instruction.* New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969.
M. N. RUTKEVICH, Ed.: *The Career Plans of Youth.* (Translated and edited by Murray Yanowitch) White Plains, New York, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969.

Reviewed by Harold J. Noah

BOTH THESE BOOKS make available to Western readers valuable Soviet materials dealing with different aspects of the Soviet educational system. The first, edited by Mr. Henry Chauncey, president of the Educational Testing Service at Princeton, N.J., and a longtime student of Soviet education, is a translation of the official "Program of Instruction" (*Uchebnyi plan*) for Soviet nursery schools and kindergartens. The second is a translation of a Soviet study originally edited by Professor Mikhail N. Rutkevich and consisting of a series of articles by Soviet sociologists on the career preferences of youth upon completion of secondary-level education.

As Urie Bronfenbrenner implies in his perceptive introduction to the Chauncey volume, the Soviet *Uchebnyi plan* (prepared under the auspices of the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Science and Academy of Medical Sciences) will inevitably be compared with the programs of Drs. Spock and Ginott in the United States; but whereas theirs are intended for parents, *i.e.*, non-professional child-raisers, the Soviet program is very much a document for the professionals who staff preschool institutions. In it they find detailed guidance on all major aspects of the normal child's physical, intellectual, moral, esthetic, and civic eduation. If the non-Soviet reader wants to know what kind of people the Communist Party wishes to raise in the Soviet Union, he need go no further than these rules for the rearing of children from birth through age six in preschool establishments.

Although provision for the group upbringing of children in the Soviet Union is extensive, probably more extensive than in any other country, it would be wrong to suppose that it is comprehensive. In fact, it still enrolls only a minority of preschool-age children: about 10 percent of those under two years of age, and perhaps 20 percent of the three to six year-olds. One reason for this deficiency, in spite of the obviously strong commitment of both the party and the government to preschool group upbringing, lies in the exceptionally high costs involved. The finance minister's latest budget report to the Supreme Soviet contains an item of three billion rubles to sustain a preschool enrollment for 1970 of 9.5 million children. The implied cost per child of nearly 300 rubles a year is two to three times higher than the cost per pupil in the ordinary schools of general education; and in addition to the 300 rubles provided by the state, parents are expected to contribute modestly toward the expenses of supplying food and other consumables. This must mean that the Soviet Union is still a long way from the time when all or nearly all of its infant citizens will be raised out of reach of the "harmful influences" of grandmothers and others, whose ideas about what constitutes perfect moral

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training may differ quite sharply from the atheistic, collectivist, and Leninist guidelines of the *Uchebnyi plan.*

DOES PRESCHOOL AND SCHOOL experience in the Soviet Union eventually turn most young people into docile, complaisant, collectively-oriented citizens, ready to do whatever is good for society, as interpreted by the CPSU? One strong indication that this, too, has not as yet happened is provided by the Rutkevich study, which has been translated with exceptional professional competence by Murray Yanowitch.

The collection provides further evidence of the welcome expansion of empirical and quantitative work in Soviet sociology. Instead of the traditional approach, which consisted of making a series of assertions about how the Soviet social system *must* work in accordance with certain immutable and inevitable laws of socialist development (all of which resulted in highly formalistic, ideological, and unreal statements about the nature of Soviet society), the authors prefer to look at the actual, stated preferences of young people for further study and careers, and to ask how far they are in fact accommodated.

The results should dispel all illusions that the Soviet Union possesses some magic formula whereby discrepancies between social needs, as expressed in planners' goals, and individual preferences have been eliminated. Because the path upward in Soviet society leads directly (and almost uniquely) through the VUZy, the higher educational institutions, and because higher education is not only tuition-free but also entitles the student to a subsistence stipend, most young men and women completing the ten-year secondary school want to go on to higher education. But such programs are very expensive for the state, and in consequence there is room for fewer than one half of secondary-school graduates. Rutkevich, in his perceptive article entitled "Social Requirements, the Educational System, and Career Plans of Youth," expressly condemns all "administrative" measures to ration scarce places in higher education according to social-class or work-experience criteria, the two favorite criteria in the past. The author and others in this symposium call instead for admission based strictly upon demonstrated academic competence in competitive entrance examinations and for doing away with the quotas based upon social origins, previous work experience, and (though this is not mentioned) religious and racial origins. The accepted line has come around 180 degrees since the Khrushchev-led "reforms" of 1958, under which few were to be admitted to the VUZy without a minimum period of two years' prior experience in the labor force. On the question of who should be granted the privilege of studying for a degree, these empirically-oriented Soviet sociologists are thus revealed as devotees of pure meritocratic principles.

But the competition is not among equally-advantaged children. Several authors demonstrate conclusively, on the basis of sample surveys, that substantial educational advantages are still enjoyed by urban children over rural children, by children of the intelligentsia over those of workers, and by workers' children over peasant children. The career choices of children from each of these groups (classes?) differ markedly; but while the state assumes the full expense of everyone's education, the children of the intelligentsia would appear to enjoy a distinct advantage over all others: they often benefit from better and costlier training on their way to better-paying positions.

Hence the curious paradox that runs throughout the argument of this book. If it is clear that the children of the well-educated and better-off are bound to win under present conditions of scholastic competition, how can one go on to call for even greater weight to be given to the "objective" results of competitive entrance examinations in selecting students for higher education? Will this not further worsen the disadvantaged position of those who did not happen to choose their parents properly? Of course it will, but nowhere is this problem faced squarely by any of the authors. Instead, in perfect accord with meritocratic principles, the need to supply the Soviet economy with the most competent labor force is stressed. An economist would never quarrel with this aim, but one may expect of sociologists a more candid recognition of the likely social consequences of pursuing such a course.

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The Future of Soviet Politics

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, Ed.: *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics.*
New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.

Reviewed by Hugh Seton-Watson

THIS BOOK CONSISTS OF a number of commentaries by eminent specialists in Soviet affairs on an article by Mr. Brzezinski entitled "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" The essays originally appeared in these pages, mostly before the spring of 1967, though Mr. Brzezinski's final summary is dated May-June 1968. Inevitably, some are a little out of date. Since they were written, we have seen the rise and fall of Dubcek, the strange *évènements* in Paris of May 1968, the intensification of the Soviet-Chinese conflict, and the sharpening of internal conflicts in the United States. As a whole, however, the material is still well worth reading, offering plenty of food for thought both to the general reader and to the student specializing in Soviet affairs.

The central issue debated—whether change in the Soviet Union is likely to come by peaceful evolution or by revolution—remains as important and as unanswerable as ever. The last two years have yielded no great new insights in this respect, so all that the writer can do is to add some further comments and ask some more questions.

Several of the contributors insist that revolutionary forces exist in the Soviet Union, and certainly in the intervening period there has been growing evidence of social and political criticism of the regime so profound as to merit the epithet revolutionary. The question remains, however, as to what opportunities exist for revolutionary action. Here a historical comparison may be enlightening.

The era since 1945 is strikingly similar to the years after 1815 in Europe. Then a league of reactionary monarchs used force to impose order and suppress the burgeoning discontent of a growing minority of politically conscious persons among their subjects. Revolts took place in the satellites of the great empires—in Piedmont, Naples, Spain, Poland and Greece. All save one (that in Greece) were brutally crushed, as was the attempted revolution inside Russia—the Decembrist rising of 1825. The revolt in Greece succeeded only because none of the reactionary Great Powers trusted each other or really wished to see the Greeks put down. In 1830 the French liberals got away with a very mild change which can hardly be called a revolution; but in Central Europe the lid was pressed down on seething discontent for another eighteen years. Then came the revolutions of 1848—but every one of these was suppressed, with its leaders punished or driven into exile. In Poland, Hungary and Romania the troops of the Tsar marched in to suppress freedom. After 1848 there were some fluctuations in political power, but essentially the autocratic regimes remained unchallenged. Certainly there was no successful bourgeois revolution. In the end, a real change was brought about not by popular revolts but by wars —in the Crimea, in Lombardy, in Moravia, and on the battlefields of France. Wars also played a vital part in the downfall of Tsardom—beginning with Russia's incomplete victory of 1878 to the defeats it suffered in 1904–05 and 1914–15.

Since 1945 one giant despotic power, far stronger and far more reactionary than the imperial regimes of Metternich or Nicholas I, has held

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Central Europe in subjection. As in the 19th century, there have been revolts against this tyranny—in Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In three cases the struggle for greater freedom was brutally suppressed; in the fourth (Poland) it was slowly betrayed. The Yugoslavs asserted their schism with impunity, and for the same reason as the Greeks did in the 1820's: aside from their courage, their strategic position and the relations between the Great Powers favored them. The Romanians, with great skill and bravery, have achieved in relation to the Soviet Union the same sort of precarious autonomy as their ancestors enjoyed in relation to the Ottoman Sultans. Yet the power of the Russian autocracy—over its direct subjects and over its colonial dependents—remains as little shaken today as it was after 1848.

The difference is that war, which between 1854 and 1870 transformed Europe's political system no less than its frontiers, and which accelerated the pace of social change as well, is a method to which no government can deliberately resort in the age of the missile and the nuclear warhead. Should we conclude from this that the atom bomb, which President Truman and his advisers thought had ensured American supremacy, was the greatest disaster that ever befell America, dooming America's European friends to enslavement and perpetuating the denial of all that America was believed to stand for? Or should we expect that, just as throughout the history of human warfare new offensive weapons have called into existence new defensive weapons, so in the struggle between tyranny and the forces which resist it, the latter will find new methods to neutralize the advantages of the tyrants?

Mr. Brzezinski makes a strong case for the degeneration of the Soviet political system. Unfortunately, the key factor in political degeneration is something that cannot be quantified, something generally ignored by the political scientists who try to blueprint the Soviet future. This is the morale of the political elite. Let us take two examples from Russian history. The abolition of serfdom in 1861 was due to many causes, but one of the most important, underrated by recent historians precisely because it is unquantifiable, was the breakdown of morale in the landowning class, especially among those members of it who held posts in the central bureaucracy. Even before the Crimean War, senior officials in the Ministry of Interior no longer believed in the system which they administered. Much the same was true of the central bureaucracy in the reign of Nicholas II with regard to the official dogma of autocracy. Local gendarmes, and even provincial governors, continued to carry out orders with prompt and cheerful brutality, but in the central ministries, even in the headquarters of the police, there were many who had lost their nerve, or who had troubled consciences. This deterioration of morale was visible at the turn of the century, in the events of 1905, and still more in the last years of the regime. It undoubtedly had much to do with the events of February 1917.

Is anything of the kind to be seen in the Soviet political class of today? The signs are not easily detected by foreigners, since their contacts with bureaucrats and members of the managerial class rarely extend to the kind of intimacy and frank exchange that was possible before the Revolution. The fact that the generation in power treats the deviant behavior of the young in the Soviet Union more mildly than was the case in the reign of Stalin or even of Khrushchev may perhaps be an indication of declining political morale, but this is too slight a foundation to support ambitious theorizing. At present the indications are that the demoralization of the political class not only is more profound but is developing much more rapidly in Western countries than in the Soviet Union.

Another decisive unknown in the Soviet picture is the attitude of the young generation. We read a good deal of the heroic young intellectuals who speak out against injustice and barbarism regardless of the cost to themselves. Such people appear not to have existed at all in the generation that was hoisted up the ladder of power after the Great Purge and immediately after the Second World War—those now aged between 45 and 55. If today there are some thousands of protesters in the age group under 30, that is real and splendid progress. They will not suffice to overthrow the regime, but by their example and by their outstanding moral courage they will have an influence out of all proportion to their numbers.

However, it would be a great error to assume that most young Russians are like them. On the contrary, most have been brought up to accept the contemporary Soviet ethos propounded in the schools and colleges, in the press and on television—an amalgam of residual Leninism, Russian imperialism, intellectual conservatism and philistinism. The keynote is a self-righteousness far exceeding anything exhibited in the age of Kipling or Teddy Roosevelt. It is not a question of "my country right *or* wrong"—whatever the Soviet leadership desires automatically becomes "right."

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That this unlimited self-righteousness does not take the outward form of Victorian chauvinism is irrelevant. Soviet young people are not told to hate Americans or Frenchmen, or even Germans or Chinese, as such; they are taught blandly to assume that in every situation the interests of the masses in every country require whatever action the Soviet leaders decide. Those persons in other countries who oppose such decisions are by definition imperialists, reactionaries and monsters of iniquity. It is inconceivable that there could be any truth in any criticism that they make, and it is inconceivable that they could be inspired by any motive that was not utterly self-serving.

We should not forget that in both the civil and the military machine of the Soviet Union, the people now moving into the upper echelons of power are too young to have held positions of responsibility during World War II—indeed many of them can hardly remember the war. They may admit, as an intellectual proposition, that war is a bad thing, but they cannot have the feelings of those who went through the last war, still less of those who had to make the decisions in it. Within another decade such people will be managing the Soviet empire. As they may well see it, their country is surrounded by governments and peoples which are in various degrees hostile to the Soviet Union and which at the same time bear all the marks of weakness and degeneration. The Chinese are a barbarous race of yellow men whose insults cannot be endured. The Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Romanians and the like are incurably vulnerable to the noxious political germs diffused from the West, especially from Western Germany. Yet the West European countries themselves are prey to every kind of internal disorder—drugs, pornography, long hair, student disorders, strikes, all the grotesque pantomime of parliamentary democracy. As for the United States, it is both the source and the victim of the most virulent germs of all.

To the extent such an outlook exists, it suggests a certain line of strategic reasoning. To attack China now would be foolish; it would lead to a long drawn-out struggle, during which the Soviet Union would be vulnerable to the West. At the same time, it might be a very good idea to frighten some American pundits into thinking that there will be a Sino-Soviet war with unpleasant consequences for all, because that might induce the degenerate American petty-bourgeois liberals to make further concessions. At present it would be unwise to try and finish off Western Europe (so as to remove once and for all the infection which keeps subverting Russia's European empire), because there is still at least some chance that the Americans might risk the destruction of their cities rather than let Europe go under. But if the internal collapse of American morale continues, there may not be so long to wait. Then Europe can be liquidated, and after that it will be China's turn.

All this may sound like fantasy, but is it really so absurd? Is it not rather one of the forms which the degeneration forecast by Mr. Brzezinski might take? One of the classic answers of tyrannies to internal strains is a victorious foreign adventure. Pleve's plan for a quick success in Japan is a well-known example; Hitler's actions from 1936 onward provide others.

There is of course no way to tell whether the degenerating Soviet regime, conscious of its internal difficulties and facing an increasingly demoralized Western world, will follow the example of the Third Reich, mobilizing for its purpose the ignorance and the untapped idealism of a chauvinistically indoctrinated youth. What *is* clear, however, is that every abdication of will in the West makes this more likely. Level-minded negotiation with the Soviet government on serious matters, combined with measures to strengthen the ability and the will of Western nations to defend themselves and to strengthen their confidence in each other's loyalty, can defeat Soviet pressures and maintain peace until the time when Chinese pressure on the Soviet Union is really dangerous. Then will come the time for concessions—not by the West but by the Soviet Union, not at the expense of the people of Central Europe and of the Russian people but to their advantage. Meanwhile every defeatist statement by a Western politician, as well as every fatuous gesture of conviviality with Soviet officialdom, is a knife in the back of the courageous protesters in the USSR who are our best friends and the best hope of the human race.

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Bearing Witness

ANATOLI MARCHENKO: *My Testimony.*
New York, E. P. Dutton; London, Pall Mall Press;
Toronto, Clarks, Irwin & Co.; 1969.

Reviewed by Ludmilla Thorne

SEVEN YEARS AGO Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* was published in the Soviet Union. The work had an immediate and profound impact both in the Communist world and in the West, not only because of its sheer artistry but also because of the political function it performed. In writing his literary masterpiece, Solzhenitsyn focussed on a subject which all Russians had long known about but had not yet dared to discuss in public—the man-made hell of Stalin's labor camps. Thus the novel contributed directly to the destalinization process, spotlighting some of the worst evils of the so-called "cult of personality." The very fact that the work was approved for publication in the Soviet Union led some Western readers to believe that the era of slave labor was finished.

Now we have a new book from the Soviet Union —one which makes it sadly clear that labor camps are still a part of the Soviet reality. Stalin has passed on, but the camps have not.

The book, titled simply *My Testimony*, was written by Anatoli Marchenko, a 31-year-old laborer with an eighth-grade education. Unlike *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, Marchenko's book was not published in the USSR and probably never will be, because for several years now writings on the "camp theme" have been forbidden (including Solzhenitsyn's other works on the subject, such as *The First Circle*). But like many other Russian books, *My Testimony* circulates in the Soviet Union in manuscript form. In the summer of 1969 it was published in Paris in the original Russian, and now it has appeared in English translation in England, Canada and the United States. The English edition has an excellent introduction by Max Hayward, who underscores the importance of Marchenko's book as "the first detailed and completely unvarnished report on conditions in Soviet camps today by someone who knows them at first hand." It should be added that the book is not a report on the treatment of regular criminal prisoners but an account of conditions in Soviet camps for political prisoners, many of whom are intellectuals, writers, artists and religious believers.

The author of the book was born in 1938 of illiterate parents in the small western Siberian town of Barabinsk. Before completing his secondary education—the regular "ten-year school"—Marchenko started working on the Novosibirsk hydro-electric station and on other similar projects in Siberia. Like other young workers, he lived in a dormitory. One day, a fight broke out in the living quarters of the young men. By the time the police arrived, most of those involved had run away or gone into hiding. Those who remained were arrested, among them Marchenko. "They sentenced us all in a single day, with no attempt made at finding out who was guilty and who innocent," he writes. "Thus it was that I found my way to the terrible camps at Karaganda."

Unable to reconcile himself to the idea of being unjustly imprisoned, Marchenko planned an escape from the camp. In October of 1960 he and another

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prisoner tried to cross the border into Iran but were captured about 50 yards from the frontier. They were taken to Ashkhabad, the capital of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic. Marchenko was then 23 years old.

After being detained in solitary confinement for five months, Marchenko faced a closed trial; not even his mother was allowed to attend. He was tried for treason by the Supreme Court of the Turkmen SSR and was sentenced to six years at hard labor—a ruling not subject to appeal. His companion, who testified against Marchenko in order to gain leniency for himself, was given only two years for attempting to cross the border. However, even Marchenko's sentence was relatively light; as a "traitor to the homeland," he could have been shot.

Marchenko's experiences during his long six-year journey through a maze of Soviet jails and forced-labor camps comprise the main part of his account. He says that after he was sentenced, "I had only one sensation, and that was that an injustice had been committed, a legalized illegality, and that I was powerless; all I could do was to gather and store my outrage and despair inside me. . . ." It is amazing that such sentiments are expressed in his account not in a spirit of hatred or vindictiveness but as a straight, stark narration of the facts.

His story is written in simple but literate Russian, with an ample sprinkling of camp jargon, some of which is impossible to translate. Michael Scammell, the translator of the English edition, has nevertheless captured the style and flavor of the original Russian text.

Artistically, Marchenko's book cannot be compared with Solzhenitsyn's classic narrative—but Marchenko does not claim to have produced a great work of literature. In his introduction he states: "I don't consider myself a writer, these notes are not a work of art." Literary quality aside, however, there are strong parallels in the two works. Marchenko himself reminds one of Solzhenitsyn's hero. Like Ivan Denisovich Shukhov, he is a simple worker and not a member of the intelligentsia. Like Ivan Denisovich, Marchenko lives each day as well as he can. Unlike other prisoners (called "*zeki*" in Russian camp jargon), neither of the two men tries to ease his frightful existence at the expense of his fellow inmates. They do not kowtow to the administration; they do not go after "soft" camp jobs.

Marchenko's term began at the large camp compound near Potma, about 250 miles east of Moscow. There are no statistics available on the total number of political prisoners in the Soviet Union today, but Marchenko tells us that at Potma alone there are about 3,500 prisoners. He mentions other prison compounds located in the areas of Vorkuta and Kazakhstan, as well as certain "death camps"—notably Norilsk—from which no prisoners return.

Comparing the present with the past, Marchenko states that "today's Soviet camps for political prisoners are just as horrific as in Stalin's time; a few things are better, a few things worse." It appears that the only really significant difference is a quantitative one: whereas prisoners under Stalin numbered in the millions, today they number in the thousands.

One aspect of prison policy which does not seem to have changed is the use of hunger as a disciplinary measure and as a means of inflicting punishment. In a chapter titled "Hunger," the author gives us a penetrating description of what it means to be tortured by starvation "day after day, month after month, year after year." The regular fare in camps is scientifically designed to provide the minimum nourishment that will keep a human being alive and "able" to do hard physical labor. The daily food ration, equal to 2,400 calories, consists typically of two cups of watery gruel in the morning, two cups of rotten cabbage soup with two spoonfuls of cereal for lunch, and two spoonfuls of cereal and one piece of codfish (the size of a matchbox) for dinner. Police dogs on duty receive nine times as much meat as the prisoners. The fare doled out to prisoners in the "*shizo*" (punishment cell) is even closer to a starvation diet. After spending seven days there, Marchenko was too weak to walk and had to hold onto the walls to support himself. He was placed in the *shizo* because he had failed to fulfill his daily work quota while suffering from an acute ear inflammation. According to Marchenko, it is commonplace for prisoners to be punished instead of receiving needed medical attention.

Prisoners are exposed to other privations—cold, filth and disease. They are also exploited by members of the camp administration, who frequently bully or bribe prisoners into doing "personal favors" (such as loading logs for firewood or helping build their private homes). Above all, the prisoners are constantly subjected to personal humiliation, reminding them that in the camps they are no longer considered human beings.

Toward the end of Marchenko's term, the writer Yuri Daniel was sent to Potma and was assigned to Marchenko's work-gang. The two men became

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friends. Daniel and Andrei Siniavsky had of course become a *cause célèbre* when they were sentenced in February 1966 to five and seven years respectively for publishing their works abroad and "slandering the Soviet Union." Marchenko gives us the most accurate report yet available on Daniel's imprisonment. He also provides some insights into the other prisoners' attitudes toward the two writers.

Daniel emerges as a man of great will and simplicity, traits which endear him to his fellow inmates. There is a moving description of how Marchenko and several other prisoners tried to shield Daniel from the vindictive persecution of the camp authorities, though without much luck. Marchenko reports that in June 1966 Daniel was sent to the *shizo* for 15 days despite the fact that he was suffering from an infection that had developed in an old wound. No sooner was he released than he was put right back in for another 10 days. According to Marchenko, Daniel was already hard of hearing when he arrived at the camp, but he later became almost completely deaf, as did Marchenko himself.

Other camp inmates, men from all walks of life, are portrayed by the author with equal sensitivity. We meet Anatoli Burov, the son of a dispossessed "kulak" family; the Lithuanian Richardas, who was shot while trying to escape and was left lying unattended for five days; Andrei Novoshitsky, a young soldier who had defected to the West but returned because he felt homesick; and many others. All have ended up at the bottom of the pit. As the author makes distressingly clear, the law of the jungle rules life in labor camps. The strong devour the weak, and only the strongest survive. Animal instincts prevail over human instincts among prisoners whose only purpose is to keep alive:

It seems that it isn't that difficult to reduce men to a condition of complete animalism. They forget what self-respect, honor and morality mean. In every cell there are at least two informers ready to squeal on other prisoners in order to receive a bit of extra food or some small privilege. . . . Others, more desperate, hang themselves, cut their veins under the blankets at night or mutilate themselves.

The author tells us of men who even succumb to drinking their blood and eating their own flesh. In helpless protest others cut off their ears, fill their eyes with ground glass, or swallow strange objects such as spoons, nails or wire. It is indeed no wonder—as Marchenko adds—that prisoners "need great discipline and great moral strength in order to preserve themselves in such inhuman conditions, in order to preserve their human dignity and human relations with one another."

My Testimony is not an easy book to read, with its fearful details of suffering and horror. Most readers will be shocked, depressed and disturbed by it. But for Western observers interested in all facets of Soviet life, it is necessary reading. Max Hayward notes that in addition to providing information on Soviet labor camps, Marchenko

. . . also succeeds . . . in giving very revealing glimpses of Soviet life in general. Not only is there a wealth of information about social habits (including sexual mores), but the reader is given the "feel" of real life at the humbler levels of existence in the Soviet Union. Marchenko introduces us to the vast submerged reality which few foreigners or even educated Russians ever see.

ANATOLI MARCHENKO'S six-year term ended in November 1966. But today he is once again in prison, because his courage did not stop with the writing of *My Testimony*. After his release, he authored a number of open letters of protest against conditions in Soviet labor camps as well as against Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia, vexing the Soviet authorities to the extent where they were determind to put him behind bars again.

On July 29, 1968, he was arrested on a trumped-up charge of violating passport regulations and was jailed for a year. His release was scheduled for July 1969, but instead he was sentenced on August 20th to two more years in prison camps for "defamation of the Soviet political system." Marchenko's friends now fear for his life; they are not certain whether his health can survive another jail term.

Camp friendships weave unique patterns of new attachments and loyalties. It was Marchenko who helped Yuri Daniel and who shed light on his fate; when Marchenko himself was again arrested in July 1968, it was Daniel's wife, Larisa Bogoraz-Daniel, who came to his aid. In an open letter dated August 1, 1968, she describes the brutal circumstances that led to Marchenko's new arrest and ends her appeal with the words: ". . . Marchenko didn't count on anyone's intercession. He understood that the authorities could reckon with him any day they pleased. But do *we* have the right to allow this?"

In October 1968 Larisa Daniel herself was exiled to Siberia, and her friends began to write letters of protest on her behalf. Her teen-age son Aleksandr has also mounted the barricades. Thus the cycle continues, a cycle of persistent resolution. We can only hope that some day the brave men and women who have dared to fight repression shall overcome.

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Reviews in Brief

Exit Khrushchev

WILLIAM HYLAND and RICHARD WALLACE SHRYOCK: *The Fall of Khrushchev.* New York, Funk & Wagnalls, 1969.

THIS WORK OFFERS a concise treatment of the two years spanning the Cuban missile crisis and the CPSU Central Committee's action stripping Khrushchev of his power. The authors have managed to cover with admirable clarity a broad spectrum of events leading up to Khrushchev's final humiliation, from purely domestic problems to intra-bloc and international relations. Two of the eight chapters deal with the Cuban crisis itself, "a turning point for both Khrushchev and his policies"—although, as the authors themselves recall, he retained enough strength to push through his unpopular bifurcation of the party *apparat* in November 1962, only weeks later. There is a detailed account of Frol Kozlov's ensuing challenge in the spring of 1963, when the First Secretary's prestige was at a new low—a series of maneuvers that might have succeeded had not Kozlov been felled at the crucial moment by a heart attack that eventually proved fatal. Messrs. Hyland and Shryock conclude their narrative with an interesting theory of Shelepin's involvement in the October 1964 *coup* and a catalog of the dissatisfactions which gave rise to it.

This study, like the earlier and more detailed one by Michel Tatu, is valuable to present-day readers for the light it sheds on the continuing peculiarities of Soviet power. Right to the end, Khrushchev's ability to crush a direct challenge was formidable, a fact clearly recognized by his undoers (consider the stealth with which they operated during his absence from Moscow). Yet on day-to-day issues, even crucial ones, he was held in check time and again by the objections of his colleagues. Their restraints on his freedom to wield power frustrated the solution of pressing problems and no doubt contributed to the displays of erratic policy-making that were laid to Khrushchev's "voluntarism" in the final indictment.

The same ambiguous situation has remained to plague Khrushchev's successors. Faced with a naked threat, as in Czechoslovakia, they at first were nearly paralyzed by time-consuming tergiversations, deciding on the massive deployment of force only—apparently—at the last moment. Against more subtle challenges, such as unsolved economic difficulties and creeping social change at home, they continue to reveal a lack of resolution almost certainly engendered by failure to reach a consensus.

Another lesson of October 1964: in the final analysis it was not the riskiness of Khrushchev's foreign course, nor the ruinous consequences of his domestic brainstorms (like the absurd suspension of crop-rotation in the virgin lands), nor even his trammeling of intellectuals and other social groups, that ultimately moved the party apparatus to shelve him. Only after his frenetic reorganizations and reshuffling had infringed on the sacred prerogatives of the party functionaries themselves did the pressures from within that gray mass finally become strong enough to goad his adversaries into taking the initiative to stop him. Khrushchev's cardinal sin was not that he failed to solve his country's problems, but that he tried to solve them without regard for vested interests. Ironically enough, that suggests that the present leadership, which defers to the interests of its functionaries, could take the Soviet Union even farther along the road to disaster before encountering resistance from those who have the means to prevent it.

James Critchlow

Soviet Philosophy

RICHARD T. DE GEORGE: *Soviet Ethics and Morality.* A study of the Russian Institute of Columbia University. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1969.

THE OFFICIAL SOVIET primers on philosophy and allied subjects—from the *Foundations of Marxism-Leninism, The Foundations of Marxist Philosophy,* and *The Foundations of Marxist-Leninist Ethics* to *The Theory of State and Law*—have never gained, nor deserved, the respect of those interested in philosophy, ethics or law. If we read them at all, we do so for other purposes; we learn to set them in historical, social and political context—and always to read between the lines. By the same token, there may have been some value, one or two decades ago, in presenting—for those who do not read Russian—a critical outline of Soviet doctrinal teachings, faithfully communicating their tedious simple-mindedness, their failure to grasp what is important and creative in Marx, and their lack of intellectual incisiveness and genuine intellectual relevance. Now, however, we expect anyone who writes on Soviet philosophy or ideology to surmount the dreariness of the subject by linking his exposition with critical insight into the problems of Marxist ideology, of Soviet society, or of contemporary intellectual developments—or of all three.

Within the last few years, Professor De George has published a series of studies of Soviet and East European ideology: *Patterns of Soviet Thought* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966), *The New Marxism: Soviet and East European Marxism Since 1956* (New York, Pegasus, 1968), and now *Soviet Ethics and Morality,* a relatively detailed exposition of official Soviet

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moral philosophy in theory and in practice. All three are painstaking, reasonably accurate, but consistently insipid accounts of formal doctrine, accompanied by equally painstaking, reasonably competent, but similarly insipid and unilluminating criticism. Professor De George shows surprisingly little sensitivity to social and intellectual history, to Soviet life and Soviet problems, or to the distinction between the first-rate and the third-rate.

Because it concentrates on a narrower topic, *Soviet Ethics and Morality* is less like an introductory primer than the author's earlier books, but unfortunately it is no less tedious. In the first half of the book, De George sets forth the dialectical-materialist and historical-materialist bases of Soviet ethics, discusses some of the recent Soviet writings on ethical categories, and then proceeds with a detailed examination of the Soviet treatment of freedom, duty and moral evaluation. The second half of the book is devoted to practical ethics: the new Moral Code of the Builder of Communism, the system of moral inculcation and social control in the Soviet Union, and finally a just but fairly superficial critique of Soviet ethical teachings, principally on the ground that they subordinate the individual to the collective. The philosopher is unlikely to find any of this of genuine philosophical interest; and for the Sovietologist, De George's laborious detail fails to cast fresh illumination either on Marxism or on Soviet society.

Eugene Kamenka

Early Fellow Traveler

ALBERT RHYS WILLIAMS: *Journey into Revolution: Petrograd, 1917-1918.* Edited by Lucita Williams, Foreword by Josephine Herbst, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1969.

ALBERT RHYS WILLIAMS might almost be called the archetypal fellow traveler. A Congregationalist minister, he went to Russia in 1917, worked for a few weeks in the propaganda department of Trotsky's foreign affairs commissariat, returned to the United States in 1918, and in 1921 published an account of his experiences entitled *Through the Russian Revolution.* Not an intellectual given to self-analysis, he never asked himself what price, in human lives, would have to be paid for the construction of a political system which, as he put it, "has pioneered the way to a new society and made invaluable laboratory experiments in Socialism on a colossal scale." He merely transferred to Soviet communism the simple faith which he had once had in the Christian gospel (or at least, in a rather woolly brand of Christian socialism).

He remained steadfast through all the shocks of Stalinism, including the purges (which did give him some cause for concern, but which he deliberately refrained from criticizing publicly), and the suppression by the Soviet censor of his own writings (in which Trotsky was mentioned). There was always a ready excuse for the faults of the Soviet regime: all governments made mistakes; the Communists' grandiose aims entitled them to the world's indulgence; ultimately it was all the Western imperialists' fault anyway. For if the Allies had not intervened against the Bolsheviks in 1918, he reasoned, the revolution would have preserved its initial idealistic and popular character, of which he was one of the few surviving witnesses.

The present volume, a padded-out version of the work which he wrote some fifty years ago and which has been edited by his widow (Williams died in 1962), is, therefore, a typical product of an unreconstructed believer; it is impressionistic, inaccurate, and tendentious.

Since there is no indication which statements are from notes and which are the product of subsequent reflection, its historical value is limited. Although Williams acknowledges that "my memory for dates and figures is wretched" (p. 276), conversations which took place in 1917-18 are reproduced verbatim. He does manage to convey something of the confusion attending the Bolshevik takeover, but he seems to have had no real understanding of the issues involved, partly because of his ignorance of Marxist theory, Russian history and politics, and for that matter, the Russian language. For example, Williams' eyewitness account of the peaceful demonstration in support of the democratic Constituent Assembly on 18 January 1918, which was bloodily suppressed by the Bolsheviks, goes as follows:

We saw a red banner being carried over the Aleksandr II Bridge. Suddenly there was the drumfire of a machine gun, and a precipitate riot. As we swung down one street, we saw Red Guards manning a barricade of wood across the street. In the effort of the Soviet to prevent bloodletting by restraining any provocation from its side against the *burzhui,* blood was spilt. (p. 194)

In this extraordinary passage one wonders which is the more reprehensible: the mumbo jumbo of the last sentence or the term "precipitate riot" applied to an unarmed crowd fleeing before a volley of machine-gun fire.

However, the book does have a modest value. Specialists in the history of the Russian revolution will gain something from Williams' account of his relations with other members of the American community in Petrograd. For the general reader, the author's impressions of Lenin, whom he met on several occasions, will not be devoid of interest. Although uncritical and incomplete, they bring out the human side of Lenin's character, in particular his unaffected charm when dealing with men he felt he could trust. Lenin seems to have been rather taken in by Williams' eloquent enthusiasm, and to have greatly overestimated both his reputation among American socialists and the impact his oratory was likely to have upon New World audiences. No one seems to have told the Bolshevik leader that his interlocutor was a Congregationalist minister who had not sundered all links with his church. Lenin even offered to help Williams with his studies of the Russian language and Marxist theory. This extraordinary suggestion shows how hard Lenin found it to adapt himself to his new functions as *de facto* head of a rapidly expanding bureaucratic state machine. It seems scarcely surprising that Stalin and his minions eventually took over.

For a discussion of early Soviet politics, or any of the great issues raised by the Russian Revolution, one looks in vain to Albert Rhys Williams. Warmhearted but almost embarrassingly gullible, he gazed at Bolshevik Russia through rose-tinted spectacles, lovingly yet unseeingly—the first of his kind, but by no means the last.

John H. L. Keep

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Observations on the Soviet Census

By Murray Feshbach

Climaxing four years of advance preparation and publicity, a nationwide census was taken in the Soviet Union during the week of January 15–22, 1970.[1] The primary purpose of the census was to collect the data necessary to make a detailed assessment of the population and manpower resources of the USSR—information that is perhaps especially crucial in a country whose economic system is based on central planning. But as in other countries, census data can also yield a wide range of other information on the state of the nation. While the results of the Soviet census will only become known at scheduled intervals over a three-year period, a number of preliminary insights can be gained from an examination of how the census was conducted, what questions were asked of the populace, and what kinds of studies are planned through correlations of the data collected. The present paper is intended to provide some brief background to help interested readers assess the significance of the Soviets' forthcoming census reports as they become available.

For the first time in Soviet experience, the 1970 census marks an interval between population counts that has not been characterized by major losses of life as a result of either internal or external factors. Soviet history has witnessed one demographic catastrophe after another. Dating from the last year of peace in Tsarist Russia (and counting only territories that initially came under Soviet rule), the combined devastation of World War I, the Revolution, the civil war, foreign intervention, famine, and epidemics reduced the 1914 population of 142.4 million persons to 136.1

A new contributor to this journal, Mr. Feshbach has gathered part of the material for this article during a recent trip to the Soviet Union. A recognized authority on Soviet manpower and population questions, he is Chief of the USSR/East European Branch, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, US Bureau of the Census. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Census Bureau.

[1] Unless otherwise stated, all information on the Soviet census in this article is from three sources: report of P.G. Podiachikh, "On the Methodological and Organizational Questions of the 1970 All-Union Census of Population," *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie statistikov, 22-26 aprela 1968 g., stenograficheskii otchet* (All-Union Conference of Statisticians, April 22-26, 1968, Stenographic Report), published by the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR (TsSU), Moscow, Statistika, 1969, pp. 173-214 and 616-89; *Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia—vsenarodnoe delo* (All-Union Census of Population—A National Matter), a detailed summary of projected plans for the census released by TsSU, Moscow, Statistika, 1969; and P.G. Podiachikh, "The Program of Processing the Results of the 1970 All-Union Census of Population," *Vestnik Statistiki*, No. 2, 1970, pp. 23-33. For additional details on the census, see Frederick A. Leedy, "The 1970 Soviet Census of Population: Content, Organization, and Processing," American Statistical Association, *Proceedings of the Social Statistics Section: 1969*, Washington, DC, 1969, pp. 470-73.

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million by the beginning of 1923—a net loss of 6.3 million.[2] In the 1930's collectivization cost an estimated 5 million lives; the purges and labor camps cost untold millions more.[3] Then came World War II, in which Soviet male military losses alone have been calculated at 15 million (almost three million more than the entire strength of the US armed forces at their peak level of 12.1 million in 1945).[4] Summing up what these losses meant, had the 1917 population on what is now Soviet territory increased at the rate of 2 percent a year, which was then the normal rate for a rural country, there would have been 325 million Soviet citizens by 1950; instead there were 178.5 million—representing a real increase of only 15.5 million persons over the 33-year period, or a deficit of some 147 million lives.[5]

This history has had a demonstrable effect on the timing and utilization of past Soviet censuses, more than once creating a conflict between the regime's urge to conceal demographic trends and its need to collect and disseminate reliable data on which to base economic planning. The five previous censuses in Soviet history were conducted at irregular intervals, and for specific purposes. The first, in 1920, was aimed at taking a head-count in the wake of the enormous disruptions of the revolutionary years. The second, in 1926, was intended to supply vital information for the preparation of the first five-year plan (1928–32). The third, in 1937, was supposed to show the results of the first two five-year-plan periods and also to measure the impact of collectivization; however, Stalin repudiated this census and ordered that its findings be discarded, presumably because of what they implied about the millions of Soviet citizens who had been lost during the collectivization drive and who were still disappearing in the purges. The fourth census, in 1939, was designed to produce a more favorable accounting of the population, and at the same time to take stock as mobilization got underway on the eve of Soviet involvement in World War II. Twenty years went by before the next census; given Stalin's reaction in 1937, it seems fair to surmise that he had no wish to engage in a postwar tally that would have revealed the war's devastating effects to the Soviet population, not to mention his real or imagined enemies abroad. The fifth census was finally held in 1959, in time to be used as the basis for preparing the annual plans of the subsequent seven-year plan period (1959–65).

Originally scheduled for January 1969, the most recent census was timed to cover a convenient 10-year interval since the 1959 census and also to provide data of use in the preparation of the 1971–75 plan. In April 1967, however, the Soviet regime suddenly announced that the census would be postponed for one year, without offering any explanation for the delay.[6] Later, Soviet sources came up with at least two reasonable—and also face-saving—explanations for waiting until 1970: one was the fact that the United Nations had advocated a universal practice of holding decennial censuses at the start of each decade; the other was the fact that 1970 was to mark a milestone celebration in the Soviet Union of the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth, and therefore would make a fitting date for the census as part of the nation's stock-taking. While there was validity in both of these arguments, there was also a good deal of evidence to suggest that incomplete preparations, and in particular a lack of data processing equipment, were at least partly responsible for the delay. In any event, the postponement meant that Gosplan (Gosudarstvennyi planovyi komitet—the State Planning Committee) was denied the fully processed data from the census in time to apply them in overall planning decisions for 1971–75.

The census count eventually taken in the third week of January 1970 was intended to record the status of the population at the specific hour of midnight between January 14 and January 15.[7] Well in advance, it was announced that a vast army of census-takers would be needed in addition to the regular staff of the Central Statistical Administration (Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie—hereafter TsSU); about 670,000 personnel were to be recruited, including 540,000 enumerators, about 100,000 instructors, over 26,000 census "chiefs" and assistants at the district level, and finally about 4,000 assistants to the state's full-time statistical inspectors at the county (raion) level.[8] The

[2] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, Geneva, League of Nations, 1946, p. 30.

[3] Lorimer, *ibid.*, pp. 133-34; also see Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror*, London, Macmillan, 1968, p. 365 and pp. 525-35.

[4] Estimate of Soviet losses is from James W. Brackett, "Demographic Trends and Population Policy in the Soviet Union," *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power*, Washington DC, Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, 1962, p. 510. US armed forces figure is from US Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1968* (89th edition), Washington DC, 1968, p. 257.

[5] The 1917 and 1950 Soviet population figures are from TsSU, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1962 godu, statisticheskii yezhegodnik* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1962, A Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, Statistika, 1963, pp. 7-8.

[6] *Izvestia*, April 9, 1967, p. 2.

[7] In the case of regions in the Far North and other areas where access would have been difficult in the middle of winter, an advance enumeration of the population was made in the fall of 1969.

[8] TsSU, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie . . .*, p. 197.

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number of enumerators—that is, those responsible for the initial collection of data—was calculated to give each of them an average workload of 675 persons in urban areas and 575 persons in rural areas. The corps of temporary census workers included school teachers, instructors and students of higher and specialized secondary educational institutions, and employees of enterprises, institutions, collective farms and state farms. Employed persons received their regular salaries during the time they worked on the census (ranging from 17 days for enumerators to 3½ months for the assistants to the state statistical inspectors).[9] In addition all census workers were paid an "enumeration bonus," presumably prorated on the basis of the time and type of work they performed.

Under the procedures adopted for the 1970 census, the enumerators visited all dwelling units in the Soviet Union two times, and half of them a third time. During the three days January 11–14, each enumerator was required to make a preliminary visit to all households in his assigned district in order to (1) establish the address and location of each household, the name of its head, and the number of persons in it; (2) arrange an appointment during the week of the official census (January 15–22); and (3) leave census forms to be filled out if he concluded that members of the household were capable of answering the queries (however, this practice was to be the exception rather than the rule). On his second round of visits, the enumerator checked over, helped to complete, and collected forms for every household. Finally, in the week following the census, the enumerator and his immediate superior, or "instructor," revisited half the households in his district to doublecheck the accuracy of the information.

The basic census form delivered to all households contained eleven questions. In addition, every fourth household was automatically chosen to be sampled on a list containing seven supplementary questions.[10] Two special questionnaires were also distributed on a selective basis. The first was left to be completed in any case where the enumerator discovered a person in the so-called "able-bodied" age group (males 16–59 and females 16–54 years of age) who did not work in an enterprise, in a public institution, on a state farm or in the public sector of a collective farm, or who was not a full-time student—in other words, a person who worked solely in a household or (with respect to the rural population) a person who worked only in the private sector of agriculture. The other special questionnaire was distributed in 34 cities with estimated populations of 500,000 or more and in their surrounding raions; its purpose was to determine commuting patterns on the part of workers, employees, and students of higher and specialized secondary schools.

The potential significance of the data collected in the census can best be shown by reviewing what questions were asked and then discussing how the information is to be used.

The 11 basic questions of the census schedule completed for the entire population covered the following items:

1. Relationships of the individual to the head of the household.
2. In the case of permanent residents who are temporarily absent: (a) the reason for the absence; (b) the length of time absent.
3. In the case of temporary residents: (a) the place of permanent (usual) residence; (b) the length of time absent from the permanent residence.
4. Sex.
5. Age (as of last birthday).
6. Marital status at the present time.
7. Nationality.
8. Native language (and any other language spoken by Soviet peoples in which the person is fluent).
9. Level of education attained: higher; incomplete higher; specialized secondary; general secondary; incomplete secondary; primary; less than primary.
10. In the case of students, the type of educational institution in which the person is studying: higher educational institution; specialized secondary school; general secondary school; vocational-technical school; other school; course.
11. Source of livelihood or means of existence: work in an enterprise or other institution; work on a collective farm; work in one's own "economy" (*khoziaistvo*)—*i.e.*, as an individual peasant outside the collective or state-farm system, or as an independent artisan producing salable goods at home;[11] work for other individuals—*e.g.*, as a

[9] B. T. Kolpakov, *Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1970 goda* (All-Union Census of Population, 1970), Moscow, 1969, p. 47.

[10] This marks the first time sampling has been permitted in a Soviet census. Interestingly, much of the original theoretical work on sampling was performed by Russians, but it was applied in other countries long before the wide use of sampling was allowed in the USSR. For many years the Soviet authorities clung to a preference for direct statistical reporting by all economic units. Their reluctance to use sampling retarded the development of analytical procedures, since data collected by the method of total coverage had to be much simpler and less detailed than that possible in a sample.

[11] The 1959 census listed only 266,000 such persons, a minuscule portion of the Soviet population.

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maid or chauffeur; work in private subsidiary agriculture—*i.e.*, as a collective or state-farm family member solely engaged in production on the household's small private plot; pension; stipend; dependent status; other source.

The 25 percent sample of the population was asked to complete the following seven additional questions:

12. Place of work: name of enterprise, institution, or collective farm, or place where the respondent engages in his own "economy".
13. Occupation at this place of work (position or work performed); in the case of pensioners, previous basic occupation.
14. In the case of any person who worked only part of the year in 1969, specification as to (a) whether the job itself was permanent, seasonal or temporary; (b) the length of time he worked (in months).
15. Classification by socio-economic group: wage-earner (*rabochii*, or blue-collar worker); salaried employee (*sluzhashchii*, or white-colar worker); collective farmer; handicraftsman; wage-earner, also a member of a collective farm; salaried employee, also a member of a collective farm; individual peasant; minister or church official.
16. Length of time in years and months that the person has resided continuously in the locality (town, city, or other local geographic unit).
17. In the case of a person with less than two years' local residence, indication of former permanent residence (including by name the republic, oblast, raion, and city or city-type settlement or rural administrative unit).
18. Reason for changing place of residence: enrollment in school at a new location; graduation from school; "social mobilization"—*i.e.*, a voluntary change of job and residence undertaken with approval, as expressed by a party or Komsomol travel pass; organized recruitment; a work transfer made for the government's convenience; or personal motives, covering unplanned and unofficial moves.

The first six of these items are basic demographic questions designed to determine general population characteristics, yielding information (in combination with responses to other questions) on the number and size of families as categorized according to particular urban and rural areas, socio-economic groups, nationalities, etc. The data on age and sex will also provide the basis for preparing a nationwide population model (or "life table," to use the demographers' technical term) which can be used to project the future population and labor resources of the country as well as to determine the potential demand for a great variety of goods, services, and public facilities (such as child-care institutions and schools).

The responses to the next two questions on nationality and national language (7 and 8) are to be analyzed on the basis of a list of 122 nationalities in the USSR. The nationality data will be coordinated with the data on language, area of residence (at the raion level), age, marital status, level of education, source of livelihood, occupation and economic sector in which the respondent works, the socio-economic group to which he belongs, and finally the type and size of the family unit. With respect to the latter, a special study will be made of families of mixed nationality. Responses indicating a residence of less than two years will also be analyzed in terms of the respondent's place of origin.[12]

Perhaps the greatest significance of the nationality data extracted from the 1970 census will be what they reveal about the relative size of the Great Russian *vis-à-vis* other ethnic populations and about the birth-rate differentials in various areas of the Soviet Union. In this respect the most important problem confronting the Soviet regime is the fact that for some years now the largely Muslim population in Central Asia has been growing at a faster rate than the Great Russian population. According to 1968 figures, the crude birth rate—that is, the number of births per 1,000 population per year—was about two-and-one-half times greater in Central Asia than in the RSFSR (for example the rate was 37.3 per 1,000 of the population in the Tadzhik SSR as opposed to 14.2 in the RSFSR). Paralleling this trend, and largely as a result of it, the proportion of Great Russians in the total population of the USSR has been on the decline over the past decade. If these trends continue, it seems very probable that in the not too distant future the Great Russians will cease to constitute a majority of the population.[13]

So far the regime's response to this problem has been rooted in the hope that gradual urbanization and modernization in the Central Asian republics would produce the usual result of a decrease in the birth rate.

[12] TsSU, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie* . . . , pp. 638, 643, 649, 655, 657-58, 661, and 666.

[13] Western demographers have come to refer to this situation as the "50-percent problem." When the present writer talked with Soviet demographers in Moscow and Kiev in September 1969, they emphatically denied the existence of this problem, but they obviously did not want to pursue the subject. An early indication of Soviet concern may possibly be found in the fact that the first postwar demographic research unit established in the USSR was located not in Moscow but in the Central Asian city of Tashkent.

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But if an appreciable slowdown is not achieved soon, the regime will be confronted with some difficult policy decisions. If the central government were to adopt a program of strong expedients to encourage birth control in Central Asia, it would risk both domestic and international repercussions, since such a policy would fan resentment not only in the areas affected but in countries of the Third World with similar cultural and economic characteristics. Therefore such an approach will probably be avoided if at all possible. As an alternative, the Moscow center might bring strong pressures to bear upon the republic governments to adopt and enforce their own birth-control programs. On the other hand, an argument could be made against the long-range wisdom of discouraging population growth in Soviet Central Asia on the ground that it shares a long common border with China and its peoples are already greatly outnumbered by their Chinese neighbors. Since there is nothing Moscow can do that will significantly alter the overall Soviet-Chinese population ratio (which can currently be estimated at 241 to 833 million), this argument may not carry too much weight. The regime could, however, step up its efforts to populate the area through internal migration. In any event, all of these considerations underscore the importance of the nationality data collected in the census, since the trends they reveal may be crucial in shaping policy decisions.

(NOTE: As this article went to press, the first results of the Soviet census were released, offering a preliminary view of the impact of differential birth rates and migration on the populations of the various republics. In a figure close to the advance estimate above, the total national population increased by 16 percent, from 208,827,000 in 1959 to 241,748,000 in 1970. However, the population of the RSFSR grew by only 11 percent, as compared to four times that figure in the Central Asian republics: 45 percent in Uzbekistan; 40 percent in Kazakhstan; 42 percent in Kirgizia; 46 percent in Tadzhikistan; and 42 percent in Turkmenistan. Specific nationality figures revealing the actual proportion of Great Russians to other ethnic populations are not expected before the end of the year, as explained later in this article. The first census results were published in Izvestia, *April 19, 1970.*—M.F.).

Questions 9 and 10 will yield important data on the pattern and level of education in the Soviet Union. In particular, they will provide information measuring the progress made toward achieving the Soviets' proclaimed goal of a 10-year schooling for all citizens. As a measure of the great strides already made in the educational sphere, it is interesting that the 1970 census discarded a question posed in 1959 directly relating to the literacy of the population. The literacy rates tabulated and subsequently posted on the basis of this question were somewhat "loaded" in that they pertained only to the portion of the population which was 9 to 49 years old, and they obviously would have been lower if the over-50 age-group had been included. Nonetheless, these rates registered enormous progress toward the eradication of illiteracy and—given the fact that many of the "senior" citizens of 1959 would now be dead in any event—the omission of this question in the 1970 census seems quite reasonable.

Item 11, the last in the basic census schedule, is the first question dealing directly with economic and occupational characteristics of the population. It is mainly designed as the basis for a preliminary statistical allocation of the population into economically active and inactive groups. Later, many more details on Soviet economic life will be garnered from the responses to Questions 12 through 15, as well as from the special questionnaire related to people employed in households and in private subsidiary agriculture.

Turning to the questions in the sample, Items 12 and 13 will provide data for an analysis of how the labor force is distributed among the different branches of the national economy and—within these branches—among different kinds of production units or institutions (over 70 separate categories have been designated). The make-up of the labor force will also be categorized in terms of 49 major occupational groups and some 325 specific occupations (including 120 types of employment that exist across the board in all the branches of the national economy). The information solicited in Question 13 on the former occupation of pensioners will probably be used in conjunction with age data to help determine potential labor reserves.

The 14th question is new and important. In the first place, it will reveal details about levels of employment in seasonal industry. It will also provide the information necessary to explain the discrepancy between the census count of the *total* number of persons in the labor force (including full-time and temporary jobholders) and the TsSU's annual compilation of the *average* number of persons employed (a figure which adjusts downward to account for temporary jobholders and seasonality in employment levels over the course of the year).[14] Finally, these data are the first statistics available in many years which could be used to examine unemployment in the Soviet Union, if the authorities so choose. Since 1930, when the Stalin re-

[14] On the latter, see this writer's study, *The Soviet Statistical System: Labor Force Recordkeeping and Reporting since 1957*, US Bureau of the Census, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 17, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1962, *passim*.

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gime suddenly decreed an end to the system of registering unemployment, the official attitude has been that none existed. Thus, despite obvious signs of the presence of frictional, structural and technological unemployment,[15] studies of the phenomenon have been taboo. For the first time, however, the data from Question 14 of the census could be used to determine unemployment, on the reasonable assumption that those persons with temporary or seasonal jobs were looking for work during the remainder of the year. It would be very interesting to know whether any such study is contemplated (none has been announced).

Question 15 will supply the TsSU with data on the distribution of the population according to socio-economic category, again to be correlated with data on distribution according to branch of the economy, occupation, level of education, geographical location, and so forth.

With respect to persons employed solely in the private sector of agriculture (90 percent of whom were women at the time of the 1959 census), the data obtained from Question 15 will be supplemented by the information provided in the special questionnaire mentioned above. Thus it will be possible to analyze this population group in terms of age, education, source of livelihood, former occupation, number of years since the last job held, number and age of children under 16 years of age, and conditions under which work in the socialized economy would become feasible—again with the aim of exploring potential labor reserves. All save one of these tabulations are being undertaken for the first time.[16]

Also new are the projected studies on migration to be based on the answers to Questions 16 through 18. These questions are important as a means of determining sources of labor supply in the USSR and their relative permanence (that is, the degree of labor turnover). Question 16 will permit the determination of the total number, proportion by nationality (in combination with Question 7), and year of arrival of persons migrating to a given area. The size of migration flows between different republics, oblasts, economic regions, cities and rural areas will be calculated on the basis of Item 17. Finally, the reasons for migration—as given in Question 18—will be analyzed, probably in the main for the light they can shed on labor incentives. These migration data are crucial to the regime as it contemplates the economic problem of promoting development in the labor-deficit areas beyond the Urals and the strategic necessity of expanding settlement along the Sino-Soviet border.

A word is in order about certain shortcomings in the census. In the first place, the 11-year interval since the last census may create methodological problems in the Soviet Union, as well as in other countries, with respect to the use and interpretation of published data. While the TsSU has a good deal of what statisticians call "single-year-of-age" data which it has not released, much of the 1959 census material available to the public was tabulated on the basis of 5-year age-group intervals (15–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, etc.). Whatever the format and detail of the materials published from the 1970 census, the extra—or 11th—year between censuses is bound to complicate the study of comparative results, since the opportunity has been lost for a simple comparison of the 5-year age groups of 1959 with exactly the same groups 10 years later.

In addition, a number of important questions are ignored in the Soviet census. For example, nowhere in any of the questionnaires was an inquiry made into the income or earnings of Soviet citizens or into the critical question of Soviet housing conditions and facilities. Nor was any effort made to collect fertility data for use in population projections. Omissions like these mark the Soviet census as a relatively limited instrument of inquiry as compared—for instance—to the United States' census of 1970. Perhaps, however, it is best not to pursue the comparison, since there are many differences in the way censuses are conducted and their results used in the two countries. (Note that the published results of the Soviet Union's 1959 census filled only 2,830 pages in all, while those of the United States' 1960 census totalled 138,000 pages. According to one report, the TsSU prepared hundreds of additional collections of data for use by particular internal institutions, but not for release to the public.[17])

Whatever its shortcomings, the 1970 census repre-

[15] For some examples, see the writer's article, "Manpower in the USSR: A Survey of Recent Trends and Prospects," *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Part III, Washington DC, Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, 1966, p. 767.

[16] TsSU, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie . . .*, pp. 673-78.

[17] See report entitled "Organization of the Processing of the 1959 Population Census Data and Proposed Procedures for the Processing of 1970 Census Data in the USSR," delivered to the Statistical Commission and Economic Commission for Europe, Conference of European Statisticians, Geneva, March 1968, Document WG 6/134—WG9/73, March 21, 1968, p. 2. While in Moscow, the present writer queried the head of the census-taking administration of TsSU (by name Piotr Gavrilovich Podiachikh) about the possibility of obtaining a full set of the 1959 census volumes. He made it clear that they were not available, stating that there would have been insufficient demand to cover the costs of printing all census data for public consumption.

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sents the first really thoroughgoing effort to collect Soviet population data since 1926, and it ought to produce some fascinating results. It is more sophisticated than past Soviet censuses in that sampling has been used for the first time and a wide range of new materials has been projected for tabulation. The discussion above has already indicated some of these areas of investigation and why they are useful; for the benefit of readers who may be interested in particular aspects or implications of the census, the following list summarizes the new tables that have been promised:[18]

- population by nationality, cross-referenced with data on source of livelihood;
- characteristics of the family, as determined by number of children, total number in the family, social group, nationality, level of education of the parents, and other factors;
- number of persons in the able-bodied ages engaged in household or private agricultural activities, tabulated in combinations of level of education and age, source of livelihood and age, former occupation and number of years since employed, former occupation and age, and conditions under which work in the socialized economy would become feasible;
- number of pensioners and their former occupation;
- number of persons who worked an incomplete year in 1969;
- length of residence in a given place, by age and social group;
- number of persons residing in a given place less than two years, by sex, former place of residence (republic and oblast), nationality and age;
- reasons for changing place of residence;
- reasons for absence from permanent place of residence;
- commuting time between home and place of work or study for urban workers, employees and students.

[18] For model tables see TsSU, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie* . . . , pp. 637, 643, 650, 652-54, 659-65, 668-76, and 679-80.

Needless to say, an enormous amount of work is involved in preparing the whole range of standard census data as well as making all of these new tabulations. The TsSU's plans for processing the census data call for several stages of completion, reflecting a logical order of priority.[19] As noted in an earlier addendum to this article, preliminary figures have just been announced, giving the population count for the USSR as a whole and for the various republics, oblasts, krais, and a number of cities. By July 30 data from the special questionnaire on persons working in households and private agriculture are supposed to be prepared. By the end of the year (December 30, 1970), population statistics are to be correlated with data on age, sex, nationality, native language, educational attainment and enrollment, family composition, and finally, source of livelihood. The rest of the tabulation program is to be carried out with respect to all 8,889 administrative units of the USSR (down to and including the raion level) during 1971 and 1972.[20] The publication of final results in 16 volumes is supposed to be completed in the first half of 1973.

As pointed out at the start of this article, while census-taking is a serious business in all countries, it is of special significance in a country such as the Soviet Union which relies on a system of economic planning. For the Soviet authorities, the 1970 census will establish basic parameters with respect to population characteristics and labor resources that can help them in shaping future plans. For outside observers, the census results will be a source of important knowledge about the social and economic conditions prevailing in the Soviet Union.

[19] Kolpakov, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

[20] The total number of units breaks down as follows: USSR as a whole, 1; union republics, 15; autonomous republics, 20; autonomous oblasts, 8; national okrugs, 10; krais and oblasts, 113; raions, 2959: city raions, 415; cities and city-type settlements, 5348. See TsSU, *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie* . . . , p. 629.

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